Court Rulings

The plaintiff service station owners appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant in their action alleging, inter alia, that the defendant's termination of certain lease agreements was in violation of the Connecticut Petroleum Franchise Act (§ 42-133j et seq.). The plaintiffs claimed that the court improperly rendered judgment for the defendant because the protec- tions of the petroleum franchise act applied to the contractual relationships between the parties. Held: The trial court properly rendered judgment for the defendant on the plain- tiffs' claims, as the plaintiffs were not "retailers" within the meaning of the petroleum franchise act and, therefore, there was no franchise relationship entitling them to protection under that act. (One judge dissenting) Argued September 16, 2025—officially released January 27, 2026

The plaintiff father, who had filed an application for child custody and visitation with respect to the parties' minor child, appealed from the trial court's judgment awarding the parties joint legal custody of the child, awarding the defendant mother primary physical custody of the child, and granting the defendant's request for permission to relocate from Connecticut to Virginia with the child. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court applied improper legal standards in considering the defendant's relocation request. Held: The trial court did not apply inapplicable law in favor of relocation but instead properly applied the best interest of the child standard in considering the defendant's relocation request, as the court repeatedly stated in its memo- randum of decision that its references to Ireland v. Ireland (246 Conn. 413), which is limited to postjudgment relocation cases, were offered in support of its consideration of the family unit as a whole and its factual findings as to the best interest determination. The trial court also did not assert different legal standards for relocation, as the plaintiff claimed, depending on whether the minor child's parents were married or unmarried, as the court's observations about the parties' circumstances and the fact that they had never been married to each other did not evidence the application of a more lenient standard to an unmarried parent seeking to relocate but, rather, could be read to distinguish postjudg- ment relocation cases and to pertain to the parties' relationship and its breakdown, especially in light of the court's repeated, proper recitation of the applicable legal standard in its decision. This court could not conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in permitting the defendant to relocate to Virginia with the minor child, as the court's finding that relocation was in the child's best interest was supported by detailed factual findings, including that the parties' circumstances i

Relator Kathleen Smith appeals the decision of the board of directors (the board) of respondent Minnesota State Retirement System (MSRS) denying Smith's application for total and permanent disability benefits. Smith argues that the board's decision is not supported by substantial evidence and the board breached its fiduciary duty. We affirm.

Petitioners Sierra Club, Vote Solar, Union of Concerned Scientists, and the Minnesota Solar Energy Industries Association (together, Sierra Club) appeal from a decision by an administrative-law judge (ALJ) that dismissed their petition for a declaration that respondent Minnesota Public Utilities Commission (the PUC) is enforcing a 2010 order as though it were a duly adopted rule. Because the PUC lacked authority to issue the 2010 order, which the parties agree is a rule, we declare that rule invalid.

¶1 In this deprived child proceeding, Appellant, Asheley Teague, the biological mother of J.S., JR. (JSJ), the minor child, appeals from the district court's order terminating her parental rights. The State of Oklahoma (State) moved to terminate Mother's parental rights, Mother waived a jury trial, and then Mother failed to appear at two subsequent scheduled hearings which were noticed by announcements memorialized in minute orders. The court minute order dated May 30, 2025, stated Mother failed to appear, but quantified "default under advisement pending best interest." Mother appeared at the best interest trial set on June 2, 2025. State's witness was sworn and examined and testified as to the child's best interest. After the best interest trial, the district court found reasonable efforts were made, Mother failed to make the corrections and termination was in the child's best interest. On appeal, Mother claims the district court erred in terminating her parental rights because the notices of May 30, 2025, hearing, i.e. the non-jury trial date, and June 2, 2025, best interest hearing were legally insufficient under 10A O.S. 2021 §1-4-905 . Mother also asserts the district court erred in finding termination was in the minor child's best interest. This Court holds the petition to terminate provided Mother with the notice required in §1-4-905(A)(1) and (2) and Mother was properly provided notice of subsequent hearings. This Court also holds State met its burden of showing it was in the child's best interest to terminate Mother's parental rights. The order terminating Mother's parental rights is affirmed.

This case addresses whether the Uniform Arbitration Act confers subject matter jurisdiction on Tennessee courts to confirm an arbitration award when the parties' arbitration agreement specified that arbitration would occur in another state. Berkeley Research Group, LLC and Southern Advanced Materials, LLC entered into a contract which provided that any dispute would be resolved by arbitration in Pennsylvania, not Tennessee. A dispute arose and the parties entered arbitration, which resulted in an award to Berkeley. Berkeley sought to confirm the arbitration award in Shelby County Chancery Court. The trial court confirmed Berkeley's arbitration award and entered judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding that while the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction, it lacked personal jurisdiction over Southern. We find that Tennessee courts lack subject matter jurisdiction to confirm an arbitration reward when the parties agreed arbitration would occur in another state. As a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to confirm an award resulting from an arbitration the parties agreed would occur in Pennsylvania. We vacate the judgments of the lower courts and dismiss the petition to confirm the award.

Whether an employee's injury, caused by an accidental discharge of the handgun he wascarrying in his waistband, arose out of his employment in the sense that it wascaused by a risk of employment or was incidental to his work duties.

The petitioner, who had been convicted of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, attempt to commit robbery in the first degree, and assault in the first degree in connection with the shooting of a pizza delivery driver, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his trial counsel, C, had rendered ineffective assistance. At the petitioner's criminal trial, the defense theory was that another individual, D, with whom the petitioner was visiting on the night of the shooting, had committed the charged offenses, but D testified that it was the petitioner who had made plans to rob a delivery driver and who had used D's cell phone to call and case various businesses, including the pizza restaurant that employed the victim. The habeas court denied the habeas petition, and the petitioner, on the granting of certifica- tion, appealed to the Appellate Court, which affirmed the habeas court's judgment. Although the Appellate Court agreed with the petitioner's claim that C had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to adequately investigate D's cell phone records, a majority of that court ultimately concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that he was prejudiced by C's deficient performance. On the granting of certification, the petitioner appealed to this court, challenging the Appellate Court's determination on the issue of prejudice. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish prejudice stemming from C's failure to investigate D's cell phone records, as there was a reasonable probability that, but for C's failure to undertake such an investigation and to introduce some or all of the records at trial, the jury would have had a reasonable doubt with respect to the peti- tioner's guilt, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case with direction that the habeas court grant the habeas petition, vacate his convictions, and order a new trial. The

In this dispute related to a harassment restraining order (HRO), pro se appellant argues that the district court lacked personal jurisdiction over him. Because the district court did not err in determining that it had personal jurisdiction over appellant, we affirm.

Appellants argue that the district court erred by denying their motion to compel arbitration. Because the claims asserted against appellants fall outside the scope of the arbitration agreement, we affirm.

Our nation was founded on the radical notion that all are created equal. Though we have often failed to live up to that promise, it remains as a constitutional lodestar—both in the U.S. and Texas Constitutions. The race-and sex-based, public sector preferences discussed in this opinion cannot survive strict scrutiny and are therefore unconstitutional. Furthermore, a large body of DEI practices in the private sector triggers liability under Title VII, the Texas Commission on Human Rights Act, and Section 1981 in addition to state and federal securities law.

Reconsideration; App.R. 26(A)(1)(a); error of law; contract; breach of contract; conspiracy to commit fraud; fraud; consumer sales practices act ("CSPA"); permit; employee; employer; relevant evidence; Evid.R. 401; Evid.R. 403; damages; insufficient evidence; manifest weight; unfair or deceptive acts; piercing the corporate veil; alter ego; apparent authority; principal; agent; attorney fees. The trial court's journal entry following a bench trial is affirmed in part, reversed in part, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. The evidence presented at trial supported the trial court's finding that the defendant-appellant LLC contracted with the plaintiff-appellee to do HVAC work through the apparent authority of its employee/agent and that the LLC breached the contract and violated the CSPA. However, there was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that the owner of the LLC was individually liable on these claims. There was insufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding of a civil conspiracy to commit fraud and, therefore, the award of punitive damages and the award of statutory damages are vacated; however, the trial court's award of attorney fees was supported by sufficient evidence.

An order from a district court granting a motion to disqualify an attorney is not appealable under N.D.C.C. § 28-27-02(3) or the collateral order doctrine. Supervisory jurisdiction may be exercised to review an order granting a motion to disqualify an attorney because a civil litigant has a protected interest in counsel of the litigant's choice, and an appeal from a final judgment is not an adequate remedy for erroneous disqualification. When a district court finds a lawyer-client relationship between an attorney and a company based on objective manifestations, including providing legal advice to the company's officers and employees, the district court does not abuse its discretion in disqualifying the attorney under N.D.R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(1) if the attorney represents clients on both sides of the litigation. A district court commits legal error by concluding an attorney has a lawyer-client relationship with a company solely because the attorney signed and prosecuted derivative claims brought by a shareholder on behalf of the company. An error is harmless if it does not affect the outcome of the case or a party's substantial rights.

A jury in a personal injury case awarded damages that were significantly lower than the plaintiff's claimed medical expenses. The trial court denied Plaintiff's motion for a new trial, and the plaintiff appealed, arguing that the jury's verdict was below the range of reasonableness and indicative of an improper compromise. We affirm.

In this appeal from an order denying a motion to reopen a harassment-restraining-order (HRO) proceeding pursuant to Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 60.02, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion. Because the district court acted within its discretion by denying his motion to reopen, we affirm.