Court Rulings

Defendant doctor appeals a medical malpractice decision. We found that the doctor failed to disclose the risks with medical treatment, the plaintiff expert was qualified to testify of the causal connection between the medical treatment and harm, the trial court properly gave informed consent jury instructions and properly excluded failure to mitigate instructions, there is sufficient evidence to suppot the jury's verdict and the trial court properly conducted the trial and the determination of expert witness. Judgment affirmed.

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment to employer where, at the very least, evidence was in conflict.

These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court on an appeal and a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for review of a November 5, 2015 bench decision in Providence County Superior Court in favor of the plaintiff, John R. Grasso. The defendants, Governor Gina Raimondo, Frank Karpinski, the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, and the State of Rhode Island, contended before the Supreme Court that the trial justice erred in determining that Mr. Grasso need not comply with G.L. 1956 §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 in order to continue receiving his accidental disability pension because, in his view, those sections were not applicable to his pension. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Grasso was indeed required to comply with §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 and, as such, could be required to undergo independent medical examinations and disclose information with respect to gainful employment as conditions of his accidental disability pension under G.L. 1956 § 45-21.2-10. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Superior Court.

In a case stemming from liens due to nonpayment of condominium association dues, the trial court's verdict in the association's favor was not against the weight of the evidence. Award of full amount of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion. Motion to dismiss R.C. Chapter 5311 negligence fiduciary duty breach of contract summary judgment motion in limine discrimination spoliation.

Single joint employer doctrine retaliatory discharge sexual harassment/hostile work environment jury interrogatories plain error closing arguments

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee on a claim for an action on an accounting. The trial court abused its discretion by utilizing a certain accrual date in awarding prejudgment interest without making specific factual determination as to when the debt should have been paid. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings relating only to the issue of prejudgment interest.

Where a plaintiff in a complaint in the Court of Claims for breach of contract alleges breaches more than two years before its filing but fails to allege any breaches within two years of its filing or that breaches are ongoing, there is a facial showing that the two-year statute of limitations for actions in the Court of Claims bars the action. Where the Court of Claims makes such a finding that the statute of limitations has run, it satisfies the requirements for dismissal pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6) for failure to state a claim, but granting a motion to dismiss pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction based on facts not in the record such as being subject to a collective bargaining agreement is error. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part.

Summary judgment is not appropriate. The defendants were put on notice of various negligence claims through the complaint. Viewing the evidence most strongly in favor of the injured plaintiff, we find the weekly delivery represented a danger that Giant Eagle was aware of and did nothing to mitigate or take reasonable precautions against. The delivery man also could separately be found to be an employee. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The claimant, Michael J. Beagan, filed a petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court seeking review of a decision of the District Court affirming the denial of his unemployment benefits. Following his termination from employment with the defendant, Albert Kemperle, Inc., the Rhode Island Department of Labor and Training (DLT) denied Beagan's application for unemployment benefits on the basis that it had found he had been discharged for "disqualifying reasons" pursuant to the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Beagan sought review in District Court where DLT's decision was affirmed. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari and held that legally competent evidence did not exist in the record to support the District Court's decision affirming the Board of Review's finding that Beagan was discharged for "disqualifying reasons" in the manner contemplated by the Rhode Island Employment Security Act. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the judgment of the District Court, and directed entry of judgment in Beagan's favor.

School board employees were not entitled to statutory immunity on age discrimination and intentional infliction of emotional distress claims because genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether they acted with malice, in bad faith, wantonly, or recklessly in pursuing disciplinary proceedings against appellee. Employees were entitled to immunity as to retaliation claims where court identified no conduct attributable to them in denying summary judgment on the merits of the claim.

ADA, termination