Court Rulings

The trial court abused its discretion in this divorce case by not including in its decision any indication that it considered the factors enumerated in R.C. 3105.171(F) in relation to determining whether its division of the marital estate was equitable. Otherwise, the trial court did not err. It did not apply inconsistent valuation dates to the parties' assets, but valued those assets as of the de facto termination date based on the only evidence available to it. It did not err by failing to consider tax effects when valuing wife's deferred compensation account, when it did not order wife to withdraw funds from the account and there was no evidence upon which to calculate the tax effects. The trial court's finding that husband did not engage in financial misconduct was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by designating husband the residential parent of the parties' child for school-placement purposes; it considered the factors in R.C. 3109.04(F)(1) and (F)(2) in conjunction with all the evidence presented at trial, made specific findings of fact, and weighed the evidence in making its determination. The trial court did not err in holding wife in contempt when she acknowledged at trial that her move out of state with the parties' child violated the temporary restraining order. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allocating two vehicles, one of which was not purchased until after the de facto termination date and one of which was separate premarital property with respect to which there no basis for determining that any portion constituted marital property. Husband's motion for attorney fees pursuant to R.C. 3105.73(B) is denied, because R.C. 3105.73(B) does not apply to direct appeals from a divorce decree, and wife's motion to strike portions of husband's appellate brief is denied.

Pursuant to the rules of practice (§ 2-47 (d) (1)), if a respondent attorney has been disciplined at least three times in a five year period preceding the date of the filing of a grievance complaint that gives rise to a finding of current misconduct, the Statewide Grievance Committee or a reviewing committee ''shall direct the disciplinary counsel to file a presentment against the respondent in the Superior Court,'' and ''[t]he sole issue to be determined by the court upon the presentment shall be the appropriate action to take'' as a result of the nature of the respondent's current misconduct ''and the cumulative discipline issued concerning the respondent within such five year period.'' Pursuant further to the rules of practice (§ 2-47 (d) (2)), ''[i]f the respondent has appealed the issuance of a finding of misconduct made by the Statewide Grievance Committee or the reviewing committee, the court shall first adjudi- cate and decide that appeal in accordance with the procedures set forth in subsections (d) through (f) of [§] 2-38 [of the Practice Book].'' The respondent attorney appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's judg- ment suspending him from the practice of law for ninety days. A 2018 grievance complaint alleging certain professional misconduct by the respon- dent was referred to a reviewing committee of the Statewide Grievance Committee, but hearings on the matter were postponed for nearly three years. The respondent ultimately moved to dismiss the complaint, claiming that he had been denied his right to due process and prejudiced by the delay in its adjudication. Following a hearing in 2021, the reviewing commit- tee denied the respondent's motion to dismiss and found that he had engaged in certain misconduct. The reviewing committee ultimately concluded that the respondent's misconduct warranted a reprimand but that it was required by Practice Book § 2-47 (d) (1) to direct

Under the corpus delicti statute, Minnesota Statutes section 634.03 (2024), when a district court correctly denies a defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal based on its determination that the trial evidence is sufficient to be presented to the jury because evidence independent of the defendant's confession reasonably tends to prove that the defendant committed the charged offense, the court acts within its discretion by declining to instruct the jury that a confession of the defendant shall not be sufficient to warrant conviction without evidence that the offense charged has been committed. Affirmed.

This opinion addresses whether a leaseholder is a third-party beneficiary to a reciprocal waiver agreement between two operators, and whether the Court's jurisdiction and authority over the entire lawsuit is affected by the Court's disposition of the leaseholder's third-party-beneficiary claim. The Court concludes (1) the leaseholder is not a third-party beneficiary to the reciprocal waiver agreement, and (2) the Court retains jurisdiction and authority over the entire lawsuit after the leaseholder's claims are dismissed. Ruling that recent resolutions with some defendants do not affect the Court's jurisdiction over remaining claims and declining to rule at this stage whether the remaining defendant owes fiduciary duties to certain plaintiffs. Denying the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 91a. The Court first finds that the case falls within the Court's jurisdictional scope and that the plaintiff's non-suit was not filed in time to prevent the court's ruling on the Rule 91a motion. It next finds that the plaintiff's application to wind up a partnership under section 11.314 of the Business Organizations Code provided sufficient factual allegations to support her claims at this early stage of the case. The Court declined to award fees. This opinion addresses the ability of the Court to adjudicate legal malpractice and fractured malpractice-based claims arising out of an alleged attorney-client relationship involving an attorney, two business associates, and multiple business entities. The Court declines to consider whether an attorney-client relationship existed between the attorney and business entities but does address whether it has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear claims emanating from the alleged relationship. The Court concludes the legal malpractice and fractured malpractice-based claims are improperly before it and, accordingly, dismisses all claims against the attorney-Defendant without prejudice. Granting Plaintiff's motion to remand for untimeline

This opinion addresses competing motions for summary judgment regarding liability for Defendant's alleged breach of a reciprocal waiver agreement. More specifically, the Court considers whether there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the definiteness of the agreement's essential terms and the parties' mutual assent to those terms. The Court concludes no such fact issues exist to preclude summary judgment for Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion and denies Defendant's motion. This opinion addresses whether a leaseholder is a third-party beneficiary to a reciprocal waiver agreement between two operators, and whether the Court's jurisdiction and authority over the entire lawsuit is affected by the Court's disposition of the leaseholder's third-party-beneficiary claim. The Court concludes (1) the leaseholder is not a third-party beneficiary to the reciprocal waiver agreement, and (2) the Court retains jurisdiction and authority over the entire lawsuit after the leaseholder's claims are dismissed. Ruling that recent resolutions with some defendants do not affect the Court's jurisdiction over remaining claims and declining to rule at this stage whether the remaining defendant owes fiduciary duties to certain plaintiffs. Denying the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 91a. The Court first finds that the case falls within the Court's jurisdictional scope and that the plaintiff's non-suit was not filed in time to prevent the court's ruling on the Rule 91a motion. It next finds that the plaintiff's application to wind up a partnership under section 11.314 of the Business Organizations Code provided sufficient factual allegations to support her claims at this early stage of the case. The Court declined to award fees. This opinion addresses the ability of the Court to adjudicate legal malpractice and fractured malpractice-based claims arising out of an alleged attorney-client relationship involving an attorney, two business associates, a

Granting Defendant's motion to strike untimely filed summary-judgment evidence. Granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. One plaintiff is not entitled to damages as a matter of law, is not entitled to lost revenue or production as a matter of law, has produced evidence of redesign costs and additional expenses incurred as a result of Defendant's breach, and the record contains evidence of that plaintiff's expectancy damages. While Plaintiffs do not allege a specific theory/category of reliance damages in their petition, the Court nonetheless addresses Defendant's argument and holds that the plaintiff has not produced evidence of reliance damages. This opinion addresses competing motions for summary judgment regarding liability for Defendant's alleged breach of a reciprocal waiver agreement. More specifically, the Court considers whether there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the definiteness of the agreement's essential terms and the parties' mutual assent to those terms. The Court concludes no such fact issues exist to preclude summary judgment for Plaintiff. Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion and denies Defendant's motion. This opinion addresses whether a leaseholder is a third-party beneficiary to a reciprocal waiver agreement between two operators, and whether the Court's jurisdiction and authority over the entire lawsuit is affected by the Court's disposition of the leaseholder's third-party-beneficiary claim. The Court concludes (1) the leaseholder is not a third-party beneficiary to the reciprocal waiver agreement, and (2) the Court retains jurisdiction and authority over the entire lawsuit after the leaseholder's claims are dismissed. Ruling that recent resolutions with some defendants do not affect the Court's jurisdiction over remaining claims and declining to rule at this stage whether the remaining defendant owes fiduciary duties to certain plaintiffs. Denying th

APPELLATE REVIEW - Trial court judgment can only be immediately reviewed by an appellate court if it constitutes a final order; R.C. 2505.02(B); deferring damages for a later determination is not a final order.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS - Teacher contract termination; R.C. 3319.16; abuse of discretion; statutory referee; credibility; deference; explanation for rejecting referee's findings; trial court applied correct legal standard; teacher contract nonrenewal; R.C. 3319.11; correction of procedural errors; evaluation procedures; R.C. 3319.111; formal observations; leave exception; unpaid suspension; common meaning of "leave"; permitted or authorized absence from work.

CIVIL LAW - interlocutory order; statutorily appealable; denial of immunity; summary judgment; mayor; political subdivision; R.C. Chapter 2744; school resource officer; disbanded police department; additional funds; city manager; belief that sheriff's officer would staff; superintendent; citizen feedback; contentious public issue; reckless, wanton, malice, or bad faith; email stated city manager would pull school resource officer; misunderstanding; mayor's email; incautious action; R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(a); not outside scope of employment; entitlement to immunity.

R.C. 124.341, civil servant, Greeley claim, R.C. 124.11, subject-matter jurisdiction, Civ.R. 12(B)(1), Civ.R. 12(B)6), Civ.R. 56(C), sex discrimination, public official intimidation, R.C. 4112.02, R.C. 2921.03(A)

This opinion addresses (i) whether the Property (Trust) Code bars a trustee from enforcing a punitive damages waiver; (ii) if not, whether the waiver in one bond financing contract applies to claims based on a related contract in the same financing; and (iii) whether a trustee owes continuing fiduciary duties to its beneficiaries once the trustee resigns and is replaced by a substitute trustee. The court concludes that (i) the punitive damages waiver is enforceable here because the Trust Code does not reflect a legislative intent to bar such waivers; (ii) the subject waiver applies to both contracts because they are integral parts of the same financing arrangement; and (iii) a terminated and replaced trustee must protect a former beneficiary's confidential information that the trustee obtained during the trust relationship. Granting Defendant's motion to strike untimely filed summary-judgment evidence. Granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. One plaintiff is not entitled to damages as a matter of law, is not entitled to lost revenue or production as a matter of law, has produced evidence of redesign costs and additional expenses incurred as a result of Defendant's breach, and the record contains evidence of that plaintiff's expectancy damages. While Plaintiffs do not allege a specific theory/category of reliance damages in their petition, the Court nonetheless addresses Defendant's argument and holds that the plaintiff has not produced evidence of reliance damages. This opinion addresses competing motions for summary judgment regarding liability for Defendant's alleged breach of a reciprocal waiver agreement. More specifically, the Court considers whether there are genuine issues of material fact concerning the definiteness of the agreement's essential terms and the parties' mutual assent to those terms. The Court concludes no such fact issues exist to preclude summary judgment for Plaintiff. Accordin