Court Rulings

The trial court erred in denying an employer's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Because the employee-claimant was precluded from refiling her complaint under R.C. 4123.512(D), the trial court should have granted the employer's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Reversed and remanded.

Arising out of and in the course of employment work-related activity negligence theory

Stay arbitration vehicle purchase Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act CSPA negligent misrepresentation Magnusson Moss Warranty Act unconscionable procedural substantive adhesion unequal bargaining public policy due process protocol R.C. 2711.02 hearing discretion. Trial court's decision to stay case pending arbitration was upheld. All claims surrounding the purchase of a vehicle fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement, which was neither procedurally or substantively unconscionable. A trial court has discretion to hold a hearing on the motion to stay pursuant to R.C. 2711.02, and the court did not abuse that discretion where it ordered supplemental briefing and had an adequate record upon which to make a determination without a hearing.

Retaliatory-discharge retaliation whistleblower retaliation. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of a hospital in an action filed by a nurse who claimed she was discharged by the hospital in retaliation for her reporting an abuse by a nursing aide who raised all four rails of a resident's bed to confine the resident. Appellant nurse failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding her retaliatory-discharge claim under R.C. 3721.24 or whistleblower retaliation claim under R.C. 4113.52

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) on a retaliation claim was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and that the ALJ had not improperly excluded evidence at the hearing. Judgment affirmed.

Breach of Contract—Unjust Enrichment—Colorado Wage Protection Act—Civil Theft—Conversion—Economic Loss Rule—Attorney Fees. Bermel entered into a "Contractor Agreement" with BlueRadios, Inc. under which he provided engineering services to BlueRadios. He also signed a "Proprietary Information and Inventions Agreement" (PIAA). The parties later ended their relationship. Anticipating that he might end up in litigation over unpaid wages, Bermel breached the PIAA by forwarding to his personal email account thousands of BlueRadios emails and attachments, some of which contained proprietary information. Bermel sent a demand letter to BlueRadios for unpaid wages, which BlueRadios paid. Bermel thereafter filed a lawsuit against BlueRadios asserting claims for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and violation of the Colorado Wage Protection Act (CWPA). BlueRadios filed counterclaims against him, including breach of contract civil theft, under CRS § 18-4-405 and conversion. The court granted summary judgment in favor of BlueRadios on Bermel's CWPA claim, and following trial, found Bermel liable on all of BlueRadios' counterclaims. On appeal, Bermel contended that the trial court erred when it denied his motion for summary judgment, in which he argued that the economic loss rule barred BlueRadios' claim for civil theft. Because the economic loss rule is a judicial construct and a civil theft claim is a statutory cause of action, the economic loss rule does not preclude a cause of action under the civil theft statute. Bermel also argued that the trial court erred in granting BlueRadios' motion for summary judgment on his CWPA claim, contending that the court failed to apply the CWPA's definition of "employee" when it concluded he was an independent contractor. The evidence attached to BlueRadios' motion for summary judgment did not establish that Bermel was free from control and direction under his contract or that he was customarily engaged in an independent trade, occupation

Property Tax Valuation—Standing—Fee Owner. Traer Creek-EXWMT LLC (Traer) is a lessee of a commercial building on Tract B. Under a "Declaration of Easements," Traer is contractually obligated to pay the property taxes "directly to the appropriate taxing authorities." But since Traer assumed the lease, the owner has made those payments and Traer has reimbursed the owner. Traer (but not the owner) initiated the statutory protest and adjustment process to challenge the 2015 valuation of Tract B, and the assessor declined to adjust the valuation. Traer appealed the notice of determination to the Eagle County Board of Equalization (Board), which upheld the valuation. Traer then appealed the Board's decision to the district court, which dismissed the case based on lack of standing. On appeal, Traer contended that the district court erred in ruling that it did not have statutory or common law standing to object to and protest a valuation. The fee owner is the only party given statutory standing to object to and protest the assessor's valuation of real property in fee. Traer's contention that he has common law standing fails because when a statute limits standing, a court cannot disregard that limitation by employing notions of common law standing. Traer also argued that the court improperly adopted the Board's factual assertions concerning the amount of Traer's leased space and his tax liability to the owner. The Court determined that these assertions are irrelevant to the standing issue, so any error as to those facts is harmless. The judgment was affirmed.