Court Rulings

Per Mayle, J., although framed as contract claims, plaintiff's complaint alleges conduct that, if proven, constitutes an unfair labor practice specifically enumerated in R.C. 4117.11. State Employee Relations Board ("SERB") has exclusive jurisdiction over her claims. Plaintiff has not been deprived of a forum in which to bring her claims. R.C. Chapter 4117 vests SERB with jurisdiction in the first instance and redress may be sought in the courts depending on SERB's disposition of her claims.

Defendant, Montrell Reid, appeals from his guilty-pleaded convictions for harassment and stalking, both Class A misdemeanors. Under the plea agreement, Defendant agreed to serve eleven months and twenty-nine days for each count, with the sentences to be served consecutively and the manner of service to be determined by the trial court. At sentencing, the trial court denied Defendant's request for probation and ordered that he serve his sentence in confinement. On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for probation. Following our review, we affirm the trial court's judgments as to the denial of probation, but we remand for a determination of the percentage of service pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 40-35-302(d).

DOMESTIC RELATIONS – VISITATION – termination of visitation rights; abuse of discretion standard of review; the trial court found clear and convincing evidence of extraordinary circumstances that would justify terminating Appellant's visitation rights, namely that visitation with Appellant would cause harm to the minor child; the court reviewed the factors in R.C. 3109.051(D) and concluded it was in the minor child's best interest to terminate Appellant's visitation; judgment affirmed.

R.C. 4513.70 — STORAGE FACILITY — TOWING SERVICE — FOR-HIRE MOTOR CARRIER — REASONABLE CHARGES — EVIDENCE: Defendant car repair shop is not a "towing service" under R.C. 4513.70 where the shop was hired to facilitate having the insured's car towed by a third-party towing company but did not itself carry or transport the insured's car. Defendant car repair shop is a "storage facility" under R.C. 4513.70 where nothing in R.C. 4513.70 prevents the shop from functioning as both a "storage facility" and a "repair facility" under R.C. Ch. 4513 and where the evidence shows that the shop charged storage fees from the first day that the insured's vehicle arrived at the shop, included storage fees as a part of the repair costs in the contract for repairs, and accepted vehicles that were "an obvious total loss" from plaintiff insurer on other claims. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that storage charges for ten days was reasonable under the circumstances where the testimony established that storage is typically not charged until there is a total-loss determination and plaintiff insurer presented evidence that the ten days of storage arises from the date the insured's vehicle was determined to be a total loss with a "few extra days" covered in the beginning.

unemployment benefits; discharge; voluntary departure; misconduct; benefit eligibility.

zoning enforcement; side street setback; board of adjustment; law of the case; permit presumption.

second opinion evaluation, temporary partial disability, wage records