Court Rulings

A mother appealed a juvenile court's modification of the permanent parenting plan for her daughter. Once briefing was complete and the case was submitted for decision, the mother voluntarily dismissed her appeal, leaving only the father's request for an award of attorney's fees incurred on appeal under Tennessee Code Annotated § 36-5-103(c). We grant the father's request and remand for a determination of the amount of reasonable fees incurred.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees in appellant's defamation claim. The statements made by a commissioner and employee were protected by a qualified privilege. The trial court did err in granting more than $200,000 in back pay as a result of Open Meetings Act violations because such an award is not contemplated by the statute. Finally, the trial court did not err when it failed to grant appellant attorney fees, pre-judgment and post-judgment interest, salary, and benefits. Attorney fees are not available for pro se litigants, and pre- and post-judgment interest, salary, and benefits are not contemplated by the statute. Judgment reversed as to back pay but affirmed in all other respects. The case will, however, be remanded to the Montgomery County Veterans Service Commission to terminate appellant in accordance with the Open Meetings Act.

The Defendant, David A. Yost, Jr., appeals from his guilty-pled convictions for unlawfulpossession of a firearm by a person with a prior felony drug conviction, simple possessionof marijuana, and two counts of possession of drug paraphernalia, for which he receivedan agreed-to, effective eight-year sentence. The trial court initially denied the Defendant'srequest for alternative sentencing and ordered the Defendant to serve his sentence inconfinement. Following the Defendant's appeal of this sentencing determination, this courtreversed and remanded the case based on the trial court's failure to make the appropriatefindings and articulate its reasoning for imposing a sentence of incarceration. On remand,the trial court again ordered confinement. In the instant appeal, the Defendant challenges,for a second time, the trial court's denial of alternative sentencing as an abuse of discretion.After review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment contending that Plaintiff's tortious interference with contract, defamation, and business disparagement claims are barred by the limitation-of-liability provision in the parties' 2022 agreement. Granting a third-party defendant's special appearance arguing no personal jurisdiction over him because he did not commit any tortious acts while in Texas. Because the respondents did not plead or prove that this defendant has sufficient Texas contacts giving rise to the claims against him to support personal jurisdiction over him for any pled cause of action, the court granted the non-resident's special appearances and dismissed the claims against him without prejudice. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166(g), the Court issues this decision holding that (1) fact issues preclude the Court from determining whether the liquidated-damages clause in the parties' contract is an unenforceable penalty and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's cost-basis theory is not the correct measure of the plaintiff's actual damages. In this force-majeure dispute arising out of Winter Storm Uri, parties to a contract for the sale of natural gas dispute whether the seller should have (i) purchased gas on the spot market to cover any production shortfall or (ii) bought back its delivery obligation. The Court holds that the parties' contract did not obligate the seller to take either action as a prerequisite or alternative to declaring force majeure or as a contractually required "reasonable effort." Denying defendant's motion for summary judgment arguing that a contract does not require it to pay royalty payments on "revenues actually received by [the defendant] for final disposal of solid waste in the sanitary landfill operated on the Property," where the disposal is in a part of the landfill that is not on the Property. This opinion addresses whether a party may remove a case concer

As used in Minnesota Statutes section 268.19, subdivision 2(c), the phrase "absolutely privileged" provides immunity from liability in civil actions for which information submitted to the Department of Employment and Economic Development, in order to determine an applicant's entitlement to unemployment benefits, forms the subject matter or basis of the claim. Affirmed.