Court Rulings

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Baldwin County, Harry J. Wilters, Jr., J. Page 429

<p>Action in the district court for Ramsey county against William J. Hoy and Michael J. O’Neil to recover $37,500 for personal injuries ¡sustained by plaintiff while in the employ of defendant O’Neil, an independent contractor, in a building of which defendant Hoy was -the general contractor. After the death of plaintiff, the special administrator of his estate was substituted in his place.</p> <p>The complaint alleged that the injury to plaintiff was received without any negligence on his part, and solely through the negligence •of defendant O’Neil in directing plaintiff to work on the fifth floor •close to a hoisting apparatus and hoistway which were unguarded by any barrier or railing, such hoistway being an exceedingly unsafe ¡and dangerous place; that defendant Hoy failed to guard such apparatus and hoistway and operated the apparatus in a wantonly careless and wilfully negligent manner, and in failing to raise said -apparatus after plaintiff was wedged in said hoistway. Defendant Hoy, in his separate answer, admitted the injury but expressly denied his negligence, alleged that he had no knowledge of the duties of plaintiff and therefore denied that at the time and place of the ■accident he was engaged in the discharge of any duty whatever to •defendant O’Neil. Before the trial it was stipulated that the action should be dismissed as to defendant O’Neil, without prejudice to ■either party.</p> <p>The ease was tried before Brill, J., who directed a verdict in favor ■of defendant. From an order denying plaintiff’s motion for a new trial, he appealed.</p>

<p>Appeal, No. 293, Jan. T., 1909, by defendant, from judgment of C. P. Erie Co., Sept. T., 1908, No. 150, on verdict for plaintiff in case of Harry Moore v. B. F. Sturtevant Company.</p> <p>Trespass to recover damages for personal injuries. Before Walling, P. J.</p> <p>The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.</p> <p>Verdict and judgment for plaintiff for $5,000. Defendant appealed.</p> <p>Errors assigned were various instructions.</p>

<p>APPEALS BY G. W. GUTHRIE AND EDWIN BINDLEY EROM THE COURT OE COMMON PLEAS NO. 2 OE ALLEGHENY COUNTY, IN EQUITY.</p> <p>Nos. 168, 159 October Term 1889, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 211 January Term 1881 (acct. at No. 180J- July Term 1888), C. P. No. 2, in Equity.</p> <p>On November 8,1879, to No. 150 January Term 1880, C. P. No. 2, J. T. Stockdale, trustee of the Pittsburgh Savings Bank, filed a bill in equity against Michael Maginn and others, shareholders, for a dissolution of the bank, for a receiver, and for an account; and on November 22, 1879, B. C. Christy was appointed the receiver. Among the assets of the bank was cer-. tain real estate, to secure possession of which the receiver brought ejectment, at No. 211 January Term 1881, against Bella H. Y. Sill et all. Before the final determination of this ejectment, it was compromised, the receiver being made a trustee for himself and the defendants in the ejectment, to sell the land and distribute the proceeds according to a certain method.</p> <p>On April 28,1888, to No. 180J July Term 1888, Mr. Christy, as trustee, filed an account of the fund realized by him from the sale of the land, amounting to 112,486.55, and on June 15, 1888, Mr. Magnus Pflaum was appointed auditor to distribute the fund. Subsequently, of the fund for distribution, $11,295.30 was awarded to B. C. Christy, receiver of the Pittsburgh S. Bank.</p> <p>On September 8, 1888, on motion of Mr. A. M. Brown for creditors of the Pittsburgh S.- Bank, but, as it Avas claimed, without notice, and notwithstanding the pendency of the proceedings at No. 150 January Term 1880, in which the receiver was appointed, and that the order appointing Mr. S. A. Me-Clung general master in that case was still in force, the court made an order that the order appointing Mr. Pflaum auditor be enlarged by adding thereto the further direction that the said auditor should report a distribution of the fund, to wit, $11,295.30, in the hands of the receiver. It was in the di

R.C. 3105.171; Cuyahoga C.P., Dom.Rel.Div., Loc.R. 14; financial disclosure statement; motion for new trial; new evidence; abuse of discretion; notice of appeal; determination of marital property. Husband, pro se, filed a complaint for divorce. Wife, pro se, filed an answer and counterclaim. Pursuant to Cuyahoga C.P., Dom.Rel.Div., Loc.R. 14, the court issued an order requiring financial disclosure statements to be filed. Wife filed statement; husband did not. Parties appeared for trial and proceeded pro se. After trial and divorce decree issued, counsel for wife appeared and issued subpoenas. Counsel then filed a motion for new trial. After the court denied the motion for new trial, counsel filed a notice of appeal from the divorce decree and the denial of the motion. Counsel also filed a motion for relief from judgment. Counsel sought and was granted a remand from appellate court for the court to rule upon the motion for relief from judgment. After the court denied the motion, no notice of appeal of the denial was filed. The domestic relations court did not commit an error of law by proceeding to trial where husband had not filed a financial disclosure statement. Neither R.C. 3105.71 nor Cuyahoga C.P., Dom.Rel.Div., Loc.R. 14 prohibits trial where disclosures are not made. Further, wife did not seek discovery prior to trial. The domestic relations court did not abuse its discretion by denying wife's motion for new trial where that motion was based on evidence that could have been reasonably obtained before trial. The appellate court did not have jurisdiction to review the court's denial of the motion for relief from judgment where no notice of appeal was taken of that judgment. The court's resolution of the evidence at trial to determine whether a condominium was marital property was not unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious where the wife's testimony regarding the purchase of the condominium was inconsistent.

Divorce; Evid.R. 611; expert witness; expert report; separate property; financial tracing; division of property; motion to show cause; contempt; financial misconduct; distributive award; child tax exemption; temporary support; time limitations; due process; attorney fees; abuse of discretion; custody determination; best interest of the children; marital debts; imputed income. Our standard of reviewing decisions of a domestic relations court is generally the abuse-of-discretion standard. Upon review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The trial court did not err in admitting evidence from an expert witness related to the financial tracing of various claim separate property. The court did not abuse its discretion in its division of marital property and separate property, or in its allocation of marital debts and liabilities. Plaintiff-appellant was not entitled to a distributive award where defendant-appellee did not commit financial misconduct. The allocation of parental rights and responsibilities and the order to alternate the child tax exemption was not an abuse of discretion. Finally, the trial court did not err in imputing income to defendant-appellee.

Quo warranto—Mandamus—Appellants failed to challenge court of appeals' judgment dismissing their quo warranto claim on basis of laches and therefore waived that argument—Court of appeals' determination that appellants could not establish entitlement to city-council offices or that appellees were unlawfully holding the positions affirmed—Court of appeals' denial of request for writ of mandamus ordering continued payment of salaries and benefits as moot affirmed.

Menacing; ethnic intimidation; R.C. 2903.22(A); R.C. 2927.12(A); misdemeanor; Crim.R. 29; sufficiency; manifest weight; race; color; racial slurs; racially abusive language; predicate offense; underlying offense; motivating factor; totality of the circumstances; infer; venue; R.C. 2901.12(H); course of conduct. Affirmed appellant's convictions for menacing under R.C. 2903.22(A) and ethnic intimidation under R.C. 2927.12(A). The convictions were supported by sufficient evidence and were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Following a disagreement over a shoe return, there were multiple interactions with the employees of the store in which appellant engaged in menacing conduct and repeatedly directed racial slurs at one of the victims. Although words alone are generally not enough to establish ethnic intimidation, in this matter the appellant engaged in actions and ongoing behavior from which it could be reasonably inferred that she committed the predicate offense of menacing, at least in part, by reason of race, color, religion, or national origin. Appellant failed to demonstrate plain error in regard to her venue challenge, and venue was proper pursuant to R.C. 2901.12(H)(1) and (3).

capacity to contract; threshold issue for the court; motion to dismiss; motion to enforce arbitration agreement; R.C. 2711.02.

gender discrimination, hostile work environment, negligent retention/supervision, motion to dismiss, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), statute of limitations, directed verdict, similarly situated employee, judgment notwithstanding the verdict, JNOV, Civ.R. 50(B), Evid.R. 702, attorney fees, prejudgment interest

The named defendant, E, an employee of the plaintiff, the Department of Public Health, filed a complaint with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the plaintiff retaliated against her for a whistleblower disclosure that she had made and that allegedly was protected by statute ((Rev. to 2017) § 4-61dd). E's job duties included reviewing the qualifications of individuals who are appointed to be a municipal director or acting director of health. The department had received an appointment letter from the then director of health of Hartford, requesting approval of W as Hartford's acting director of health. Both the letter and W's resume represented that W held a master's degree in public health, which is one of two alternative statutory ((Rev. to 2015) § 19a-200 (a)) prerequisites for the appointment to the position of municipal director of health. E reviewed the request, including W's resume, and she drafted a letter approving the appointment without first verifying that W actually possessed a master's degree in public health. The Commissioner of Public Health ultimately signed the approval letter. E subsequently learned that W did not possess a master's degree in public health, and, after she notified her supervisor, B, W was removed from the acting director position. Shortly thereafter, E again failed to verify the credentials of an individual who had been appointed to serve as another municipality's acting director of health. When B learned of the repeated error, E received a letter of reprimand. E subse- quently received another letter of reprimand and multiple, unsatisfactory performance appraisals, and was ultimately demoted. Pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement, E filed grievances challenging the fore- going, adverse personnel actions but did not raise a whistleblower retali- ation claim in connection with those grievances. All of the grievances were denied. E then filed the present whistleblower retaliation claim wit

Joinder severance Crim.R. 8(A) Crim.R. 14, abuse of discretion. Defendant was prejudiced by single indictment leading to only one trial involving two alleged rape victims for two reasons: the jury could have improperly accumulated evidence from first victim's case to evidence from second victim's case and the evidence from either case would be inadmissible in the other case under Evid.R. 404(B). Rape convictions reversed, sentence vacated, and case remanded.

CIVIL - teacher evaluation formal observation R.C. 3319.111 R.C. 3319.11 collective bargaining memorandum of understanding subject matter jurisdiction limited contract pre- and post-conference reinstated

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 appellate review alternative argument Ohio Civil Rights Act R.C. 4112 discrimination race employment discrimination termination policy violations pretext. We reviewed a summary judgment granted in favor of the employer-defendants on a claim of race discrimination by a former employee. The trial court erred when it held that a plaintiff who was (1) African American, (2) qualified for his position as a Branch & Business Center Manager, (3) terminated from his job and (4) replaced by a Caucasian person had not established a prima facie case of race discrimination under the Ohio Civil Rights Act. The plaintiff urged us to remand the matter without considering the rest of the burden-shifting analysis relevant to his claim, but we concluded that the de novo standard of review allows us to consider the rest of the analysis. After doing so, we concluded that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment because they proffered a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the termination — namely, that an internal investigation concluded that the plaintiff had engaged in acts of dishonesty in violation of the employer's policies — and the plaintiff did not meet his burden to point to evidence showing a genuine issue for trial as to whether that stated reason was pretext. We, therefore, affirmed the summary judgment.

A trial court does not abuse its discretion by denying a Civ.R. 60(B)(3) motion for relief from a dissolution decree if the court finds that the movant knew about allegedly undisclosed property before signing the parties' separation agreement. A trial court does not err by relying on a magistrate's credibility determination and using that determination to independently make findings of fact and conclusions of law.

The plaintiff, P, sought to recover damages from the defendant, S Co., for S Co.'s breach of the parties' employment contract in connection with S Co.'s termination of P's employment. P was hired by S Co. in 2012, pursuant to an employment contract for a term of two years, and his contract was renewed in 2013 for an additional term of two years. In October, 2015, S Co. approved and executed a new employment contract with P for an additional term of two years, to begin on January 25, 2016. Although the 2015 contract was dated October 12, 2015, the board of S Co. approved the contract on October 13, 2015, at a special meeting. In December, 2015, S Co. notified P that his employment would be termi- nated as of January 25, 2016, the date his 2015 contract was to begin. Following a bench trial, the parties executed a joint stipulation providing for an extension of the statutory (§ 51-183b) 120 day deadline for the trial court to render a decision. The trial court issued its memorandum of decision past the agreed upon extended deadline, rendering judgment for S Co. P moved to open and vacate the judgment and for a new trial, which the trial court granted. A new bench trial was held, and the trial court rendered judgment for P. On S Co.'s appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court properly granted P's motion to open and vacate the judg- ment rendered in the first trial as that court's finding that P did not waive his right to object to the untimely decision was not clearly erroneous: P was under no duty to speak or to protest after the court failed to issue a decision by the agreed upon deadline, prejudgment silence alone was not sufficient to support a finding of waiver under § 51-183b, as there must have been some other act or conduct that either delayed the start of the deadline, created a duty to protest in the silent party or served as an affirmative act of waiver or consent, and S Co. was unable to identify any such act or conduct by P that supported a finding of

Summary judgment affirmed where no issues of fact remained regarding the fourth element of appellant's prima facie age discrimination claim, and appellant failed to demonstrate pretext for termination.

Civil stalking protection order competent and credible evidence abuse of discretion menacing by stalking pattern of conduct knowingly cause. Trial court abused its discretion by granted a civil stalking protection order against the appellant, because the evidence presented at the hearings did not amount to menacing by stalking in violation of R.C. 2903.211(A)(1). The appellee's testimony concerned protests against her employer's business, at which the appellant was present as a protester. There was no evidence that appellant engaged in a pattern of conduct that knowingly caused the appellee to believe that the appellant will cause her physical harm or caused her mental distress. Judgment reversed.

Summary judgment breach of contract, collateral estoppel actually and directly litigated prior action determination by court of competent jurisdiction. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of appellee on its claim that appellants breach the parties' contractual agreement. Applicable to this matter is collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, which prevents relitigation of an issue that has been actually and necessarily litigated and determined in a prior action. Collateral estoppel applies when three requirements are met: the fact or issue (1) was actually and directly litigated in the prior action, (2) was passed upon and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, and (3) when the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party in privity with a party to the prior action. Appellants' adversarial proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court resulted in the specific finding that appellee did not breach the parties' contractual agreement. In the prior action, the court determined that appellants failed to provide certain material that appellee requested to complete the tasks at hand and, that such failure was a breach of the contract by appellant. Additionally, there is no dispute that the parties here were the identical parties in the prior action. Further, neither parties dispute that a court of competent jurisdiction entered a final judgment on the merits of the claim. Because the instant issue, between the same parties, was decided, when appellants were fully represented and, when appellants had a full and fair opportunity to litigate this issue, collateral estoppel applies. We conclude that the breach-of- contract issue was already decided in the Bankruptcy Court. As such, there was no genuine issue as to any material fact and appellee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 meaningful appellate review statement of reasons Ohio Civil Rights Act R.C. Chapter 4112 disability discrimination employment discrimination retaliation failure-to-accommodate discrimination 12-hour shifts. The trial court did not commit reversible error by failing to set forth detailed reasoning in its journal entry granting summary judgment to the defendant. A hospital was entitled to summary judgment on its employee's disability-discrimination, failure-to-accommodate, and retaliation claims where the hospital's reasonable staffing judgment required nurses to work twelve-hour shifts, the employee's doctor restricted the employee from working more than eight hours at a time and the employee and his doctor proposed no alternative accommodation other than working all eight-hour shifts. The employee's requested accommodation would have required the hospital to create a new shift for him, would have required other nurses to pick up the employee's patients for four hours at the end of each of his shifts, and would have negatively affected patient care by increasing the number of patient handoffs between nurses it was therefore not a reasonable accommodation.

Relator's request for a writ of mandamus denied as there was no error in magistrate's determination there was some evidence before STRS board to support a finding relator was no longer permanently disabled from her teaching position, and therefore board did not abuse its discretion in terminating her disability benefits.

Workers' compensation—Independent contractors and employees—Right to control manner or means of work—Some-evidence standard—Some evidence supported determination of Bureau of Workers' Compensation that workers were company's employees rather than independent contractors—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

The plaintiff employer appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities sustaining a disability discrimination complaint filed by the defendant employee, L, and awarding L, inter alia, back pay and emotional distress damages. L, who is hearing impaired, was hired by the plaintiff in 2012 and assigned to a secretarial position in its education personnel department. She worked directly for the human resources assistant, M, and performed many of the same tasks as him and covered his duties when he was absent from the office. As a result of her hearing impairment, L tended to speak loudly, and, on occasion, coworkers had raised concerns to T, the department's interim director, about the volume of her voice. In addition, S, who worked in the civil service personnel department, had inquired whether there was something wrong with L and had told M that he thought that L was loud and unprofessional. In 2014, M informed L that he intended to retire the following year. M encouraged L to apply for his position, began teaching her any duties of the position that she was not already performing, and strongly supported her candidacy. In August, 2015, the position was posted online, and L submitted an application. L met the qualifications listed in the posting. Two weeks later, S had the job posting removed and revised because he felt that he had a vested interest in assuring that the position was filled correctly. S interviewed prospective candidates for the position. Six candidates were interviewed for the position and two, P and J, were hired. L was not granted an interview because S concluded that she did not satisfy the revised minimum requirement of four years of human resources experience set forth in the revised job posting. After M retired, L became the interim human resources assistant until P's employment com- menced. In her complaint, L claimed that the plaintiff had discriminated against her on the basis of her

Disability discrimination summary judgment substantially limited major life activity disabled as a matter of law epilepsy is a physical impairment genuine issue of material fact. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment to the defendant-employer and determining that the plaintiff-employee did not demonstrate that she is disabled under the law. Under C.F.R. 1630.2(j)(1)(vii), epilepsy is a disability in terms of a prima facie case of disability discrimination. There are genuine issues of material fact remaining, including whether defendant-employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff-employee was merely pretextual.

Not-for-profit religious organization independent contractor political subdivision summary judgment agent/employee contracts. Catholic Charities, a not-for-profit religious organization, is not a political subdivision. Catholic Charities entered into five consecutive yearly contracts to provide services as an independent contractor. It performed its services as an independent contractor, not as an agent or employee of a political subdivision. Therefore, Catholic Charities was not entitled to summary judgment on the basis of statutory immunity.

CIVIL LAW - trial court properly dismissed appellees appellant's claims of forgery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and fraud were barred by res judicata and judicial/prosecutorial immunity interference with civil rights need a state actor right to trial by jury does not extend to determinations of law failed to identify due process, equal protection, ethical violations, and/or demonstrate prejudice.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's administrative appeal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. R.C. 119.12 did not confer on appellant the ability to appeal appellee's adjudication order concerning appellant's grievance. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court did not err by granting summary judgment in favor of cross-appellants on plaintiff-appellant's claims for tortious interference with contracts and business relationships and trade-secret violations against cross-appellants, its claims against Orians for conversion and defamation, and its claim against Chiles-Laman for ratification. Moreover, the trial court did not err by determining that plaintiff-appellant's tort claims were not preempted by Ohio's Uniform Trade Secret Act and by granting summary judgment in favor of cross-appellants as to their claim for conversion against plaintiff-appellant. The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

CIVIL - summary judgment deposition testimony Civ.R. 56 factual testimony/legal conclusions genuine issues of material fact workers' compensation retaliation R.C. 4123.90 disability discrimination R.C. 4112.02 Ohio public policy wrongful termination jeopardy, clarity and causation workplace safety Article II, Sections 34 and 35 of the Ohio Constitution R.C. 4101.11 and .12 R.C. 4121.13(A) and .17(A) OSHA 29 U.S.C. 654(a)(1) and (2)

Trial court erred in excluding evidence as hearsay where evidence was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted and where probative value was not substantially outweighed by prejudicial effect in giving jury instructions that were not supported by the evidence in directing verdict on the basis of immunity where question existed whether the defendants acted in bad faith, with malice, or recklessly and in excluding expert witness on damages and not recognizing concept of constructive discharge.

APPELLATE REVIEW/ADMINISTRATIVE – STATUTORY INTERPRETATION – R.C. 4733.16 – Ohio Adm.Code 4733-3-02(B): The trial court erred in failing to defer to defendant administrative agency's decision construing R.C. 4733.16 and Ohio Adm.Code 4733-3-02(B) where the statute and the rule were ambiguous and the agency's construction was reasonable. The trial court erred in reversing defendant administrative agency's denial of plaintiff's application for a certificate of authorization to provide professional engineering services where the agency's denial was based upon its reasonable interpretation of the applicable ambiguous statute and administrative regulation: the agency's determination that a "full-time manager" under R.C. 4733.16 must be directly employed by the firm versus an independent contractor was a reasonable interpretation of the statute.

Arbitration stay cardholder agreement. Under the express terms of the arbitration agreement, the agent of the creditor was not entitled to invoke the creditor's right to demand arbitration because the terms limited arbitration as between the debtor and the creditor.