Court Rulings

In a mandamus action following an Ohio Adm.Code 3307:1-7-05 appeal, the trial court erred in failing to consider whether an independent physician report requested by the board of the State Teachers Retirement System under Ohio Adm.Code 3307:1-7-05(B)(5)(e) and letters of two medical review board members constitute some evidence to support the board's determination to terminate appellee's disability benefits under R.C. 3307.48. Judgment reversed, cause remanded.

Appellant did not demonstrate the trial court erred in designating the mother as legal custodian and residential guardian of a minor child without determining a change of circumstances occurred under R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a) since, at the request of both parties, the trial court terminated the prior shared parenting decree and plan pursuant to R.C. 3109.04(E)(2)(c). The trial court did not commit reversible error under R.C. 3119.01 in basing its child support calculations on appellant's prior employment where, pursuant to Dach v. Homewood, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-502, 2015-Ohio-4191, the record contained evidence to support a finding appellant was voluntarily underemployed. Judgment affirmed.

Where eminent domain is exercised by a utility business, condemnation for service to a single industrial customer does not forestall a finding that the taking is for a public use. In the absence of bad faith, gross abuse of discretion, or fraud by the condemning authority in its determination that the property sought is necessary for the authorized use and is pursuant to specific statutory authority, such determination should not be disturbed by the courts. The Supreme Court does not address inadequately briefed issues.

Ex-employee and wife, shareholders in family-owned trucking business, appeal court decision dismissing claims for attorney fees and for the value of alleged shareholder benefits, a company car, which the couple alleged were provided to other shareholders but denied to them following the ex-employee's termination. Shareholders had no statutory right to attorney fees limited to demonstrating bad faith. No bad faith where ex-employee sent one attorney letter demanding corporate records, company responded by stating that production of the records was unnecessary and invited additional discussion. Ex-employee did not respond filed a complaint over a year later. Shareholders failed to prove that company cars were shareholder benefits as opposed to employment benefits. Ex-employee had been chief financial officer and referred to his and wife's vehicle as part of "employment compensation package."

R.C. 4112.02(A), same-sex sexual harassment, supervisor, wrongful discharge, IIED, negligent hiring

This matter arises from a claim by plaintiff, Richard P. Sullivan, that he was entitled to pension benefits based on his tenure in various positions with the Town of Coventry. The plaintiff appealed a Kent County Superior Court judgment granting the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and the grant of defendants' alternative motion for summary judgment. On appeal, plaintiff asserted that the Superior Court erred in determining that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to review his claims and further argued that the hearing justice erred in reviewing and affirming the plan administrator's decision that denied plaintiff pension benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the hearing justice's grant of defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and thus did not reach the Superior Court's alternative grant of summary judgment. The Supreme Court reinstated plaintiff's prior petition for writ of certiorari, which the Court had previously denied, without prejudice, and consolidated it with the present appeal. The Court reviewed the plan administrator's decision denying plaintiff pension benefits and concluded that the decision was not arbitrary and capricious. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court regarding its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, and affirmed the decision of the plan administrator denying plaintiff pension benefits.

CIVIL - denial of judgment on the pleadings final appealable order R.C. 2744.02(C) statutory immunity employee of political subdivision school district malicious purpose, in bad faith, wanton or reckless negligence exceptions to immunity individual capacity official capacity R.C. 2744.02(B) R.C. 2744.03(A)(6).

Cummings was a deputy sheriff in Arapahoe County. The Sheriff terminated Cummings' employment, asserting that he violated the Sheriff's employee manual (the Manual) and was dishonest during the investigation of the original charges against him. Cummings exhausted his remedies within the Sheriff's department and sued for (1) wrongful discharge in violation of public policy, and (2) breach of an implied contract of employment, based on the policies in the Manual. The Sheriff moved to dismiss the wrongful termination claim based on governmental immunity, and the district court dismissed the claim with prejudice. The district court denied the Sheriff's motion to dismiss the implied contract claim, and the Sheriff moved for summary judgment. The district court denied the motion for summary judgment, holding that there was an implied contract of employment and disputed issues of material fact existed. The Sheriff brought an interlocutory appeal under C.A.R. 42 challenging the denial of summary judgment. On appeal, the Sheriff contended that the trial court erred in denying his motion for summary judgment. He argued that the at-will employment concept in CRS § 30-10-506 requires the court to hold that all policies promulgated by a sheriff relating to termination of deputy sheriffs' employment are only precatory, and to conclude otherwise would mean that the sheriff lacks the power to terminate at-will employees. CRS § 30-10-506 requires a sheriff to promulgate written employment policies, and the sheriff must give deputies the rights of notice and opportunity to be heard. A sheriff's other employment policies may be, but are not required to be, binding. If the sheriff elects to confer binding employment rights on his deputies, those rights are enforceable according to their terms. The Sheriff next argued that even if CRS § 30-10-506 allows sheriffs to promulgate binding personnel policies, the disclaimers in the Manual and the yearly disclaimers that Cummings signed preclu

Arbitration motion compel stay de novo contract whole context language intent arbitration clause placement subsection fee disputes Rules of Professional Conduct Ohio Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(f). Affirmed trial court's decision that denied defendants-appellants' motion to compel arbitration pursuant to R.C. 2711.03, to stay proceedings pursuant to R.C. 2711.02 and/or for order of dismissal. Upon examining the contract as a whole and reading the words of the arbitration clause in context, it was determined that the clear intent of the contracting parties was to limit the arbitration clause to disputes involving the division of attorney fees after termination of the employment agreement. The arbitration clause was placed within a subsection to the section of the agreement pertaining to the division of attorney fees, and the language referenced the Rules of Professional Conduct and any other requirements mandated by the Ohio Supreme Court for resolution of disputes between attorneys, which is consistent with arbitrating fee disputes pursuant to Ohio Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(f). Parties cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute they have not agreed to submit to arbitration.

Plaintiffs-appellants, who are mother and daughter, were employed by Defendant-appellee. Defendant-appellee terminated mother and daughter, resulting in the filing of a complaint alleging that their respective terminations were unlawful. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment against the daughter because she did not establish, through either direct or circumstantial evidence, a prima facie case that the termination decision was based upon her race. Further, the trial court, turning to the mother's case, did not err in dismissing her cause of action under Civ.R. 12(B)(6), because a termination based upon a family relationship, the only termination reason set forth in the complaint, is not, under R.C. 4112.02 or otherwise, an unlawful employment decision. Finally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by not allowing the mother to amend the complaint. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., concurring.)

Nonprofit Corporation Act, statutory interpretation, termination of membership

Workers' compensation-R.C. 4123.931(G)-A claimant becomes eligible for benefits at time of injury or death that occurred during course of employment and remains eligible unless and until a determination that claimant is not entitled to benefits has been made and has become final (i.e., is no longer subject to appeal) or, if no claim is filed, until time allowed for filing a claim has elapsed-Benefits applicant was a claimant at time she settled with insurance companies-Applicant and insurance companies are jointly and severally liable to statutory subrogee, Bureau of Workers' Compensation, for full amount of its subrogation interest-Court of appeals' judgment affirming trial court's summary-judgment entry vacated and cause remanded.

Because some evidence in the record supports the commission finding relator is medically capable of engaging in sustained remunerative employment of a sedentary nature and the relevant nonmedical disability factors do not preclude relator from currently engaging in such employment, the fact that the commission incorrectly relied on relator's non-allowed conditions as a basis for denying PTD in a separate portion of the order does not constitute grounds for the granting of a writ of mandamus. Writ denied.

Workers' compensation-Violation of specific safety requirement-Industrial Commission did not abuse it discretion in granting additional award-Record contained evidence supporting commission's finding that specific safety requirement applied, that employer violated it, and that violation was proximate cause of injury-Whether worker disobeyed employer's instruction to stay out of hazardous area is immaterial.

The Unemployment Compensation Review Commission did not err.

The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). Appellant's Civ.R. 60(B) motion was not an appropriate mechanism to challenge the trial court's judgment affirming a decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission denying appellant unemployment benefits. Judgment affirmed.

The defendant, Eric Neufville, appealed the hearing justice's sentencing determination on a probation violation and the denial of a motion for reconsideration. On appeal, the defendant argued that the hearing justice erred in denying the motion for reconsideration because he should not have found the key witness's testimony credible in light of newly presented evidence. As to sentencing, the defendant argued that the hearing justice abused his discretion in removing the suspension from the defendant's sixteen-year sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment. The Court first held that the hearing justice did not act arbitrarily or capriciously when he found the key witness's violation hearing testimony credible. As to the motion for reconsideration, the Court treated it as a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure and concluded that the motion was improper due to the defendant's untimely filing. The defendant filed the motion more than sixteen months after the violation hearing judgment. However, the Court noted that even if the defendant's motion was properly before it, the hearing justice did not err in denying the motion after taking into account the newly presented evidence. Finally, the Court held that the hearing justice did not abuse his discretion in sentencing the defendant to sixteen years in prison. The Court held that based upon the defendant's underlying convictions, coupled with the new robbery offense, the hearing justice was within his discretion to impose the sixteen-year sentence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the Superior Court's judgment.

Limitations agreement contained in an employment application is enforceable as a contract where it is supported by consideration in the form of the employer's promise to review the prospective employee's application.