Court Rulings

A Ramsey County jury found Morris Robert Chie Ryan guilty of attempted second- degree intentional murder and other crimes based on evidence that he fired 14 gunshots at the window of an occupied room of a home. We conclude that the evidence is sufficient to support his convictions, that the prosecutor did not engage in prosecutorial misconduct, and that the erroneous admission of hearsay evidence is a harmless error. Therefore, we affirm.

The issuance of a DVCPO against father was improper because the trial court did not analyze whether the children were "endangered" or "abused" under Ohio law. The DVCPO proceedings were improperly treated as a substitute for child custody proceedings among quarreling parents. However, the trial court's denial of father's DVCPO petition against stepfather was not against the manifest weight of the evidence after presuming—with father not overcoming that presumption—the trial court's determination that one of the children's testimony against stepfather was not credible.

This matter is before the Court upon the Defendant's application for an extraordinary appeal pursuant to Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 10. The Defendant seeks review of the trial court's order transferring the Defendant to the custody of the Tennessee Department of Correction (TDOC) for safekeeping prior to trial. The Defendant argues that the trial court lacked statutory authorization to transfer a pretrial detainee to TDOC custody or, alternatively, that the facts of this case do not support such a transfer. The State has filed a response in opposition, arguing that the trial court has not so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to require immediate review. We conclude that extraordinary review is "necessary for complete determination of the action on appeal." Tenn. R. App. P. 10(a)(2). Therefore, we hereby GRANT the Defendant's application for extraordinary appeal. However, further briefing and argument are not required. See Tenn. R. App. P. 10(d). For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court.

The appellee sustained severe injuries after falling off of a ladder at his job. The appellee was performing work on a building owned by the appellant when the accident occurred, and he claims the ladder was owned by the appellant. The appellant's workers' compensation policy had lapsed and was not in effect at the time of the accident. The appellee filed a common law tort action against the appellant. Following a bench trial, the trial court awarded the appellee a judgment of $471,038.36. We conclude that the trial court erred in calculating the appellee's damages for lost wages and future lost earning capacity and modify the trial court's judgment to correct such error. We also remand this case to the trial court for consideration of whether the appellee is entitled to an award of noneconomic damages. We affirm the trial court's judgment in all other respects.

Granting traditional and non-evidence summary judgment against Plaintiff's defamation claim because the complained-of statements are not objectively verifiable and therefore, as a matter of law, are not defamatory. Denying reconsideration of an order remanding the case back to district court on the grounds that the removal to business court was untimely. Denying permission to take a permissive interlocutory appeal of that order. This opinion addresses (i) whether the Property (Trust) Code bars a trustee from enforcing a punitive damages waiver; (ii) if not, whether the waiver in one bond financing contract applies to claims based on a related contract in the same financing; and (iii) whether a trustee owes continuing fiduciary duties to its beneficiaries once the trustee resigns and is replaced by a substitute trustee. The court concludes that (i) the punitive damages waiver is enforceable here because the Trust Code does not reflect a legislative intent to bar such waivers; (ii) the subject waiver applies to both contracts because they are integral parts of the same financing arrangement; and (iii) a terminated and replaced trustee must protect a former beneficiary's confidential information that the trustee obtained during the trust relationship. Granting Defendant's motion to strike untimely filed summary-judgment evidence. Granting in part and denying in part Defendant's Traditional and No-Evidence Motion for Summary Judgment. One plaintiff is not entitled to damages as a matter of law, is not entitled to lost revenue or production as a matter of law, has produced evidence of redesign costs and additional expenses incurred as a result of Defendant's breach, and the record contains evidence of that plaintiff's expectancy damages. While Plaintiffs do not allege a specific theory/category of reliance damages in their petition, the Court nonetheless addresses Defendant's argument and holds that the plaintiff has not produced evidence of reliance damages. This opinio

Appellant's second assignment of error was not rendered moot by virtue of our determination regarding his first assignment of error and remand to the trial court. Thus, upon remand, in addition to conducting the proper review as set forth in R.C. 119 in the first instance as instructed in our prior decision, the trial court is hereby instructed to consider and rule upon the assignments of error asserted by appellant in the trial court. Application for reconsideration granted.

Nursing home malpractice; admitted liability; jury instructions; jury interrogatories; punitive damages; R.C. 2315.21; invited error; plain error; wavier; judgment notwithstanding the verdict ("JNOV"); de novo; ratification; corporate entity; scope of employment; actual malice; damages cap; noneconomic damages; R.C. 2315.18; $250,000; separate incident; nursing home resident's bill of rights ("NHRBR"); abuse of discretion; attorney fees; reconstructed hours; expenses; lodestar; prejudgment interest; R.C. 1343.04; good-faith settlement. Judgment affirmed. The trial court did not err in denying defendants' JNOV motion as to punitive damages in Plaintiffs' nursing home malpractice case. In the instant case, there is no dispute that Defendants drafted the jury instructions that it complains of on appeal. The trial court adopted the jury instructions verbatim, and the Defendants' did not object at trial. Because defendants invited this error by providing the court with jury instructions and never objected to the instructions, it may not now seek to use the instruction to its advantage on appeal. In addition, Defendants' failure to object to the interrogatory constituted waiver of any error on appeal. Furthermore, trial court did not apply the wrong standard for punitive damages against a corporate entity as Defendants contend. Defendants failed to raise ratification in its JNOV motion and, therefore, waived the issue on appeal, but for plain error. We do not find plain error because Plaintiffs established ratification at trial. Plaintiffs adduced evidence demonstrating that the nurse's job responsibilities included decedent's trach care and the Defendants ratified the nurse's conduct when Defendants failed to terminate or discipline the nurse. The evidence at trial also demonstrated actual malice. The Defendants' staff nurse ignored the Plaintiff's cries for help. A reasonable person could conclude that the staff's conduct amounted to a conscious disregard for the decede

Summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; evidence; age discrimination; direct evidence; discriminatory intent; prima facie case. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment for employer where employee presented direct evidence of discriminatory intent in his age-discrimination suit. This evidence created a genuine issue of material fact.

Motion for summary judgment; Civ.R. 56; workers' compensation claim; R.C. 4123.01(C)(5); preexisting condition; substantially aggravated; clear and unambiguous statute; and objective pre-injury medical evidence. The trial court erred when it granted an employer's motion for summary judgment because the plaintiff-appellant worker provided, pursuant to R.C. 4123.01(C)(5), objective clinical findings, objective test results, and subjective complaints to support his claim that his work incident caused a substantial aggravation of preexisting conditions.

In an appeal from a judgment of the Court of Appeals reversing a jury verdict awarding over $2 billion in damages in favor of a software company against a competitor based on its claims for misappropriation of trade secrets under the Virginia Uniform Trade Secrets Act ("VUTSA"), Code § 59.1-336 et seq., the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to support the plaintiff's claim that the competitor misappropriated its trade secrets, and thus the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the circuit court did not err by denying the competitor's motions to strike and set aside the verdict. However, the Court of Appeals correctly concluded that the circuit court erred by instructing the jury that the competitor bore any burden of proof regarding the plaintiff's damages claim and that the number of people with access to a purported trade secret is not relevant. The Court of Appeals also correctly determined that the circuit court abused its discretion in how it enforced its interpretation of the defendant's response to a particular interrogatory because certain information the defendant sought to introduce did not contradict that response and the circuit court's resolution effectively denied the defendant's ability to put on its damages defense; and erred in precluding the defendant from attempting to authenticate and possibly introduce as evidence relevant versions of its software at trial. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed, and the matter is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Is an insurer comprised of political subdivisions joined to provide liability coverage for its members considered a public entity for purposes of the notice of claim statute A.R.S. Section 12-821.01? On the facts of this record, does the third-party insurance claims administrator have direct or vicarious liability to the insured employee for purposes of a bad faith claim?

NCWHA, UDTP, severance payment, non-compete payment

The plaintiff home improvement contractor appealed from the trial court's judgments for the defendant condominium owners on their respective coun- terclaims for breach of contract and negligence. The plaintiff had com- menced a separate action for, inter alia, breach of contract against the owners of each of four condominium units following the owners' termination of contracts to construct decks for their units. Prior to trial, the plaintiff withdrew its complaint in each case, and the court consolidated the cases for trial on the defendants' counterclaims. On appeal, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly found that it had materially breached the contracts it had entered with the respective defendants. Held: The trial court's finding that the plaintiff had materially breached the con- tracts was not clearly erroneous, as the court's finding that the delay in construction was a material breach was supported by the evidence in the record even though the contracts did not specifically provide that time was of the essence in the completion of the construction projects. The trial court improperly calculated the amount of damages that the defen- dants could recover on their breach of contract counterclaims because the defendants did not incur losses for which they could recover in contract, as the court expressly found that no defendant paid more than the original contract price for the completion of the work called for under the contracts, and, accordingly, this court vacated the damages awards and remanded the cases with direction to enter awards of nominal damages on the breach of contract counterclaims. To the extent that the trial court's damages awards included any amounts attributable to its finding that the plaintiff breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, the court erred in issuing those awards, as the defendants neither pleaded a claim for such a breach or alleged conduct by the plaintiff that would support such a cla

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's partial judgment in favor of N Co., the plaintiff's automobile insurer. The plaintiff had brought an action against the defendant L, seeking damages for, inter alia, diminution of value and loss of use of his vehicle in connection with an automobile accident allegedly caused by L's negligence. Thereafter, L impleaded N Co. and alleged that his insurer, S Co., had tendered to N Co. $25,000, which was the full liability coverage limit for property damage under L's insurance policy, based on N Co.'s alleged misrepresentation that the plaintiff had been made whole. The plaintiff subsequently filed an amended complaint, alleging, inter alia, that N Co. was unjustly enriched when it prematurely accepted the $25,000 from S Co. and thereby reduced the amount of funds that otherwise would have been available to indemnify L in the plaintiff's negligence action, in violation of the make whole doctrine, which restricts an insurer's ability to enforce its right to subrogation until after the insured has been fully compensated, or made whole, for the insured's loss. The trial court ultimately dismissed the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim against N Co. as not ripe for adjudication. In affirming the trial court's partial judgment of dismissal, the Appellate Court concluded that the unjust enrichment claim was not ripe until the plaintiff first obtained a judgment against L because that claim was otherwise contingent on whether and to what extent the plaintiff could recover from L and on L's ability to satisfy the hypothetical judgment. On appeal to this court, the plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that his unjust enrichment claim was ripe for adjudication. Held: The Appellate Court improperly upheld the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiff's unjust enrichment claim on ripeness grounds, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court

Appellant's assignments of error, which challenged the trial court's determination that he failed to exhaust administrative remedies because he did not allege in his charge to the Ohio Civil Rights Commission that he had been constructively discharged, were moot because appellant did not assign as error the trial court's independent determination that his claims of discrimination and retaliation predicated on constructive discharge were time-barred under R.C. 4112.052(C). Trial court's judgment is affirmed on that unchallenged basis.

Appellant seeks review of the district court's order denying her fee-waiver application, which, if granted, would allow her to commence a civil action "without payment of fees, costs, and security for costs" as provided in Minn. Stat. § 563.01, subd. 3 (2024). Because the district court determined that appellant's civil action is frivolous and appellant does not challenge the frivolousness determination on appeal, we affirm.

Appellant Tieshawn Stevie Fields pleaded guilty to felony domestic assault after assaulting his romantic partner at her workplace. Before sentencing, Fields moved to withdraw his plea because he was no longer interested in the terms offered by respondent State of Minnesota. The district court denied the request, reasoning that "changing [one's] mind" is not a valid basis to withdraw a plea under the fair-and-just standard. Fields appeals. Because Fields failed to establish reasons to justify withdrawal of his plea under the fair-and-just standard, and because he is not entitled to withdraw his guilty plea under the manifest-injustice standard, we affirm. In so doing, we also reject Fields's claim that the district court judge committed a structural error by conducting an independent investigation, as the record conclusively shows that the judge merely reviewed the record in Fields's current case.

The trial court's award of sole custody to Mr. Mahbub was against the manifest weight of the evidence as there was no competent, credible evidence to support such a determination. Pursuant to App.R. 12(C), we award sole custody and residential parent for school purposes to Ms. Son. The trial court also abused its discretion by designating Ms. Son as the obligor for child support purposes. Judgment reversed; cause remanded with instructions.

Domestic violence civil protection order ("DVCPO"); menacing by stalking; mental distress; sufficiency of the evidence; abuse of discretion; manifest weight of the evidence; scope of DVCPO. The domestic relations court issued a DVCPO in favor of petitioner-appellee ("Petitioner") against respondent-appellant ("Respondent"). Respondent appealed, claiming that there was insufficient evidence presented to support the DVCPO, the order was against the manifest weight of the evidence, and that the scope of the DVCPO was overbroad. The lower court's issuance of the DVCPO was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence presented. The evidence presented at the full hearing demonstrated that on one occasion, while on a Facetime call, Respondent made what could be considered a threat to Petitioner. A few months later, while Petitioner and Respondent were taking their son to a therapy appointment, Respondent raised his voice at Petitioner, eventually calling her a "cunt." The situation escalated to a point wherein security was contacted by Petitioner. Petitioner also presented evidence that Respondent, a licensed attorney in Ohio, kept filing legal motions and instructing the clerk of courts to serve Petitioner with them, even after he received a cease-and-desist letter from Petitioner's place of employment and after Petitioner obtained counsel. The evidence was sufficient to demonstrate that a protection order was necessary. The lower court's decision was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. With respect to the scope of the DVCPO, the court held that the order was tailored to prevent future harassment of Petitioner from Respondent. The order listed only the Petitioner as the protected person under the DVCPO. Respondent's children were not listed as protected persons. As such, Respondent was still allowed to parent his children during his allotted parenting time as set forth under the custody arrangement.

A district court has jurisdiction to modify a foreign custody determination, including visitation orders, when the child's home state is North Dakota and the child and parents no longer reside in the issuing jurisdiction. Appellate courts have the authority and duty to determine the applicability of relevant statutes to legal controversies, even when the parties do not identify those statutes or argue for their application. When a parent seeks to modify an existing nonparent visitation order, the court must apply the modification standards under the Uniform Nonparent Custody and Visitation Act. When modifying an order granting nonparent visitation, the court must determine whether the nonparent rebutted in the initial proceeding the presumption that the parent's decision regarding visitation is in the child's best interest. If the nonparent rebutted the presumption in the initial proceeding, the presumption remains rebutted.

Whether the administrative law judge's calculation of the average monthly wage for an injured worker, who had recently been promoted when the injury occurred, was a reasonable reflection of the worker's monthly earning capacity.

1. Whether the superior court erred in dismissing a lawsuit filed against a school district for lack of standing where the parent of a student alleged violations of several statutes, including Arizona's Parents' Bill of Rights, A.R.S. § 1-602, arising from the district's adoption of guidelines designed to support transgender and gender nonconforming students. 2. Whether the superior court properly concluded a school district board member lacked standing to sue the district for a writ of mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunction on the grounds that the district's guidelines violate multiple statutes and that she was denied the right to vote on whether the guidelines should have been adopted by the board. 3. Whether the superior court erred in finding that the parent's lawsuit was not timely filed under A.R.S. § 12-821, which requires all claims against governmental entities and employees to be filed within one year of when the claim accrues.