Court Rulings

A medical product sales representative brought suit against her former employer, a hospital, claiming retaliation in violation of the Tennessee Human Rights Act. After a bench trial, the trial court judge entered a verdict in favor of the hospital, having concluded that the employee failed to carry her burden of proof. In spite of dismissing the employee's case, the trial court awarded the employee a portion of her attorney's fees as "sanctions" against the hospital for making an allegedly late-filed motion to strike the employee's demand for a jury trial, which the trial court granted. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the employee's retaliation claim, and we reverse the trial court's order granting the employee attorney's fees.

Dependency and Neglect—Indian Child Welfare Act Notice—Bureau of Indian Affairs. In this dependency and neglect proceeding, J.S.R. is the father of one of the four children. He told the Weld County Department of Human Services (Department) that he had Cherokee heritage on his father's side and his lineage descended from a tribe in Arkansas, but he did not know which tribe. The Department did not notify any tribe or the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) of the dependency and neglect proceeding. Following the filing of their motion to terminate parental rights, the Department sent notice of the termination proceedings to the three federally recognized Cherokee Tribes. Each responded that the child was not a member or eligible for membership. The Department also notified the BIA, but did not mention J.S.R.'s reported affiliation to an unknown tribe in Arkansas. No further inquiry was made and all three parents' parental rights were terminated. On appeal, J.S.R. contended that the trial court and the Department did not comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) after he asserted Native American heritage. He argued the Department failed to comply with the ICWA's notice requirements because it did not send notice to any tribes in Arkansas. ICWA-implementing legislation in Colorado requires that in dependency and neglect proceedings, the petitioning party must make continuing inquiries to determine whether the child is an Indian child. When there is reason to know or believe that a child involved in a child custody proceeding is an Indian child, the petitioning party must send notice of the proceeding to the potentially concerned tribe or tribes. The BIA publishes a list of designated tribal agents for service of ICWA notice in the Federal Register each year. There are no federally recognized tribes with designated tribal agents in Arkansas. If the identity or location of a tribe cannot be determined, notice must be given to the BIA. While the ICWA does not requi

Summary judgment constitutionality tax certificate foreclosure statute attorney general R.C. 5721.371 magistrate's decision extension of time motion to reconsider jurisdiction declaratory judgment. Trial court properly granted summary judgment ordering foreclosure on tax certificate holder's certificates where delinquent property owners did not produce any evidence demonstrating a genuine issue of material fact regarding the certificate owner's right to foreclose or the amounts due trial court was without jurisdiction to render a declaratory judgment regarding the constitutionality of Ohio's tax certificate legislation because the Ohio attorney general was not served in the action as required by R.C. 2721.12(A) the trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision awarding attorney fees even without a determination of the reasonableness of the fees because the magistrate awarded attorney fees less than $2,500 and under R.C. 5721.371(B)(1), attorney fees less than or equal to $2,500 are presumptively reasonable trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for extension of time to respond to magistrate's decision where appellants' counsel was not newly retained and had been working on the case for two months before he filed a notice of appearance trial court did not err in denying appellants' motion for reconsideration because it raised new issues that were not raised in appellants' motions for summary judgment and responses to plaintiff's summary judgment motion.

Residential lease holdover tenant security deposit month-to-month tenancy lease agreement R.C. 5321.16(B) R.C. 5321.17(B). The lower court's judgment ordering landlord to return month-to-month holdover tenant's security deposit was in error where tenant failed to provide landlord 30 days notice of her intent to terminate the tenancy.

LEGAL MALPRACTICE - PROCEDURE/RULES - CIV.R. 56 - SUMMARY JUDGMENT: For purposes of determining the proper statute of limitations, a cause of action is determined not from the language or form of the complaint, but from the gist-the essential ground or object-of the complaint where plaintiffs' claims arose out of the manner in which they were represented by counsel within the attorney-client relationship, their claims sound in legal malpractice, despite being labeled otherwise. While the determination of whether a statute of limitations bars claims often presents a mixed question of fact and law, when no genuine issues of material fact remain, the application of a statute of limitations presents a question of law appropriate for resolution by summary judgment. Under R.C. 2305.11(A), a cause of action for legal malpractice accrues and the limitations period begins to run either (1) when there is a cognizable event by which the plaintiff discovers or should discover the injury giving rise to a claim and is put on notice of the need to pursue possible remedies against the attorney or (2) when the attorney-client relationship for that particular transaction terminates, whichever occurs later a cognizable event is "some noteworthy event" that would alert reasonable persons that they have been damaged as a result of improper representation, such as when a client learns of an adverse decision in litigation. A report, attached as an exhibit to a memorandum in opposition to summary judgment, which was not sworn to, certified, or incorporated by reference into a properly framed affidavit is not the type of evidentiary material contemplated under Civ.R. 56(C) or 56(E) a court may not consider evidence other than that specifically listed in Civ.R. 56 when an opposing party has made a timely objection to the use of that evidence. While sworn pleadings, like a verified complaint, constitute evidence for some purposes under Civ.R. 56, where a party moving for summary judgment has

Summary judgment, negligence, workers' compensation immunity, R.C. 4123.74, R.C. 4123.35, loss of consortium. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the employer because it complied with the relevant workers' compensation statutes and, therefore, was immune to the plaintiff's negligence claim. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the employer as to the plaintiffs' claim for loss of consortium because that claim was dependent upon the plaintiffs' underlying claims, which were dismissed on summary judgment.

Magistrate decision abuse of discretion credibility trier of fact. Judgment affirmed. Trial court's decision adopting magistrate's decisions was not an abuse of discretion. When testimony is in dispute, we defer to the trier of fact's credibility determination. Here the factfinder found in favor of defendants on some claims and in favor in plaintiff on other claims.

Negligent promotion negligence summary judgment Civ.R. 56 employment relationship proximate cause supervisor authority knowledge borrowed or loaned servant control imputed knowledge reasonable care. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of an employer that had knowledge of circumstances of an individual it promoted to a position of authority that could endanger other employees. Material questions of fact remain. The court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of another appellee where it had no knowledge of such circumstances and knowledge could not be imputed to it.

Unemployment compensation/Whether quit with just cause

Motion to vacate motion for relief from judgment Civ.R. 60(B) default judgment service of process void judgment personal jurisdiction due process Civ.R. 4.1 evidentiary hearing abuse of discretion. Appellant's motion to vacate the default judgment entered against her based on lack of service contained operative facts that warranted relief from judgment. Thus, the trial court abused its discretion by denying appellant's motion to vacate without holding an evidentiary hearing.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 R.C. 1333.61 kept person responsible trade secret copyright grant application attorney-client moot. Overview: Requester sought copies of federal grant application forms filed by respondent fire district. Respondent claimed that the contents of the applications were not "records" of the fire district, or alternatively were trade secret and copyright interests held by the fire district and a privately contracted grant writer. The special master found that the applications were public records documenting the official activities of the fire district, and that the contents did not reveal any secret trade methodology. As technical writing to answer questions in an application form, the contents involved negligible creativity as a claimed "literary work." Requester's purpose qualified as "fair use" in any case. The special master recommended a finding that the contents of the grant applications did not fall under either the Ohio uniform trade secrets act, or federal copyright law. The special master found the that respondent had properly redacted the narrative portions of requested itemized attorney billing statements.

board of Education, termination of contract, abuse of discretion, referee's report and recommendation, R.C. 3319

This appeal concerns whether a tax on certain property containing oil and gas deposits constitutes an unlawful additional severance tax. The Coal Creek Company ("Coal Creek") appealed the tax assessments of various county property assessors ("Assessors"). After administrative proceedings and appeals, the Tennessee Assessment Appeals Commission reinstated the original assessments. Coal Creek filed suit in the Chancery Court for Knox County ("the Trial Court") seeking judicial review of the Appeals Commission's decision. Following a bench trial, the Trial Court entered an order dismissing Coal Creek's complaint. Coal Creek appeals to this Court. We hold, inter alia, that the taxes assessed upon Coal Creek's property relative to oil and gas remaining in the ground are property taxes, not a severance tax. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

Trial court abused its discretion when it reversed the appealable administrative order of the appellant/cross-appellee to terminate the employment contract of appellee/cross-appellant. Judgment reversed. R.C. 3319.16, Administrative appeal to trial court standard of review, a preponderance of substantial, reliable and probative evidence, appeal of trial court decision standard of review, abuse of discretion.

Stay versus dismissal of action pending arbitration R.C. 2711.02(B) class arbitration contract interpretation Garmon preemption gateway issues for judiciary National Labor Relations Act

Workers' compensation-Violation of a specific safety requirement-Ohio Adm.Code 4123:1-5-17(G)(1)(a)(i)-Protective headgear must be provided whenever employees are required to be in places where their heads are exposed to potential hazards-Employer's argument was not waived-An employer does not face liability for violation of a specific safety requirement when it did not know of the specific danger requiring a safety device-Court of appeals' judgment denying writ of mandamus reversed and limited writ granted.

arbitration agreement, unconscionability, waiver of a jury trial, scope of arbitration

Negligence employer intentional tort Wellman v. East Ohio Gas Co., 160 Ohio St. 103, 113 N.E.2d 629 (1953) active participation open and obvious assumption of the risk deliberate misrepresentation.

Sealing of records-R.C. 2953.33(B)-Questions explicitly requiring disclosure of sealed convictions on Department of Developmental Disabilities applications to renew registration as adult-services worker did not violate R.C. 2953.33(B) because questions were directly and substantially related to appellant's position with appellee and his qualifications for adult-services registration-Court of appeals' judgment affirming appellant's termination for dishonestly answering the questions affirmed.

R.C. 2307.91 et seq., Ohio Asbestos Reform Act, Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45 U.S.C. Sec. 51, et. seq., railroad worker, competent medical authority, substantial occupational exposure to asbestos. Viewed in a light most favorable to claimant pursuant to R.C. 2307.92, the trial court properly denied railroad employers' motion for administrative dismissal of employee's claim under the Ohio Asbestos Reform Act and FELA. The Ohio Asbestos Reform Act's prima facie requirements are procedural, not substantive, in nature. Appellee, a smoker suffering from cancer who claims railroad asbestos exposure during employment is a substantial cause of his impairment, must provide substantiation from a competent medical authority. Asbestos exposure is not required to be the sole or predominant cause, but a "predominate" cause, i.e., a substantial factor. A trial court is not precluded from considering supplemental medical evidence offered to support the prima facie case as the rules of evidence are relaxed in administrative proceedings.

N.C.G.S. Sec. 97-84 waiver N.C. Workers' Compensation Act Statutory employer