Court Rulings

Appellant mother challenges the district court's order denying her motion for a new trial following the termination of her parental rights. Appellant argues the district court abused its discretion when it denied the motion because she demonstrated that (1) she received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, which violated her right to a fair trial; (2) she was denied her constitutional right to due process; (3) fraud on the court occurred through false testimony and fabricated reports at trial; and (4) the district court lacked jurisdiction to enter the order terminating her parental rights due to improper venue. Because appellant has not met her burden to demonstrate the district court abused its discretion when it denied her motion for a new trial, we affirm.

Plaintiff brought claims against Knox County and the County Clerk based on allegedly discriminatory employment practices. The trial court determined that Plaintiff committed serious discovery violations and imposed as a sanction the exclusion of certain evidence. With this evidence excluded, the trial court granted summary judgment to the Defendants. Plaintiff appeals, challenging the discovery sanction, the trial court's conclusion under the Tennessee Human Rights Act that the continuing violation doctrine did not apply, the trial court's conclusion that the Clerk was not individually liable, and the award of attorney's fees against the Plaintiff and her attorney. We affirm.

Petition for writ of mandamus is denied. Magistrate did not err in his determination that OneSource failed to demonstrate a clear legal right to the requested relief or that the commission was under a clear legal duty to provide it.

A respondent's valid marriage to a United States citizen entered into after a removal order does not constitute an exceptional situation warranting sua sponte reopening of removal proceedings.

Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err when granting appellee's motion to dismiss appellant's complaint under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Appellant purported to assert a civil rights violation arising from allegations of threatening behavior by appellee's employee in a convenience store, but such a claim is not cognizable against a non-state actor for private conduct. Even if appellant's allegations are construed as a claim for an intentional tort such as battery, appellee could not be held vicariously liable for acts of an employee that fall outside the scope of employment.

The defendant property owners appealed from the trial court's judgment determining that they had breached the terms of a restrictive covenant that runs with their property by constructing a six car commercial garage and operating a commercial roofing business therefrom without having received prior approval from the plaintiff, the owner and developer of the subdivision where the defendants' property was located. The defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly determined that the three year statute of limitations (§ 52-575a) did not bar the plaintiff's action. Held: The trial court properly determined that the plaintiff's action was not barred by § 52-575a, as the three year limitation period of § 52-575a was suspended by Governor Ned Lamont's Executive Order No. 7G, seven and one-half months after the plaintiff was notified of the defendants' construction of the garage, and the plaintiff subsequently commenced the present action less than eighteen months after the suspension of § 52-575a was lifted by Executive Order No. 10A. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' request to amend their special defenses to include laches, which was based on their assertion that the plaintiff had more knowledge than the ordinary person concerning the town's municipal building department operations and infor- mation, as the plaintiff's trial testimony did not reasonably reflect that he had or should have had the special knowledge asserted by the defendants, and the existence or nonexistence of that knowledge on the part of the plaintiff was not relevant. This court declined to review the defendants' claim that the trial court improperly determined that the restrictive covenant was enforceable, as this claim was raised by the defendants for the first time on appeal. The trial court's determination that the defendants had violated the restric- tive covenant by failing to obtain the plaintiff's approval for the construction of the six car ga

This opinion addresses Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 33's definition of "responsible third party" and the meaning of "the harm for which recovery of damages is sought," as used therein. This Opinion addresses the enforcement of a mandatory Buy-Sell Option clause and its specific performance remedy after the Offeror tendered the requisite buy/sell notice and the Offeree failed to respond to the notice and claimed the Offeror violated the underlying Company Agreement. The Court ultimately finds the Offeror is entitled to specific performance from the Offeree under the Buy-Sell Option clause. The Court awards the Offeror attorneys' fees. Ruling after court-ordered Rule 166(g) briefing. Ruling that Plaintiffs take nothing by their claims for declaratory relief and, with respect to one defendant, that Plaintiffs take nothing by their claims for accounting and inspection of books and records, breach of contract or an alleged partnership agreement, or for fraud and unjust enrichment. Ruling that Defendants take nothing by their claims for declaratory relief. Ruling that Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud relating to one plaintiff and alternative claim for quantum meruit, and Defendants' claim for conversion, remain pending and will proceed to jury trial as set. Granting traditional and non-evidence summary judgment against Plaintiff's defamation claim because the complained-of statements are not objectively verifiable and therefore, as a matter of law, are not defamatory. Denying reconsideration of an order remanding the case back to district court on the grounds that the removal to business court was untimely. Denying permission to take a permissive interlocutory appeal of that order. This opinion addresses (i) whether the Property (Trust) Code bars a trustee from enforcing a punitive damages waiver; (ii) if not, whether the waiver in one bond financing contract applies to claims based on a related contract in the same

This opinion addresses Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 33's definition of "responsible third party" and the meaning of "the harm for which recovery of damages is sought," as used therein. This Opinion addresses the enforcement of a mandatory Buy-Sell Option clause and its specific performance remedy after the Offeror tendered the requisite buy/sell notice and the Offeree failed to respond to the notice and claimed the Offeror violated the underlying Company Agreement. The Court ultimately finds the Offeror is entitled to specific performance from the Offeree under the Buy-Sell Option clause. The Court awards the Offeror attorneys' fees. Ruling after court-ordered Rule 166(g) briefing. Ruling that Plaintiffs take nothing by their claims for declaratory relief and, with respect to one defendant, that Plaintiffs take nothing by their claims for accounting and inspection of books and records, breach of contract or an alleged partnership agreement, or for fraud and unjust enrichment. Ruling that Defendants take nothing by their claims for declaratory relief. Ruling that Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud relating to one plaintiff and alternative claim for quantum meruit, and Defendants' claim for conversion, remain pending and will proceed to jury trial as set. Granting traditional and non-evidence summary judgment against Plaintiff's defamation claim because the complained-of statements are not objectively verifiable and therefore, as a matter of law, are not defamatory. Denying reconsideration of an order remanding the case back to district court on the grounds that the removal to business court was untimely. Denying permission to take a permissive interlocutory appeal of that order. This opinion addresses (i) whether the Property (Trust) Code bars a trustee from enforcing a punitive damages waiver; (ii) if not, whether the waiver in one bond financing contract applies to claims based on a related contract in the same

Summary judgment

This appeal arises from Mother's petition to modify the parties' parenting plan and request that Father be held in contempt for failure to pay child support. After a hearing, the trial court entered an order generally finding that the parties simply had two different parenting styles and denying Mother's request to modify the parenting plan. The trial court also found that the contempt matter had been addressed, but the trial court's order lacked any findings of fact or conclusions of law concerning the alleged contempt. After review, we reverse the trial court's determination that Mother had not proven a material change in circumstances to permit modification of the parenting plan. To that end, the matter is remanded for the trial court to conduct an analysis of whether a change in the parties' parenting plan is in the children's best interest pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-6-106(a). Further, we vacate the trial court's order as it relates to the civil contempt action against Father. That matter is remanded as well for additional findings and conclusions related to Father's civil contempt.

Trial court did not violate mother's First Amendment rights by terminating shared parenting where decision rested on mother's failure to communicate and cooperate with father about unilateral changes affecting child, not on content of mother's religious beliefs. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in imputing annual income to mother for child support where mother voluntarily quit employment to pursue self-sufficient lifestyle with new husband and made no job search efforts. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in relying on guardian ad litem's report where GAL failed to physically visit mother's home because Superintendence Rule 48 creates only administrative directives, not enforceable procedural rights.

In this complex suit over a breach of a contract to sell real estate, the trial court dismissed one of the plaintiffs in an order certified as final under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.02, but it reinstated that plaintiff two years later. The court awarded the plaintiff-buyers specific performance, one of the limited available remedies under the contract. However, because the seller had meanwhile taken actions that may have made this relief impossible, the trial court also noted it would consider civil contempt in the event the seller would not perform, and would award approximately $12.2 million in damages, which was the measure of harm for the dismissed plaintiff party. The seller appeals. We conclude that the trial court erred in reinstating the party and that the proper method to challenge an improvidently granted 54.02 final judgment is appeal or an appropriate post-judgment motion. We also conclude that, although the party was erroneously reinstated, the seller is not entitled to a new trial on the issue of liability. Additionally, the trial court did not err in its determination that the seller committed the first material breach and did not err in awarding specific performance. This court cannot review a future and speculative contempt judgment, and we vacate the portion of the judgment delineating any future contempt award. We remand for consideration of whether the buyer is entitled to attorney's fees on appeal under the contract.

Summary judgment granted to employer on workers' compensation claim; "qualifying chemical test"

R.C. 2711.03; enforcement of arbitration provision; oral hearing unequivocally and specifically requested is mandatory; abuse of discretion. Appellants appealed the trial court's denial of their motion to stay and enforce an arbitration agreement before conducting an oral hearing as requested in their motion. We find that while an oral hearing is not always required to satisfy the "hearing" mandate of R.C. 2711.03, an oral hearing is required and shall be granted when unequivocally and specifically requested by a party pursuant to R.C. 2711.03. As such the trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion to stay and enforce arbitration before conducting an oral hearing. The matter is reversed and remanded to the trial court to conduct an oral hearing to determine whether the validity of the arbitration agreement is at issue.

Abuse of discretion, de novo review, competent credible evidence, R.C. 3127.16, continuing jurisdiction, exclusive jurisdiction, subject-matter jurisdiction, intent to relocate, R.C. 3109.05(G)(1), change of circumstances, best interest, R.C. 3109.04(F)(1), alienation, terminating spousal support, child support, imputed income, R.C. 3119.01, R.C. 3119.02, attorney fees, R.C. 3105.73(B). Judgment affirmed. We find that the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over the parties even though none of the parties resided in Ohio because once Ohio courts obtained jurisdiction over a child-custody determination, it retains continuing jurisdiction, even when the parties no longer reside in Ohio, so long as no other court has asserted jurisdiction. Further, a notice of relocation does not strip the trial court of jurisdiction to modify parental rights and responsibilities when a motion is pending before the court. There was competent, credible evidence of a change of circumstances and that it was in the best interest of the children to modify custody. In addition, spousal support was properly terminated. Moreover, ordering appellant to pay child support was not an abuse of discretion, and imputing income to appellant was proper when she was voluntarily unemployed. Finally, the trial court is not required to consider appellant's income when awarding attorney fees.

Contempt; final appealable order; untimely; purge; first time on appeal. Appellants appealed from the trial court's order finding that two nonparty witnesses remained in contempt of court, stemming from a previously issued contempt order. Neither of appellants' arguments are properly before the court. The trial court's initial contempt order finding the nonparty witnesses in contempt was a final appealable order from which appellants could have appealed but chose not to do so. As such, appellants were precluded from challenging the court's finding of contempt in this later appeal. Also, appellants never moved the trial court to purge the contempt order and the trial court never made any determination whether nonparty witnesses had complied with the purge conditions set forth in the initial contempt order. As such, we will not determine, for the first time on appeal, whether the purge conditions had been met. The court further held that one of the appellants that had not been found in contempt was precluded from intervening in a matter between the contemnor and the court. The court therefore dismissed the appeal that had been filed by the appellant that was not subject to the trial court's contempt order.