Court Rulings

Motion for judgment on the pleadings Civ.R. 12 Civ.R. 8 Civ.R. 10 pro se litigant false imprisonment confinement force threat of force breach of contract constitutional deprivation state actor discrimination. Appellant failed to plead actionable claims for false imprisonment, breach of contract, deprivation of constitutional rights, or discrimination. Accordingly, the trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion for judgment on the pleadings.

The plaintiff, a minority member of the defendant B Co., a Connecticut limited liability company, sought to recover damages from B Co. and the defendant C for, inter alia, breach of contract, and sought the dissolu- tion of B Co. on the ground of oppressive conduct. The plaintiff and C formed B Co. for the purposes of purchasing and operating a cafe. C received a 60 percent interest in B Co. and the plaintiff received a 40 percent interest in B Co. A hurricane caused the cafe to be closed for a period of time, and, despite an oral agreement between C and the plaintiff that neither would take any guaranteed payments from B Co. for fifty-two weeks, the plaintiff continued to take cash from B Co. during this period. C subsequently reconstructed the cafe's financial history, which revealed that the plaintiff had misappropriated approxi- mately $190,000 of B Co.'s funds. C amended the operating agreement of B Co., and terminated the plaintiff as a manager of B Co., terminated the plaintiff's son as an employee, stopped payment on certain checks issued to the plaintiff and changed the locks on the cafe to prevent the plaintiff from accessing the building. The plaintiff commenced the present action asserting various claims, including breach of fiduciary duty and oppression by C, and seeking the dissolution of B Co. pursuant to statute (§ 34-267 (a) (5)), and B Co. filed a counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty. After a bench trial, the court rendered judgment in favor of the defendants as to all counts of the plaintiff's complaint, and in favor of B Co. on the count of its counterclaim alleging breach of fiduciary duty. From the judgment rendered thereon, the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly concluded that B Co.'s counterclaim stated a claim on which relief could be granted: B Co. pleaded facts which sufficiently alleged a claim of breach of fiduciary duty, specifically, that the plaintiff owed a fiduciary duty to B Co., that the

CONTRACTS — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — R.C. 2721.12: The trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff employee on plaintiff's declaratory-judgment claim that tenure entitled plaintiff to continued employment absent just cause for his termination, because plaintiff met his initial burden demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact existed, presenting extrinsic evidence from plaintiff and a witness on the committee that recommended him for tenure, and defendant did not meet its reciprocal burden demonstrating a genuine issue of fact existed for trial, failing to combat plaintiff's extrinsic evidence that tenure included just cause protection. [But see DISSENT: The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on plaintiff's declaratory-judgment claim that tenure entitled plaintiff to continued employment absent just cause for his termination, because a genuine issue of fact existed for trial, both parties offering disputed evidence on whether plaintiff was an at-will employee at the time he was terminated]. The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on plaintiff's declaratory-judgment claim that tenure entitled plaintiff to procedural-due-process protections because plaintiff did not meet his initial burden demonstrating that no genuine issue of fact existed, presenting only a vague statement in his affidavit that tenure entitled him to an opportunity to challenge the allegations against him. The trial court's order granting a declaratory judgment did not violate R.C. 2721.12(A), because defendant failed to establish how the declaratory judgment would affect the College of Medicine, and therefore, that the College of Medicine was a necessary party to the litigation, never asserting what "legally protectable interest" the College of Medicine maintained in the dispute.

The trial court erred in granting appellees' motion to dismiss based on its finding that federal law preempts Ohio law relating to tampering with in-use motor vehicle emission control systems. Congressional intent to preempt the State law is not clear and manifest. Judgment reversed cause remanded.

Court of Claims' determination that the University breached its agreement with appellee was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the Court of Claims made an express determination that appellee's witnesses were more credible and persuasive than the University's witnesses and the evidence, though conflicting, supported a finding that many of the delays in construction were attributable to the construction manager, project architect, and other prime contractors. The Court of Claims' determination that the University breached the takeover agreement with appellee's Surety was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the undisputed evidence showed that the University never released any of the remaining contract funds to the Surety to pay for work completed by the Surety's subcontractor. Court of Claims did not err when it awarded damages to appellee for a breach of the takeover agreement where appellee had taken an assignment from the Surety of the Surety's right to the remaining contract funds held by the University. The University failed to demonstrate, with reference to the record, that the award of damages to appellee included compensation for work appellee did not complete. Having correctly determined the University breached both the agreement with appellee and the takeover agreement with the Surety, the Court of Claims did not err by denying contractual and statutory damages to the University as compensation for delays to project completion. Judgment affirmed.

In this negligence action, the plaintiff, Joshua Mello, appeals from a Superior Court grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant, Sean Killeavy, based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, G.L. 1956 § 28-29-20. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that, despite the limitation on remedies contained in the exclusivity provision, G.L. 1956 § 28-35-58, which governs the liability of thirds persons when an employee is injured, allowed him to bring a claim against his fellow employee for tortious acts of the coemployee that were outside the scope of employment, even after Mello had collected workers' compensation benefits. The Supreme Court held, after surveying cases considering purported exceptions to the exclusivity provision, that there was no exception to that statute's exclusive remedies for acts of coemployees, even acts that could be considered outside of the scope of the coemployee's employment. The Court concluded that, by accepting workers' compensation benefits and not retaining his common-law rights pursuant to § 28-29-17, the plaintiff was bound by the remedies in the Workers' Compensation Act. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Prohibition—Megan's Law provisions remain in effect for those who committed their offenses before enactment of the Adam Walsh Act—Judgment dismissing writ action affirmed.

Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction of age discrimination claim against school board where employee elected to file OCRC charge tortious violation of rights not recognized claim under Ohio law employee failed to submit proper evidence to support disability discrimination claim employee failed to make prima facie case of retaliation conduct supporting IIED claim not sufficiently extreme and outrageous no abuse of discretion in affirming termination under R.C. 3319.16.

Administrative Procedures Act Rule Making Exemption N.C.G.S. Sec. 135-5(a3) Teachers' and State Employees' Retirement System State Agency Adoption of Rules and Regulations

The plaintiff, Christopher G. Rein, appealed from a Superior Court order granting a motion to dismiss his action, which was brought by the defendants, ESS Group, Inc., Charles J. Natale, Jr., and the Charles J. Natale, Jr. 2003 Trust u/d/t January 23, 2003, as amended. Rein argued that the Superior Court justice erred in finding that Rein's complaint failed to state a claim under the Rhode Island Business Corporations Act (BCA) because ESS is incorporated in Delaware and Rhode Island does not have the authority to regulate the internal affairs of a foreign corporation, such as ESS. Rein also asserted that the hearing justice erred in dismissing his claim brought under the Whistleblowers' Protection Act (WPA) after finding that the WPA claim was premised on a violation of the BCA, to which the hearing justice had found ESS not subject. On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the hearing justice's decision in part and affirmed it in part. Specifically, the Court concluded that the BCA count was properly dismissed because the defendants' alleged violations of the BCA constitute "internal affairs," which Rhode Island has no authority to regulate. The Court held, however, that Rein's complaint sufficiently pled a WPA claim because, under the WPA, he need not prove that an actual violation of a law occurred, only that he reasonably believed that a violation occurred. The Court concluded that Rein's belief that the defendants were subject to and violated the BCA may well have been reasonable. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the hearing justice to dismiss the BCA count of Rein's complaint, and it reversed the dismissal of the WPA count.

summary judgment - sex discrimination - gender discrimination - sexual harassment - privacy interest - R.C. 4112.02(A) - retaliatory discrimination - circumstantial evidence - R.C. 4112.02(I) - aiding and abetting to commit discrimination - R.C. 4112.02(J)

Court of Claims erred in granting appellee's motion for summary judgment by finding a reasonable innocent construction applied as a matter of law to alleged defamatory statements. Appellee met its initial burden under Civ.R. 56 on the issue of whether certain employees of appellee were entitled to civil immunity, and appellant failed to meet her reciprocal burden to set forth specific facts demonstrating a genuine issue for trial on that issue. Judgment reversed cause remanded.

termination of attorney-client relationship prior contingency agreement does not bar attorney's recovery of reasonable value of services rendered prior to discharge, whether termination with or without just cause clients alleged a "stipulation" of full recovery was added to the contract summary judgment entered against law firm on quantum meruit counterclaim reversed and remanded summary judgment against clients on their legal malpractice claim affirmed claim requires evidence attorney's breach proximately caused damages settlement entered in underlying case after attorney terminated.

Arbitration stay contracts substantive and procedural unconscionability. Trial court did not err in staying matter pending arbitration where arbitration agreement met requirements of enforceable contract and was not procedurally or substantively unconscionable.

Sovereign immunity, immunity, political subdivision tort liability, employee, public school, public school teacher, teacher, R.C. 2744.03(A)(6), motion for judgment on the pleadings, motion to dismiss, Civ.R. 12(C), Civ.R. 12(B)(6).

Arbitration-Any limitation on an arbitrator's authority to modify a disciplinary action pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") provision requiring that discipline be imposed only for just cause must be specifically bargained for by the parties and incorporated into the CBA-CBA placed no limitation on arbitrator's authority to review disciplinary action imposed and fashion a remedy-Arbitrator's award draws its essence from CBA, and arbitrator acted within his authority-Court of appeals' judgment reversed, award reinstated, and cause remanded.

Appellant failed to plead fraud with particularity, and accordingly the trial court was correct in dismissing his complaint because his fraud claim failed, his derivative claim of civil conspiracy failed as well.