Court Rulings

This is an appeal from a will contest wherein the decedent executed the will at the hospital where he was a patient. Two hospital employees signed the will as attesting witnesses, and their signatures were then notarized by another staff member. After the decedent died, his son contested the validity of the will, and the matter was set for a hearing. The proponent of the will attempted to serve subpoenas on the two attesting witnesses at the hospital where they signed the will, one by process server and the other by certified mail. Neither attempt at service was successful, and consequently, neither of the attesting witnesses appeared at the will contest hearing. The notary did appear and testified as to the identity and presence of the attesting witnesses at the will's execution. The proponent of the will sought to have both witnesses declared unavailable. The trial court declared unavailable the witness who was served using a process server but declined to do the same regarding the witness who was served by certified mail. Consequently, the court determined that the will was invalid. The proponent of the will appealed, asserting that the trial court abused its discretion when it made a distinction between serving a subpoena using a process server and serving a subpoena by certified mail. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm.

In this property dispute between neighbors, Michelle A. Blechman and James W. Blechman (collectively, plaintiffs), appealed from a Superior Court judgment, following a bench trial, in favor of the defendant, Donald Woodward. The plaintiffs argued that the trial justice erred: (1) in her determination that they failed to show hostile and adverse use of the disputed area by clear and convincing evidence; (2) by failing to conduct a proper analysis of each element of adverse possession under G.L. 1956 § 34-7-1; (3) by finding that the plaintiffs failed to establish the requisite ten-year period necessary to succeed on an acquiescence claim; and (4) in dismissing the plaintiffs' claim for a prescriptive easement without complying with Rule 52(a) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. After carefully considering each of the plaintiffs' contentions, the Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err and, accordingly, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

The respondent, Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island (ERSRI), sought review by a writ of certiorari of a Workers' Compensation Court (WCC) order denying its motion to dismiss an appeal by the petitioner, Sean M. O'Connell (Mr. O'Connell), of a state retirement board decision denying his request for an accidental disability pension. ERSRI argued, as it had before the WCC, that the WCC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider an appeal from a state employee's denial of benefits. This Court concluded that the WCC lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider Mr. O'Connell's appeal because a state employee's entitlement to benefits is adjudicated pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 36-10-14, which does not contain a provision authorizing appeals to the WCC. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the order of the WCC denying ERSRI's motion to dismiss and remanded the case with instructions that the WCC dismiss Mr. O'Connell's appeal.

Relators challenge the licensing order with penalty issued against them by respondent Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry (the department), arguing that the commissioner of labor and industry's final order was arbitrary and capricious and unsupported by substantial evidence. Because the commissioner's findings are supported by substantial evidence in the record and the commissioner did not legally err, we affirm.

On certiorari review, relator challenges the decision of an unemployment-law judge (ULJ) that relator is ineligible for unemployment benefits because she was discharged for employment misconduct. Relator argues that the ULJ's decision must be reversed for four reasons: (1) the decision was not supported by substantial evidence; (2) relator's conduct falls under certain statutory exceptions to employment misconduct; (3) the ULJ based its determination on a single incident of misconduct; and (4) relator's employer discharged her as a pretext for age discrimination. We conclude that substantial evidence supports the ULJ's misconduct determination, relator's conduct does not fall under any of the statutory exceptions relator cites, relator's conduct was a serious violation of her employer's reasonable expectations, and relator failed to raise a claim of age discrimination in proceedings before the ULJ and therefore forfeited the issue. Thus, we affirm.

In this mortgage-foreclosure dispute, the district court granted summary judgment for respondent-bank, permitted foreclosure of appellant's property, reformed the underlying mortgage, and dismissed appellant's counterclaims. On appeal, appellant challenges those determinations. Because the district court did not err in granting summary judgment, permitting foreclosure, and reforming the mortgage, and it did not abuse its discretion by denying appellant's motion for relief from final judgment, we affirm.

This intellectual-property dispute between two companies based in California arises out of the alleged misappropriation of trade secrets that initially occurred in California some fifteen years ago. Defendant CrowdStrike, Inc. (CrowdStrike) filed a special appearance, which the Court grants. The Court holds that it lacks general jurisdiction over CrowdStrike because, despite having a large office and sales in Texas, Crowdstrike does not have its principal place of business in Texas and is not "essentially at home" here under the exceptional-case doctrine. The Court holds that it lacks specific jurisdiction over CrowdStrike because plaintiff's claims do not "arise out of or relate to" CrowdStrike's Texas contacts, which occurred years after the initial alleged misappropriation and are peripheral to, rather than substantially connected to, the operative facts of the case. Granting an application for a temporary injunction against the defendant (the plaintiff's former employee) based on plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim with respect to a non-compete agreement and reforming the scope of services covered by the non-compete agreement. Denying temporary injunctive relief based on plaintiff's breach-of-contract claim with respect to a customer non-solicit agreement, a worker non-solicit agreement, and a confidentiality agreement. Denying temporary injunctive relief with respect to alleged TUTSA violations. Granting the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction against the plaintiff's derivative claims on entities' behalf for lack of standing because the plaintiff was no longer a member of the entities when he filed suit. This opinion addresses the division of settlement funds and the entitlement to reimbursement of litigation expenses arising from a prior lawsuit. The settlement funds were placed in an escrow account in 2024 pending the resolution of the present dispute. Denying a motion to remand the case back to district court because the alleged agreement in the case plain

This is a dispute between a neighborhood homeowners' association ("HOA") and a homeowner in the HOA's neighborhood. On remand after a prior appeal, the trial court entered a declaratory judgment in favor of the homeowner. The homeowner appealed the declaratory judgment and then filed multiple motions in the trial court seeking inherent authority sanctions and costs against certain attorneys who had been involved in the case. The trial court denied the motions, and the homeowner appealed those determinations. We affirm the trial court's decisions in all respects.

Granting the defendant's plea to the jurisdiction against the plaintiff's derivative claims on entities' behalf for lack of standing because the plaintiff was no longer a member of the entities when he filed suit. This opinion addresses the division of settlement funds and the entitlement to reimbursement of litigation expenses arising from a prior lawsuit. The settlement funds were placed in an escrow account in 2024 pending the resolution of the present dispute. Denying a motion to remand the case back to district court because the alleged agreement in the case plainly meets the definition of a qualified transaction, provided that under its terms the plaintiff may be "entitled to receive" consideration that meets the $5 million threshold, and the defendants' pleadings and the evidence before the Court plainly establishes the possibility—plausibility, even—that the plaintiffs' damages claim could satisfy the Business Court's jurisdictional minimum for a qualified transaction under §25A.004(d)(1). Granting a motion to confirm an arbitration award and denying a motion to vacate the same award, the Court holds: the parties' contract and applicable law gave the arbitration panel authority to decide both substantive and procedural arbitrability questions. Judgment is entered confirming the award. Denying the defendant's special appearance because the Court has specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Applying the court's jurisdictional balance-shifting framework, the court holds that the defendant's removal notice, which pleaded more than five million dollars in controversy, satisfied the statutory jurisdictional threshold where plaintiff offered no rebutting evidence. The plaintiff's allegations that the former president's new company aided and abetted his breach of fiduciary duties satisfied the jurisdictional clause in Tex. Gov't Code Section 25A.004(b)(5). The petition's repeated allegations regarding misappropriation of sensitive business information invoked Secti

Defendant, George Harris Patterson, III, who was described at oral argument as a First Amendment Auditor, was indicted for resisting arrest, disorderly conduct, and assault on a first responder after an incident at a Davidson County Post Office. A jury found Defendant not guilty of resisting arrest but guilty of disorderly conduct and assault. Defendant appeals, raising several issues. He challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, the constitutionality of the disorderly conduct statute under the First Amendment as applied to him, the trial court's failure to give a special jury instruction, the trial court's admission of a piece of evidence and testimony from a postal employee, and the trial court's failure to grant a mistrial. He also insists he is entitled to cumulative error relief. After a review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

employer intentional tort, R.C. 2745.01, summary judgment, de novo, intent to injure, equipment safety guard, active participation, critical

The defendants appealed from the decision of the Compensation Review Board affirming an award by the Workers' Compensation Commissioner for the Seventh District of total incapacity benefits to the plaintiff. The plaintiff had retired from his position as a police officer in the Stamford Police Department in 1999, shortly after he was awarded permanent partial disability benefits, and he became temporarily totally disabled in 2015. On appeal, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the board improperly failed to determine that the plaintiff should be entitled, at a maximum, to temporary total disability benefits calculated using the minimum compensation rate as of the plaintiff's 2015 date of incapacity. Held: The board properly upheld the commissioner's denial of the defendants' request for a finding that the temporary total disability compensation rate should be based on the fifty-two weeks of earnings prior to the plaintiff's date of incapacity, which would have resulted in a compensation rate of zero dollars, as in cases in which there is a gap of time between the date of the injury and the date of incapacity, the compensation rate must be calculated using the date of incapacity, and, accordingly, pursuant to statute (§ 31-310 (a)), the plaintiff's compensation rate must be based on the prevailing wages of Stamford police officers at the time of the plaintiff's date of incapacity. The board properly determined that the defendants' claim that they were entitled to a credit against a certain increased permanent partial impairment award for any temporary total disability benefits paid after the plaintiff's date of maximum medical improvement was not ripe for review, as the com- missioner had scheduled further hearings to address the issue of credits due to the defendants and further factual development was necessary prior to any review by the board or by this court. Argued September 18, 2025—officially released March 10, 2026

UNREPORTED OPINION DISMISSING CASE: The plaintiff filed his claim for wrongful discharge more than 18 years after April 16, 2007, and as a result his claims are untimely under 28 U.S.C. &167; 2501. Thus, the Court lacks jurisdiction over the plaintiff&039;s claims. The defendant&039;s [17] motion to dismiss is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment. No costs are awarded

¶0 Petitioner seeks writs of prohibition and mandamus to preclude enforcement and require modification of Respondent's discovery order. We assume original jurisdiction and grant the writ of prohibition.

Relator Kenneth Kuller challenges a decision affirming his ineligibility for unemployment benefits from respondent Minnesota Department of Employment and Economic Development (DEED). Kuller advances two arguments on appeal. He asserts first that the unemployment law judge (ULJ) failed to consider new evidence submitted at an evidentiary hearing. He argues second that the record lacks substantial evidence that his conduct violated any workplace policies and constituted employment misconduct. We conclude that the ULJ's decision reflects careful consideration of the relevant evidence and that relator engaged in employment misconduct by violating known and acknowledged employment policies, and we affirm.