Court Rulings

Unemployment Compensation

The language of the Virginia wage theft statute, Code § 40.1-29, specifically lists wages and salaries, but it does not expressly apply to commissions, and its context does not support an interpretation that extends the statute's protections to commissions. Resting its contrary conclusion on the remedial purpose of the statute, past decisions interpreting the term "wages" in other contexts, and an interpretation by an administrative agency contained in a field manual, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court concluding that Code § 40.1-29 did not apply to commissions. However, neither the plain meaning of the terms "wages" or "commissions," nor the use of the term wages in the context of Code § 40.1-29, suggests that the use of that term sweeps in the concept of "commissions," and contentions to the contrary, while compelling, are properly addressed to the legislature. Therefore, the most plausible reading of Code § 40.1-29 is that the General Assembly did not intend for the wage theft statute to apply to commissions. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed.

The defendant administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, who had determined that the plaintiff was ineligible for unemployment benefits, appealed from the trial court's decision remanding the plaintiff's unemploy- ment compensation action to the Board of Review of the Employment Security Appeals Division for reconsideration by its appeals referee of the decision denying the plaintiff's motion to open the referee's decision dismiss- ing her appeal as untimely. The defendant claimed, inter alia, that the court exceeded its limited scope of judicial review in making factual findings and in substituting its judgment for that of the board. Held: The trial court improperly exceeded its limited scope of judicial review by finding facts beyond those contained in the certified record and by relying on its improper findings in examining the board's decision, and, on the basis of the controlling factual findings set forth in the certified record, this court could not conclude that the board acted unreasonably, arbitrarily, illegally, or in abuse of its discretion in affirming the referee's denial of the motion to open. Argued November 17—officially released December 30, 2025

The plaintiffs appealed from the trial court's judgment dismissing their administrative appeal from the defendant commission's decision imposing civil penalties for violations of a state statute (§ 30-94 (a)) and its correspond- ing regulation (§ 30-6-A29 (a)), which prohibit a licensed permittee, in any transaction with another permittee, from receiving any free goods, gratuities, gifts or other inducements in connection with the sale of alcoholic beverages. The commission concluded that the plaintiffs had received an improper inducement in the form of free labor, namely, that employees of two whole- sale beer distributors had stocked the shelves of the plaintiffs' retail liquor stores with newly delivered beer. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that substantial evidence supported the commission's finding that the beer distributors' employees provided the plaintiffs with free labor by stocking the shelves of the plaintiffs' stores. Held: The trial court properly concluded that the commission's decision was supported by substantial evidence, as the members of the commission rea- sonably credited the testimony of K, a liquor control agent with twenty- three years of experience, regarding what transpired at the plaintiffs' two retail stores, and the commission was free to credit K's firsthand account over the testimony of the plaintiffs' witnesses, who testified only generally about the stores' policies, procedures and practices but were not present when the beer was delivered and placed on the stores' shelves. This court declined to review the plaintiffs' claim that, even if the commission reasonably had concluded that the distributors were engaged in prohibited stocking, the receipt of such free labor was not an inducement under § 30- 94 (a) and § 30-6-A29 (a) of the regulations without proof of an agreement between the distributors and the stores for the provision of that free labor, as the plaintiffs failed to raise

In this appeal from an order indeterminately committing him as a sexually dangerous person (SDP), appellant argues that the district court erred in two ways: (1) the record does not establish by clear and convincing evidence that appellant is an SDP, and (2) alternatively, appellant proved by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment program was available and appropriate. Because the record establishes that appellant (a) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual conduct, (b) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other mental disorder or dysfunction and, as a result, (c) is likely to engage in future harmful sexual conduct, we affirm the district court's determination that appellant is an SDP. And because appellant failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that a less restrictive treatment program (a) is available and willing to accept him, (b) is consistent with his treatment needs, and (c) is consistent with the requirements of public safety, we affirm the district court's determination that appellant be indeterminately committed to a secure treatment facility as an SDP.

arbitration agreement, actual authority, apparent authority, guardianship, R.C. 2111.13, R.C. 2111.14, guardian of person, guardian of estate, R.C. 2111.50, incompetent, 2111.01(D)(1), contract

Judgment affirmed. The trial court properly found the purchaser, Benie, breached the parties' Asset Purchase Agreement ("APA") by failing to provide the seller, Momentum, with both the $69,269.00 and the $257,999.32 Bureau of Workers' Compensation ("BWC") policy holder dividend payments. Evidence from the BWC demonstrated that both payments were dividend reimbursements calculated based on the premiums an employer paid in 2019. Because both payments were a "premium dividend reimbursement" for the 2019 policy period, the APA obligated Benie to provide both payments to Momentum in a timely fashion. The trial court did not err by finding that Momentum could pierce the corporate veil of Benie. Competent and credible evidence demonstrated the owners of Benie, Elizabeth and Russell Dawson, operated Benie as their alter ego, used their control over Benie to commit a fraudulent transfer and civil theft, and that Momentum suffered damages as a result of the Dawsons' control and wrongful conduct of Benie. The economic loss rule did not bar Momentum's claim for civil theft but did bar Momentum's claims for fraudulent transfer and civil conspiracy, because the damages resulting from the fraudulent transfer and civil conspiracy were the same as the damages resulting from the breach of contract. However, because the trial court did not award any damages attributable to the fraudulent transfer or civil conspiracy claims, there was no aspect of the trial court's judgment to reverse.