Court Rulings

Workers' compensation; spinal stenosis; expert opinions; manifest weight; high-dose steroids. The trial court's judgment finding that plaintiff was entitled to additional workers' compensation benefits was not against the manifest weight of the evidence even though there were conflicting expert opinions where there was evidence corroborating the plaintiff's expert opinion and there was no evidence corroborating the employer's expert opinion.

Concerning a personal injury suit premised on negligence arising out of the collision of a city trash truck and a private vehicle in routine traffic, the Court of Appeals erred in determining that sovereign immunity did not protect the city against the plaintiff's negligence claims but was correct in determining that the city's employee was not so protected. In Virginia, sovereign immunity protects municipalities from tort liability arising from governmental functions, and the removal of trash, when undertaken by a municipality, is a governmental function. Consequently, the city is immune from liability for negligence in performing or in failing to perform this function. However, since at the time of the collision, the city's employee was engaged in ordinary driving in routine traffic, as opposed to collecting trash, and only the latter activity required him to exercise judgment and discretion in the operation of the trash truck beyond that involved in ordinary driving, sovereign immunity does not bar the plaintiff's negligence claims against him. The portion of the Court of Appeals' judgment holding that the city does not benefit from sovereign immunity is reversed, but the portion of its judgment holding that the trash truck driver employed by the city does not benefit from sovereign immunity is affirmed, and the case is remanded to the Court of Appeals with instructions to remand the case for trial in the circuit court.

¶0 Melissa Evans died in a car accident on September 3, 2020, leaving a will that named her former spouse as the primary beneficiary and her descendants as contingent beneficiaries. Her son, Joshua Evans, initiated probate proceedings and, on November 17, 2020, obtained an order which admitted the will to probate, appointed Joshua as personal representative, and identified the heirs, devisees, and legatees. Joshua was later removed, and James Greer was appointed as successor personal representative. On January 5, 2024, Greer moved to vacate that portion of the 2020 order identifying heirs and beneficiaries. The motion alleged Joshua neglected to serve two individuals entitled to notice, including the decedent's former stepdaughter. The trial court granted the motion on March 25, 2024. Two months later the trial judge entered a new order modifying the list of heirs and beneficiaries, specifically finding Decedent's former stepdaughter was a beneficiary under the will. Joshua filed the present appeal on June 11, 2024, challenging both the court's authority to vacate the 2020 order and its subsequent determination of heir and beneficiary status. We retained the appeal but now dismiss it, concluding that Joshua's challenge to the vacatur order is untimely and that the interlocutory order identifying heirs, devisees, and legatees is not appealable.

The plaintiffs, retired law enforcement officers formerly employed by the defendant town, sought a judgment declaring that, pursuant to a pension agreement between the town and the union that had represented them during their employment, they were entitled to the same contributions to their health savings accounts (HSAs) that the town makes to the HSAs of police officers currently employed by the town (active police officers). The provision of the pension agreement addressing the scope of health insurance coverage for retirees provided that retirees are entitled to the ''nature and scope of coverages, including but not limited to deductibles . . . in effect for active [p]olice [o]fficers . . . .'' The pension agreement was incorpo- rated into a collective bargaining agreement, executed after all of the plain- tiffs retired, pursuant to which the town changed its group health insurance plan to a high deductible plan with an annual deductible of $2000 for single person coverage and $4000 for two or more person coverage. The collective bargaining agreement also requires the town to contribute 50 percent of the cost of an active police officer's annual deductible to the active police officer's HSA. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, and the Appellate Court upheld the trial court's decision, concluding that the pension agree- ment required the town to make the same HSA contributions to the plaintiffs' HSAs that it makes to the HSAs of active police officers. On the granting of certification, the defendant appealed to this court. Held: The Appellate Court incorrectly concluded that the pension agreement enti- tled the plaintiffs to the same HSA contributions as those made by the town to the HSAs of active police officers, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment, remanded the case, and directed that the trial court render judgment for the town. The plain and unambiguous meaning of the terms ''coverages'' and ''deduct- ibles,'' as

summary judgment; workers' compensation retaliation claim; R.C. 4123.90; no genuine issue of material fact regarding legitimate and non-retaliatory reason for termination