Court Rulings

Arbitration award, collective bargaining agreement, police officer, public policy. The arbitration award modifying a police officer's termination to a substantial suspension, without back pay and benefits, drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement, was not unlawful, arbitrary, or capricious, and is not against public policy.

Tortious interference with employment

Real property-Deeds-Adverse possession-Court of appeals' determination that 1882 deed created a fee simple absolute affirmed-In re Petition of Copps Chapel Methodist Episcopal Church disapproved to extent it suggested that a deed can create a determinable fee only by including language explicitly saying that property would revert to grantor upon occurrence of stated event-A title holder's licensee may defeat exclusivity element of an adverse-possession claim if licensee performs acts on the land that would ordinarily require owner's permission-Licenses granted by railroad company that previously owned abandoned rail corridor to two telecommunications companies and associated corridor-maintenance activities failed to defeat exclusivity element of adverse-possession claims of neighboring landowners-Railroad companies' activities on corridor were insufficient to defeat exclusivity element of two adverse-possession claims but sufficient as to third-Court of appeals' determination that genuine issues of material fact exist and preclude summary judgment as to two adverse-possession claims affirmed, and cause remanded-Court of appeals' determination that genuine issues of material fact exist and preclude summary judgment as to third adverse-possession claim reversed.

Where the evidence and circumstances showed that company-wide demographic statistics were likely to prove relevant to a disparate impact claim (either to aid or damage the claim), such statistics were properly discoverable and summary judgment granted against claimants denied their discovery is reversed.

In the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of Miami Valley Hospital on Noelle Diller's claims of sexual harassment (hostile environment) and retaliation. While the trial court abused its discretion in striking Exhibits B, C, and D, attached to Diller's memorandum in opposition to MVH's motion for summary judgment, since the Exhibits were properly authenticated business records, the documents were either not in dispute, were otherwise part of the record, or were not relevant to the summary judgment decision, and the error was harmless. Judgment affirmed.

R.C. 2744.02, political subdivision immunity, summary judgment, R.C. 2744.09, employment relationship, employee. Plaintiff's claims arose out of her employment relationship with the county, and the county is not immune from liability pursuant to the exception in R.C. 2744.09(B).

Breach of attorney fee agreement independent review objections to magistrate's decision Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) failure to file transcript waiver of objections to factual findings form of signature individual liability narrative billing reasonableness of attorney fees. Appellant waived factual challenges to magistrate's decision by failing to file a transcript or affidavit with the trial court as required under Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii). Appellate court could not consider transcript on appeal that was not provided to the trial court when ruling on objections to magistrate's decision. Trial court did not abuse its discretion in adopting magistrate's conclusion that appellant was individually liable under attorney fee agreement where both the form of the promise and the form of appellant's signature to the agreement supported that determination. Law firm's alleged failure to submit itemized billing statements did not preclude it from recovering for breach of attorney fee agreement. Appellant's claim that law firm failed to present sufficient evidence establishing that its fees were reasonable and necessary could not be considered because it would involve a factual analysis of the evidence presented before the magistrate.

The phrase "intoxicated person" in Ohio's Dram Shop Act, R.C. 4399.18, includes not only patrons but also workers, independent contractors, and others served by the permit holder-Dram Shop Act applies to determine liability of permit holder who sold intoxicating beverages to an intoxicated worker or independent contractor whose intoxication caused an injury.

Court-ordered dissolution of PLLC accounting and distribution appointment of referee procedures used by referee summary judgment

J.C. obtained a temporary civil protection order (CPO), issued on JDF Form 399, against her ex-boyfriend Hartsuff. The county court made the CPO permanent in 2015. Among other things, the CPO states that it does not expire and only the court can change it. It prohibits contact of any kind and includes a notice to the protected person that she cannot give the restrained person permission to change or ignore the order. The restrained person is similarly notified that if he violates the order because he believes the protected person has given permission, he is wrong and can be arrested and prosecuted. J.C. called the police and stated Hartsuff was on her front porch threatening her. In addition, J.C. showed the responding officer text messages and logs of phone calls from Hartsuff over the previous two days. Hartsuff was charged with harassment and violation of a protection order, both as acts of domestic violence. Hartsuff raised the affirmative defense of consent, which the trial court allowed. The district attorney sought judicial review pursuant to CRCP 106(a)(4), contending that the harm sought to be prevented by the CPO statute is broader than simply contact between the protected and restrained persons and includes preserving the integrity of a court order and preventing domestic violence. The district court found no abuse of discretion and remanded to proceed with trial. The district attorney appealed. The sole issue on appeal was whether the affirmative defense of consent as defined in CRS § 18-1-505 is available to a defendant who is criminally charged with violating a CPO. The Court of Appeals considered the entire statutory scheme relating to the offense of a violation of a protective order to give effect and meaning to all its parts. Under CRS § 18-1-505, the defense of consent of the victim is not available to any crime unless "the consent negatives an element of the offense or precludes the infliction of the harm or evil sought to be prevented by the law

Plaintiffs sued the Clark County Board of Developmental Disabilities ("CCDD") and three of its employees after a CCDD client bit a young child. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to the CCDD defendants on Plaintiffs' claims arising out of the provision of service and support administration to the CCDD client. The CCDD defendants were entitled to immunity, pursuant to R.C. Chapter 2744. Judgment affirmed.