Court Rulings

The trial court's ruling was not an abuse of its discretion that resulted in material prejudice to appellant as it is not unreasonable to find that the petition filed by appellee against her ex-husband in a divorce proceeding was irrelevant as it involved an unrelated matter and a different respondent from the case at issue. Moreover, even if assuming appellant's evidentiary argument had merit on this point, based on the evidence in this case, any error on this issue would have been harmless. Appellant was provided a full hearing as contemplated under R.C. 3113.31. The trial court finding of facts were satisfactory to enable a reviewing court to evaluate the existence of error. While the trial court would be better served with a more expansive examination in the order, its analysis at the conclusion of the hearing resolves any concerns by this court as to its ruling on this matter. The trial court's ruling was not against the manifest weight of the evidence as the trial court is best positioned to observe the parties and their testimony and make a determination as to their credibility. The trial court was not unreasonable in the scope of the order to include the minor children as protected parties. Judgment affirmed.

Husband's appeal of the property division in a divorce decree was not moot where Wife's evidence failed to demonstrate that he had satisfied that portion of the judgment. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to compensate Husband for Wife's claiming their minor son as a dependent for tax purposes during the pendency of the divorce or in allocating the debt on his credit cards solely to him, except for $1,500. The trial court abused its discretion in failing to address disputed property that Wife took from the marital home during the pendency of the case. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in designating Wife as residential and custodial parent of the minor child or in its determination of Husband's parenting time. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss complaint pleading stage de novo review civil conspiracy underlying tort independent unlawful act misappropriation of trade secret OUTSA preempted. A trial court's review of a Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss is limited to the four corners of the complaint along with any documents properly attached to, or incorporated within, the complaint. Within those confines, a court accepts as true all material allegations of the complaint and makes all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. A plaintiff is not required to prove his or her case within the complaint at the pleading stage. As long as there is a set of facts, consistent with the plaintiff's complaint, which would allow the plaintiff to recover, the court may not grant a defendant's motion to dismiss. An appellate court reviews de novo a trial court's decision granting a motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6). In this matter, appellant argues the trial court erred by dismissing its claim for civil conspiracy. To establish a civil conspiracy claim, the plaintiff must prove: (1) a malicious combination of two or more persons, (2) causing injury to another person or property, and (3) the existence of an unlawful act independent from the conspiracy itself. Our de novo review confirms that appellant failed to plead an unlawful act, that is separate and apart from the conspiracy itself. Appellant's failure proves fatal to this claim. As such, the trial court did not err when it dismissed appellant's claim for civil conspiracy. Appellant also argues that the misappropriation of trade secrets claim in Count 8 should not have been dismissed as being preempted by OUTSA. OUTSA displaces conflicting tort, restitutionary, and other laws of this state providing civil remedies for misappropriation of a trade secret Again, our independent review reveals that the allegations contained in Count 8 are, in substance, mirror images of those contained in Counts 4 and 5. As such, the tri

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-64c (a) (1)), it is a discriminatory practice ''[t]o refuse to sell or rent after the making of a bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable or deny, a dwelling to any person because of . . . lawful source of income . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 46a-64c (a) (3)), it is a discriminatory practice ''[t]o make, print or publish, or cause to be made, printed or published any notice, statement, or advertisement, with respect to the sale or rental of a dwelling that indicates any preference, limitation, or discrimination based on . . . lawful source of income . . . or an intention to make any such preference, limitation or discrimination.'' The plaintiff sought to recover damages for alleged housing discrimination in connection with certain statements that the defendant H, a real estate salesperson, made regarding the plaintiff's participation in the Section 8 Housing Choice Voucher Program. H served as an independent contrac- tor for the named defendant, R Co., a real estate broker. R Co., through H, entered into a listing contract with the defendant V for the exclusive right to lease an apartment owned by V and his wife. Thereafter, the plaintiff, through her real estate agent, B, submitted an application and offer to lease the apartment. After receiving the documents and speaking with V, who wanted the apartment rented by April 1, 2017, H notified B that they were ''all set'' for a lease commencing on that date. B then sent H blank section 8 paperwork to accompany the plaintiff's application. H and B then proceeded to exchange e-mails and text mes- sages, in which H repeatedly indicated that she was not aware that the plaintiff would be using a section 8 voucher, that she would have to speak to V, that the decision was up to V, and that she was not sure if V would want to wait for the section 8 approval process. H eventually texted B that V had received a competing offer for t

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for the alleged wrongful termination of her employment by the defendant, which she claimed was the result of pregnancy discrimination in violation of the Connecticut Fair Employ- ment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.). The defendant hired the plaintiff to work in its brand and creative strategy department. S, the only other employee in the department, was her supervisor. According to the plain- tiff, the two had a good working relationship through the end of her first month of employment, when the plaintiff informed S that she was pregnant. Thereafter, the relationship deteriorated. According to the plaintiff, S no longer invited her to collaborate on projects, became curt and unfriendly, and began to micromanage and criticize her work. S also started to document the plaintiff's alleged performance deficiencies. Less than five weeks after the plaintiff disclosed her pregnancy, S informed the plaintiff that her employment was being terminated for her poor performance. Following a trial to the jury, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of liability. Thereafter, the trial court denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and awarded the plaintiff economic damages in addition to prejudgment interest, postjudgment interest, and attorney's fees. On appeal to this court, the defendant challenged only one element of the plaintiff's prima facie case, namely, whether she established that the termination of her employment occurred under circumstances that gave rise to an inference of discrimination. Held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict: a. The plaintiff satisfied her initial burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination: there was sufficient evidence in the record from which a rational fact finder could have inferred that the termination of the plaintiff's employment was motivated by discriminatory bia

Claim for unpaid overtime wages App.R. 9(B) duty to file a transcript. Appellant failed to file a transcript of the trial that is the basis of her appeal. Accordingly, we have nothing to review and must presume the regularity of the lower court's proceedings.

While there is no evidence to support the commission's determination that the hearing officer made a clear mistake of law, the commission did not abuse its discretion invoking continuing jurisdiction based on a clear mistake of fact. There is also some evidence to support the conclusion that the commission identified and explained the bases for reconsidering the hearing officer's initial determination. The commission did not abuse its discretion in awarding 850 weeks of compensation pursuant to R.C. 4123.57(B) and Ohio Adm.Code 4123-3-3. Objections overruled in part and sustained in part. Writ of mandamus denied.

Home health aide sought workers' compensation benefits after she fell in the wet grass in the side yard of her client's home and sustained an injury to her back. The employee had completed her shift, had stayed with the client (a long-time friend) for approximately 15 minutes after her shift, and was leaving the home when she went to check on an unknown noise around the side of the house. The trial court did not err in concluding that the employee's injury did not occur in the course of and arising out of her employment. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court erred by overruling appellants' motion to dismiss under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) as the motion related to appellees' claims against 10 unnamed employees of appellants. Appellees claims against these defendants should have been dismissed because appellees did not satisfy the requirements of Civ.R. 15(D). Otherwise, the trial court did not err in overruling appellants' motion. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

Trial court erred by limiting cross-appellant's award of damages for appellant's breach of the non-compete provision in the independent contractor agreement to the additional salary cross-appellant would have earned from his limited liability company if appellant had not beached the agreement. Because cross-appellant was the contracting party, not his company, cross-appellant was the only party with standing to prosecute a claim against appellant, and he was entitled to recover all damages flowing naturally from the breach. Accordingly, the trial court erred when it failed to award damages to cross-appellant representing the full amount of profit lost. Sufficient evidence was presented by cross-appellant to support an award of damages representing that estimated gross profit lost over the two-year duration of the non-compete provision because cross-appellant's business was well-established, the financial records presented by cross-appellant permitted a reasonably reliable estimate of lost profit, and an award equal to two-years of estimated lost profit was necessary to place cross-appellant in the same position he would have occupied had appellant not breached the agreement. Judgment reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Summary judgment prima facie case sexual harassment gender discrimination retaliation. The trial court did not err in granting the appellees' motion for summary judgment because the appellant did not establish a prima facie case for sexual harassment, gender discrimination, or retaliation.

Trial court's judgment in favor of appellee on appellant's tortious interference with a contract claim is against the manifest weight of the evidence where the evidence in the record established the appellee's interference with the appellant's former employee's noncompete agreement was improper pursuant to the Siegel factors.

attorney-client privilege – emails – drafts – communications between client and attorney – communications between employees – legal advice – business purpose

A medical corporation cannot directly commit medical malpractice and may be held vicariously liable only when one or more of its principals or associates are liable for medical malpractice. Thus, when a doctor who is a shareholder of a medical corporation, rather than a traditional employee, is dismissed from a medical malpractice action, the corporation cannot be held liable for the plaintiff's injuries based on the doctrine of respondeat superior. Because that is the situation in this case, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the medical corporation. Judgment affirmed.

The plaintiff, who was a remainder beneficiary of a revocable trust, brought an action for damages against his sisters, B and R, and against D, the administrator of the estate of the plaintiff's mother, S, in connection with the administration of the trust. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that B and S, who had been cotrustees of the trust, had breached their fiduciary duties to him, and that S, D and R had fraudulently concealed, pursuant to statute (§ 52-595), facts that were necessary to his causes of action against them. In 2004, S and B filed an application with the Probate Court to remove the plaintiff as a trustee pursuant to statute (§ 45a-242 (a)). The court thereafter issued a written decree in which it found, inter alia, that the plaintiff had neglected to perform the duties of the trust and ordered his removal as a trustee. The court also issued orders pertaining to certain antique automobiles that were part of the trust. S and B thereafter acted as cotrustees until June, 2013, when the Probate Court issued an order removing them as cotrustees and appointing a successor trustee. After S died in 2015, the Probate Court appointed D the administrator of her estate. The plaintiff commenced his action against B, R and D in May, 2017. The trial court thereafter granted motions to strike that were filed by D and B as to certain counts of the complaint against them that alleged that the trust was a contract they had breached. R, D and B subsequently filed separate motions for summary judgment in May, 2018, in which they alleged that all counts of the complaint against them were time barred pursuant to the three year tort statute (§ 52-577) of limitations. While the three motions for summary judgment were pending, the plaintiff filed a revised complaint that added a count against B sounding in unjust enrichment, which was not thereafter adjudicated in the trial court's ruling on B's motion for summary judgment. The trial court then granted the summary judgment

Summary judgment agency apparent authority successor in interest statute of frauds equity fraudulent misrepresentation unjust enrichment civil conspiracy deposition. Plaintiff-appellant loaned over $400,000 dollars to the owner of Barker Products, which began suffering financial difficulties. The defendant-appellee approached the members of the company with a plan to purchase the company. The parties dispute whether the defendant promised the plaintiff employment and/or an equity share as part of the defendant's ownership in order to pay off the plaintiff's debt. The defendant purchased the assets of the company and renamed it Cleveland Plating. Plaintiff brought suit against the defendant alleging that the defendant had agreed to repay the loans through employment and/or the equity share. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment as to all claims. The court granted the motion and dismissed all the claims. We found that the motion was improperly granted as to two claims and that there were genuine issues of material fact as to whether the defendant, and an individual acting as his agent, had bound Cleveland Plating to pay off the plaintiff's loans.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants, H and city of New Haven, for injuries she sustained when she was struck by a police cruiser driven by H while she was a pedestrian crossing a city street. Following a bench trial, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her economic and noneconomic damages. In calculating the noneconomic damages, the trial court found that the emotional trauma suffered by pedestrians struck by vehicles is ''generally greater'' than that suffered by the occupants of a motor vehicle involved in an accident. On the defendants' appeal to this court, held that the trial court's factual finding that pedestrians struck by motor vehicles suffer greater emotional trauma than occupants of a motor vehicle involved in an accident was clearly erroneous; there was no evidence in the record to support the court's finding and it was not a matter of common knowledge but, rather, a determination subject to verification by medical science and, in light of the weight given by the court to this finding in reaching its award of noneconomic damages and the lack of subjective complaints from the plaintiff regarding any emotional trauma she suf- fered, the judgment with respect to the award of noneconomic damages was reversed and the matter was remanded for a new hearing in damages. Argued June 29—officially released October 13, 2020

SUMMARY JUDGMENT – RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR – NEGLIGENT HIRING – EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE: Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendants-appellees on plaintiff's respondeat superior and negligent hiring, supervision, and retention claims where the plaintiff offered no proof that defendants knew or should have known of the employee's propensity for sexual assault, or that the employee was acting within the scope of his employment while committing the sexual assault.

Workers' compensation—Whether a claimant has voluntarily retired or has abandoned the workforce is a question of fact for the Industrial Commission to determine—A court must uphold a factual determination by the commission so long as it is supported by some evidence in the record, regardless of whether evidence supporting a contrary conclusion also exists, even if the contrary evidence is greater in quality or quantity—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 business negotiation attorney-client waive common interest work product trade secret reasonable period of time draft ambiguous redact. Requester sought copies of email between respondent and the Cincinnati Bengals organization during negotiation of an agreement regarding real property purchase and management. Respondent denied access, claiming all email content was attorney-client privileged communication and attorney work product, and that some information in the emails was trade secret. The special master found that almost all content was merely negotiation of business terms, with no showing that the correspondence involved respondent counsels' legal professional services. The special master found that the privilege had been waived for emails that included an unnecessary third party, i.e., members of the Cincinnati Bengals organization or respondent's contracted publicity consultant. The special master found that respondent did not reasonably anticipate litigation over the matters communicated and thus the attorney work product privilege did not apply. The special master further found that respondent had neither identified nor supported any information in the communications as the county's trade secret. Respondent admitted that it misplaced and forgot the public records request for over three months. The special master found this constituted a violation of its duty in R.C. 149.43(B)(1) to respond "within a reasonable period of time."

Summary judgment in favor of appellee on claims of disability discrimination and retaliation is appropriate where appellant provided no evidence that he was able to perform the functions of the job, even with a reasonable accommodation, or that he engaged in a protected activity, respectively. Trial court does not abuse its discretion in denying motion for leave to amend the complaint where motion was untimely filed after summary judgment motion, resulting in prejudice to appellee.

Public records—R.C. 149.43—Mandamus—Statutory damages and attorney fees—Court of appeals' judgment denying writ of mandamus and requests for statutory damages and attorney fees affirmed.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to a city where former employee failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination and retaliation.

The plaintiff subcontractor, E Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant, S Co., for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with a dispute arising from a project relating to the expansion and renovation of a hospital. Pursuant to its contract with S Co., E Co. agreed to perform all electrical work for the project. The contract provided that E Co. had a duty to coordinate with S Co., that E Co. had made allowances for all hindrances and delays to its work, and that E Co. would work within S Co.'s schedule, which S Co. may revise from time to time. S Co. had the right to direct a change in E Co.'s work on written notice and, during the course of the project, thirty-eight change orders were issued. After several months, E Co. sent S Co. a notice, alleging a cardinal change to the contract due to issues that arose during the preceding months and asserting that it could only continue to perform under the contract if S Co. agreed to additional financial terms. S Co. responded that E Co.'s refusal to proceed under the contract constituted default and, the next day, S Co. terminated E Co. E Co. alleged that S Co. had breached the contract by its wrongful termination of E Co., and S Co. filed a counterclaim, alleging, inter alia, breach of contract. S Co. also filed a third-party complaint against K and T, the chief financial officer and president of E Co., respectively, alleging, inter alia, fraudulent conduct. The case was tried to the court, which rendered judgment in part for S Co. on its counterclaim, and in favor of K and T on the third-party complaint. On S Co.'s appeal and E Co.'s cross appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly rejected E Co.'s claim that there had been a cardinal change in the contract terms and properly concluded that E Co. breached the contract by abandoning the project: the court properly focused on the nature and impact of the delays on the work expected of and performed by E Co., which were not extraordinary in a pr

Appellant failed to produce sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could reject as pretextual the employer's legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for termination of poor work performance. Accordingly, there are no genuine issues of material fact in this case and it was not error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of MacIntosh. The judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.

Prohibition—In a child-custody proceeding, Ohio has home-state jurisdiction to make the first child-custody determination of a particular child when Ohio is the child's home state on the date of the commencement of the proceeding—Juvenile-court judge and magistrate do not patently and unambiguously lack jurisdiction—Writ denied.

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court denying her postdissolution motion for contempt, in which she claimed that the defendant had violated a certain alimony obligation contained in the parties' separation agreement. The separation agreement, which was incorporated into the dissolution judgment, required the plaintiff to pay the defendant alimony based on his annual income from employ- ment, which was defined as line 1 on the plaintiff's annual schedule K- 1 from his then employer, the law firm M. Co., and included a requirement that the plaintiff pay the defendant true up alimony based on his gross income over a certain amount. Subsequently, the plaintiff sold his inter- est in M. Co., where he had been a partner, and became a partner in a new law firm, G. Co. That year, the plaintiff received two schedule K- 1s, one from M. Co. and one from G. Co., each of which listed income amounts on lines 1 and 4. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's true up alimony obligation for that year must be based on the total of all of those lines and filed a motion for contempt based on the plaintiff's nonpayment of any true up alimony for that year. The defendant objected to the plaintiff's motion and requested statutory attorney's fees and costs. The trial court denied the motion for contempt and did not award attorney's fees to either party. On the defendant's appeal and the plain- tiff's cross appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly denied the defendant's motion for contempt: pursuant to the specific and plain language of the settlement agreement, which the parties freely agreed to use when they drafted the agreement, only income reported on line 1 of the schedule K-1 could be used in calculating the plaintiff's true up alimony obligation, and because the plaintiff's combined line 1 income from both K-1s was less than a certain amount, the defendant was not e

Job applicant's claim—that employer breached a unilateral contract of employment—failed where applicant failed to show that he satisfied the conditions set forth on pre-employment checklist.

public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 149.43(A)(2) investigatory uncharged suspect initial incident report moot reasonable period of time capable of repetition evading review naming labeling aggrieved person. Overview: Requester sought all police reports naming or involving listed university students and respondent had provided some records. Respondent redacted the name of one student, a suspect in the investigation of an alleged rape, from a report created by the first responding officer. Respondent asserted that the document was not an initial incident report - a type of law enforcement record to which the "uncharged suspect" exception asserted by respondent did not apply – but merely an "unapproved draft" in the investigation file. During litigation, respondent disclosed the suspect's name to the requester. The special master found that respondent's disclosure rendered the claim for production moot, but that the issue of whether production had been timely remained for determination. The special master further found that respondent's characterization of its police records involved important issues capable of repetition yet evading review. The special master found that the record underlying the dispute was an initial incident report compiled as such pursuant to the university police department's general orders and records management system. The special master recommended the court grant respondent's motion to dismiss the claim for production as moot, and further recommended the court find that respondent had failed to provide the requested report within a reasonable period of time.

Pursuant to Columbus Div. of Income Tax v. Capital Data Sys., 186 Ohio App.3d 775, 2010-Ohio-1026, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.), a judgment debtor who ultimately received a hearing was not prejudiced by allegedly not receiving notice of a nonwage order of garnishment under R.C. 2716.13(C) and (D), and, therefore, the trial court erred in ordering the disputed funds released to the judgment debtor instead of the judgment creditor. Judgment reversed cause remanded.