Court Rulings

1. Did the superior court err in concluding that Arizona's real estate broker licensing statutes required plaintiffs' employees to be licensed under A.R.S. § 32 2101 for their activities? 2. Did the superior court err in determining that the contracts formed through plaintiffs' unlicensed brokerage activities were illegal and void, thereby precluding plaintiffs' tortious interference claims?

Summary judgment, N.C. Const. art. I, Section 19, disparate impact, N.C. Const. art. I, Section 18

Denying a motion to remand the case back to district court because the alleged agreement in the case plainly meets the definition of a qualified transaction, provided that under its terms the plaintiff may be "entitled to receive" consideration that meets the $5 million threshold, and the defendants' pleadings and the evidence before the Court plainly establishes the possibility—plausibility, even—that the plaintiffs' damages claim could satisfy the Business Court's jurisdictional minimum for a qualified transaction under §25A.004(d)(1). Granting a motion to confirm an arbitration award and denying a motion to vacate the same award, the Court holds: the parties' contract and applicable law gave the arbitration panel authority to decide both substantive and procedural arbitrability questions. Judgment is entered confirming the award. Denying the defendant's special appearance because the Court has specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Applying the court's jurisdictional balance-shifting framework, the court holds that the defendant's removal notice, which pleaded more than five million dollars in controversy, satisfied the statutory jurisdictional threshold where plaintiff offered no rebutting evidence. The plaintiff's allegations that the former president's new company aided and abetted his breach of fiduciary duties satisfied the jurisdictional clause in Tex. Gov't Code Section 25A.004(b)(5). The petition's repeated allegations regarding misappropriation of sensitive business information invoked Section 25A.004(d)(4)'s jurisdictional clause, requiring that the suit relate to intellectual-property ownership or use, despite no standalone trade-secret misappropriation claim. This opinion addresses Civil Practice & Remedies Code Chapter 33's definition of "responsible third party" and the meaning of "the harm for which recovery of damages is sought," as used therein. This Opinion addresses the enforcement of a mandatory Buy-Sell Option clause and its specific perfo

In this divorce matter, the trial court classified and valued the parties' assets, subsequently fashioning a distribution of the marital assets and liabilities that the court deemed equitable. The husband has appealed. We reverse the trial court's determination regarding the classification and valuation of two assets and remand those issues to the trial court for further determination. Accordingly, because of these unresolved classification and valuation issues, we vacate the trial court's overall distribution of marital property and remand that issue for further determination as well.

In this appeal after remand, appellant-mother C.J.W. (mother) challenges the district court's decision to deny her private petition to terminate respondent-father L.S.G.'s (father) parental rights to their joint child. Specifically, mother argues the district court abused its discretion when it determined that termination was not in the child's best interests. Because the district courts best-interests determination addressed the appropriate criteria and has support in the record, we affirm.

Relator Noelle Erling challenges an unemployment-law judge's (ULJ) determination that her filing of a false compliance form constituted employment misconduct, rendering her ineligible for unemployment benefits. She argues that (1) the ULJ's findings are not supported by substantial evidence; (2) even accepting the findings, her conduct did not rise to the level of employment misconduct; and (3) the ULJ erred by denying relief on her request for reconsideration. We affirm.

In this certiorari appeal, relator challenges an order by an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) affirming the ULJ's earlier decision that relator quit her employment, that she was therefore ineligible for unemployment benefits, and that no ineligibility exceptions apply. Because we conclude that substantial evidence supports the ULJ's order, including its credibility determinations, we affirm.

This is an appeal from an interpleader action filed by a trustee of a trust who held funds that were to be distributed to a beneficiary but were subject to claims by other parties. The trial court granted the trustee permission to deposit the funds, discharged him from liability, and ordered some of the funds to be disbursed in accordance with settlement agreements the beneficiary had entered into in other litigation involving his children. The trial court proceeded to consider the claims of various other parties to determine who was entitled to the remainder of the interpleaded funds. Law firms who had represented the beneficiary in separate litigation filed an answer and claimed that they had an attorney charging lien against the trust distributions. After an evidentiary hearing, the trial court determined that the law firms presented no proof of an attorney lien against the trust distributions. As such, the trial court ordered the remaining funds to be distributed to other parties. After an additional hearing on motions to revise, the trial court again found that no attorney lien existed. The law firms appealed. For the following reasons, the decision of the trial court is hereby affirmed and remanded.

Mandamus—Public-records requests—Relator failed to show that the only named respondent, a mail-room employee, had a clear legal duty to provide requested public records—Court of appeals improperly dismissed complaint after granting summary judgment to respondent—Court of appeals' judgment modified, and writ and request for statutory damages denied.

Arbitration; arbitrability; motion to compel arbitration; motion to stay; Ohio Arbitration Act; Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"); interstate commerce; Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 ("EFAA"); Franken Amendment; sexual harassment; hostile environment; employment discrimination; sexual-harassment dispute; standard of review; notice pleading; 9 U.S.C. 3; 9 U.S.C. 4; 9 U.S.C. 401; 9 U.S.C. 402; 48 C.F.R. 222.7402; R.C. 2711.02; R.C. 2711.03; R.C. 4112.01; R.C. 4112.02; Civ.R. 8; Civ.R. 12(B)(6); App.R. 3(C)(2); App.R. 12(A)(1)(c). Judgment affirmed and remanded. The trial court correctly denied defendants-appellants' motion to stay and compel arbitration. The EFAA barred arbitration of plaintiff-appellee's entire case against his former law firm and the managing attorney of the firm's Cleveland, Ohio office. Reviewing the complaint de novo under Ohio's notice-pleading standard, plaintiff-appellee alleged facts occurring after the effective date of the EFAA that, if true, would support a claim of sexual harassment under Ohio law. In addition to some post-EFAA remarks being sexual in nature, hostile environment sexual harassment under Ohio law does not require comments and behavior to be explicitly sexual in nature and can occur when abuse is directed at an employee because of that employee's sex. The trial court also correctly concluded that if the EFAA renders an arbitration agreement unenforceable, the bar to arbitration applies to the entire case, not merely claims of sexual assault or sexual harassment. Plaintiff-appellee's argument in the alternative, that defendants-appellants had waived their right to seek an order compelling arbitration by coupling their motion to compel with a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss, was moot.

Appellant challenges a judgment of the circuit court sustaining a plea of sovereign immunity filed by a separately incorporated subsidiary of the Chesapeake Hospital Authority (the "Authority") in response to claims for breach of contract and tortious interference with appellant's employment agreement with one of its physicians. For the reasons explained in this opinion, it is concluded on the present appeal that the circuit court erred in sustaining the plea of sovereign immunity and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.