Court Rulings

<p>Appeal from the Circuit Court of the City of St. Louis. —Hon. Thomas G. Hennings, Judge!</p> <p>(1) The petition does not state cause of action. It alleges that appellant maintained an open trapdoor and that deceased, while lawfully on the premises, fell through same. There is no allegation of an invitation. The owner of premises owes no duty-to trespassers or mere licensees to keep the premises in reasonably safe condition. O’Brien v. Western Steel, 100 Mo. 182; Straub v. Soderer, 53 Mo. 38; Schmidt v. Kansas City Distilling Co., 90 Mo. 284; Whittee v. Stifel, 126 Mo. 295; Butz v. Cavan'agh, 137 Mo. 503; Benson v. Baltimore Traction Co., 77 Mo. 535; Sterger v. Yan Sticklen, 132 N. Y. 490; McG-ill v. Compton, —111. 327; Evansville v. Terre Haute R. R., 100 Ind. 221; Muench v. Heinemann, 96 N. W. (Wis.) 800; Ryerson v. Bathgate, 51 Atl. 708; Manning v. Railroad, 16 L. R. A. 271; Redigan v. Railroad, 14 L. R. A. 276, (2) (a) The peremptory instruction asked by appellant should have been given. While there was testimony that appellant was to receive a portion of the receipts of the firm of Wilson & Jones, there was no evidence that appellant was to take any part in the business of said firm or share the losses thereof. Therefore, there was no partnership relation between the firm of Wilson & Jones and appellant. Maclrie v. Mott, 146 Mo. 230; Sille Hardware & Iron Co. v. McCleverty, 89 Mo. App. 154; Mulholland v. Rapp, 50 Mo. 42; Bank of Odessa v. Jennings, 18 Mo. App. 65; Hansom v. Jones, 20 Mo. App. 595; Weise v. Moore, 22 Mo. App. 530 ; Hach v. Hill, 160 Mo. 18; Lockhart y. Forsythe, 49 Mo. App. 654; Ileyerle v. Hunt, 50 Mo. App. 541. (b) The firm of Wilson & Jones, while operating on the stage of appellant’s theater, was operating as an independent contractor, and appellant was not liable for any negligence on the part of said firm. Burns v. McDonald, 57 Mo. App. 599; Kaiser v. Suppe, 133 Mo, App. 29; Burnes v. Railroad, 129 Mo. 41; Byre v. Jordan, 111 Mo. 428. (

<p>Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Blue Earth county, refusing a new trial after a trial before Severance, J., (a jury being waived,) and judgment ordered for plaintiff.</p>

<p>Error to Buchanan Circuit Court. — Hon. Joseph P. Grubb, Judge.</p> <p>argued that if the road had been built by the company’s officers, agents and employees, it would have been liable on the doctrine of respondeat superior; but having been built by an independent contractor, who took the whole job at a stipulated price, employing and paying his own workmen, over whom the company had no control, it is not liable, citing Clark v. Hann. $ St. Jo. B. B., 36 Mo. 202; Barry v. St. Louis, 17 Mo. 121; Harriman v. Stowe, 57 Mo. 98; 1 Redfield on Railways, 506 ; Laugher v. Pointer, 5 B. & C. 547; Quarmann v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499; Beedie v. N. W. B. B. Co., 4 Exch. 248; Peachy v. Bowland, 16 Eng. L. and E. 442 ; Overton v. Freeman, 8 lb. 479; Sadler v. Ilenlock, 30 lb. 167; Steel v. S. E. B. B. Co., 32 lb. 366; Scott v. Mayor, $c., 38 lb. 477 ; Bailey v. Mayor, 3 Hill 531; 2 Denio, 433 ; Belrnonico v. Mayor, 1 Sandf. 222; Lloyd v. Mayor, 1 Selden 369; Blake v. Ferris, 1 Seld. 48 ; Pack v. Mayor, 4 Seld. 222; Kelly v. Mayor, 1 Kernan 432; Currier v. Lowell, 16 Pick. 170 ; Dowell v. B. § D. R. R. Go., 23 Pick. 24; Hilliard v. Richardson, 8 Gray 349; Carson v. Goclley, 2 Oasey, 111; Erie v. Schioingle, 10 Harris 384; West Chester v. Apple, 11 Casey 284; Samynv. McGlosky, 2 Ohio St., 536; Carman v. S. $ I. R. R. Co., 4 Ohio St. 399; DeForrest v. Wright, 2 Mich. 368; Wiswall v. Brinson, 10 Ired. 554; Buffalo v. Holloway,- 3 Seld. 493; Milligen v. Wedge, 12 A. and E. 737; Allen v. Hayward, 7 Id. N. S. 960 ; Rapson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710; Knight v. Fox, 1 Eng. Law and Eq. 477 ; Painter v. The Mayor, $c., 46 Penn. St. 213; O. § M. R. R. Co. v. Davis, 23 Ind. 553; Story on Agency, §§ 453, 454; Pierce on Am. Railway Lav, pp. 235, 242; 2 Hilliard on Torts, §§ 533, 551.</p> <p>argued that as the contractor had no right on the plairstiff’s land, except through the authority of the company, the contractor must to that extent be considered as its servant, and the company must be liab

<p>Certiorari to the Orphans’ Court of Butler county: Of October and November Term 1875, Nos. 216 and 253.</p> <p>These were the appeals of Ada Y. Storey and Anna L. Adams, and Julia E. J. Boyd, from the decree of the Orphans’ Court, making distribution of the estate of Oliver David, deceased.</p> <p>Oliver David died intestate at Butler, Pennsylvania, on the 5th day of November 1871, at the advanced age of eighty-three years. His estate, valued at about $90,000, consisted entirely of government bonds and other interest-bearing securities, with the exception of a small farm in Ohio of inconsiderable value.</p> <p>A widow survived the intestate, and his heirs-at-law were ten grandchildren, the children of three daughters, who had all died during Mr. David’s lifetime.</p> <p>One of these deceased daughters married James Campbell, the issue of which marriage were six of the heirs; William O., T. Chalmers, J. Thompson, Howard J., Margaret A. and Clara B. Campbell.</p> <p>A second daughter married W. C. Adams, of whom were born Ada V. Adams, now Ada Y. Storey, and Anna Lanah Adams, two of the appellants. Lauretta Campbell, now Lauretta Thompson, and Julia E. J. Boyd, the other appellant, were children of a third daughter who was married first to William Campbell and subsequently to Henry Boyd.</p> <p>Letters of administration upon the estate of the intestate were granted to James Campbell, father of six of the grandchildren, whose relations with the intestate had been of an intimate and confidential character and who had transacted much of his business for him.</p> <p>On the same day letters of administration were granted, and previous to the granting of them, Mr. Campbell, with the written consent of all the heirs except Julia Boyd, purchased the interest of the widow in the estate for $28,467, with funds realized from the sale of government bonds then in his possession.</p> <p>This purchase was declaredly made for the benefit of the heirs-at-law and a profit of $683 wa

R.C. 3319.16, good and just cause for termination, remedies for wrongful termination

Motion for staying pending arbitration denied; appellee, an orthodontist, entered seven contracts with a dental alliance; some contracts had arbitration clauses and employee restrictive covenants, some did not; the restrictive covenants in the contracts were not the same; appellant filed declaratory judgment and breach of contract action; dental alliance followed by filing for arbitration; court did not err by not granting stay pending arbitration because parties agreed to the stay; court did not err in retaining jurisdiction over the case due to conflicting provisions in the contracts; although public policy favors arbitration, arbitration clauses are not elevated over other contract provisions; questions of arbitrability are decided by the court unless delegated to the arbitrator; the contracts did not contain delegation clauses; a venue clause does not typically conflict with an arbitration clause; judgment affirmed.

INSURANCE – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – DOCTRINE OF INFERRED INTENT – HARMLESS ERROR – DICTA – APPELLATE REVIEW – STANDING – AGGRIEVED PARTY: The trial court correctly assigned both insurers and the insured a burden to demonstrate they were entitled to summary judgment where both insurers and the insured sought a judicial determination of the scope of the insurance policies at issue and both insurers and insured moved for summary judgment in their favor. The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of insurers and against their insured where the insurance policies at issue limit liability coverage to accidents and not intentional acts, and the trial court properly inferred the insured's intent to harm the plaintiffs in an underlying civil suit because the insured made payments to a terrorist organization knowing or intending those payments would be used to prepare or carry out acts of terrorism and those payments necessarily resulted in the harm to the victims of the acts of terrorism. The trial court properly granted summary judgment though it erroneously relied on an overruled legal test for inferring an insured's intent to injure because the error was harmless as the trial court arrived at the correct result. Though the trial court mischaracterized an argument by the insured as raising an affirmative defense that the court ultimately determined was nonviable, the error was harmless as the trial court's decision was otherwise correct. The trial court properly granted summary judgment though it held that dicta had precedential effect, because the dicta was ultimately correct and any potential error from relying on the dicta was harmless. Where the trial court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment in its entirety and awarded it the relief requested, the insurer was not an aggrieved party, and therefore, had no standing to appeal the judgment.

Mandamus—Procedendo—Mootness—Judicial notice—Vexatious litigators—A writ of mandamus can be used to compel a court to issue a decision, but a writ of procedendo is the more appropriate remedy because an inferior court's failure to timely dispose of a pending action is the ill a writ of procedendo is designed to remedy—The record does not support a conclusion that trial court ruled on appellant's hanging-charge motion and therefore mooted his claim for extraordinary relief regarding that motion—Court of appeals erred in determining that trial court's docket entry itself disposed of hanging-charge motion—Judicial-notice requests did not involve facts generally known or capable of accurate determination—Request to declare appellant a vexatious litigator denied based on lack of precedent in which this court declared a party a vexatious litigator under S.Ct.Prac.R. 4.03(B) when party had prevailed—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part and cause remanded.

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court for the plaintiff on her claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. Between 2012 and 2015, the plaintiff periodically operated her business that transported special needs children to and from school from her home. Between 2012 and 2015, the defendant, who resided in a nearby home, became concerned that the plaintiff was operating a commercial transportation business from her home after he observed an increase in the number of cars and the amount of traffic in the neighborhood that was associated with the plaintiff's business. In 2015, the defendant complained to his town's zoning department and discovered that the plaintiff did not have a permit to operate her business from her home. After meeting with one or more zoning department officials, the defen- dant began to document his complaints with photos, digital recordings, and a detailed written timeline of the comings and goings of the plaintiff, her family, and others based upon his personal surveillance of the plain- tiff's property. The defendant continuously recorded the plaintiff's resi- dence and took photos of the plaintiff's property from his vehicle using a zoom lens. Although the defendant stopped taking photos of the plain- tiff's property in approximately January or February, 2016, he continued to conduct video surveillance of the plaintiff's home until the time of trial and would regularly review the digital recordings. The defendant submitted his documentation, including his digital recordings, photos, and a surveillance report of what he believed to be the plaintiff's alleged zoning violation, to the town's zoning department. In November, 2015, a zoning enforcement officer issued a cease and desist order to the plaintiff, claiming that the operation of her business violated the town's zoning regulations. In response, the plaintiff contacted the local police department and complained to the defendant's supervisors at

On workplace intentional tort claim, summary judgment to employer is appropriate where employee presents no facts to show that employer acted with specific, deliberate intent to injure him. Denial of Civ.R. 60(B)(3) motion for relief from judgment based on alteration of a form not an abuse of discretion where alteration was not material to the claim, not providing original form in discovery was an oversight, and where the act of altering the form supports the underlying claim, not fraud under 60(B)(3).

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment App.R. 16 App.R. 12 at will employment wrongful discharge in violation of public policy clarity element. Appellant fails to separately argue her assignments of error, but in the interest of judicial fairness, we address the assigned errors. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees when appellant was unable to show that there were genuine issues of material fact. Although there is a clear public policy favoring workplace safety, appellant was unable to identify a public policy exception to the at will employment doctrine that is applicable to her claims.

Ohio Patrolmen's Benevolent Association collective bargaining agreement arbitration award overpayments recoupment equitable estoppel. The county overpaid several grievants in 2021 by mistake, and when the county realized its mistake, it unilaterally deducted the grievants' pay over three pay periods in 2022. The issue on appeal is whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority when he determined that the county's unilateral recoupment of the 2021 overpayment by deducting the grievants' 2022 pay did not comport with the provisions of the CBA. Our review indicates the arbitrator did not exceed his powers because the arbitration award drew its essence from the collective bargaining agreement. Furthermore, the arbitrator's application of equitable estoppel is supported by a detailed analysis of the arbitration and court precedent. Because we find no statutory grounds exist to vacate the arbitrator's award pursuant to R.C. 2711.10, the trial court's judgment affirming the award is affirmed.

Motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(1) lack of subject-matter jurisdiction exclusive jurisdiction SERB CBA collective bargaining rights R.C. Chapter 4711. Judgment reversed and remanded. Although the Union's application and motion to compel arbitration does not explicitly allege violations of R.C. Chapter 4117, substantively its claims arise from a labor dispute and resolution process set forth in the CBA, which stems from the rights created in R.C. Chapter 4117. The fact that the Union frames its action pursuant to R.C. 2711.03 is insufficient to vest jurisdiction in the common pleas court. Because the Union's application and motion to compel arbitration are based on rights set forth in R.C. Chapter 4117, its application and motion fall directly within the exclusive jurisdiction of SERB. Therefore, we find that the trial court erred by denying the City's motion to dismiss the Union's application and motion to compel arbitration for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.

Trade secrets—Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act, R.C. 1333.61 through 1333.69—Preemption—Information is a trade secret protected by Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act only if it has independent value because it is not generally known to and readily ascertainable by others and the owner has taken reasonable efforts to maintain its secrecy—Customer information was not kept secret because it was accessible to a number of employees, was provided to third parties, and was available as a public record—Tort claims for tortious interference with business contracts, tortious interference with business relationships, and conversion that were based on alleged misappropriation of trade secrets were preempted—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

First Amendment—Freedom of speech—Picketing in connection with a labor-relations dispute—R.C. 4117.11(B)(7)'s prohibition against inducing or encouraging any individual in connection with a labor-relations dispute to picket the residence or place of private employment of any public official or representative of the public employer violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as a content-based restriction of expressive activity—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-58 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . for any person to subject . . . any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the . . . laws of this state or of the United States, on account of . . . mental disability [or] physical disability . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute (§ 46a-64 (a) (1)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . [t]o deny any person within the jurisdiction of this state full and equal accommodations in any place of public accommodation . . . because of . . . intellectual disability [or] mental disability . . . .'' The defendant M filed a complaint with the named defendant, the Commis- sion on Human Rights and Opportunities, on behalf of his minor child, A, alleging that the plaintiff board of education had discriminated against A on the basis of A's mental disability. A, who had been diagnosed with several mental and cognitive disorders, attended a public magnet school, where he initially was enrolled as a special education student who was entitled to an individualized education plan and special accommodation services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) (20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.). The school subsequently determined, against the wishes of A's parents, that A would no longer be designated as a special education student under the IDEA. Thereafter, A sustained a concussion during an incident at school, and A's parents kept A out of school until he was symptom free on the basis of the recommendation of A's physician. During A's absence, the board sent a habitual truancy notice to A's parents and held a planning and placement team meeting, which was attended by M and various representatives of the board, among other individuals, to discuss A's eligibility for special education services. At that meeting, M attempted to offer a letter from A's physician regarding A's post-concussion syndrome, but the board declined to accept

The plaintiff employee sought to recover damages from the defendant employer for personal injuries he sustained while working for the defen- dant. In his complaint, the plaintiff, whose employment duties included painting, alleged, inter alia, that, although he was initially provided a respirator by another employee to prevent excessive inhalation of toxic chemicals from the paint he used, after about one month, D, the defen- dant's safety manager, informed the plaintiff that he was not authorized to use the respirator in the workplace. The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant had deliberately instructed him to continue to paint in known dangerous conditions, the defendant was aware that his injuries were substantially certain to result from its action, and it had engaged in wilful and serious misconduct. The defendant filed a motion to strike with prejudice on the ground that the plaintiff's claim was barred by the exclusivity provision (§ 31-284) of the Workers' Compensation Act (act) (§ 31-275 et seq.), which provides that the act is the exclusive remedy for employees injured in most instances, because the plaintiff failed to allege sufficient facts that D was the defendant's alter ego such that the defendant could be held liable for D's tortious conduct, and, alternatively, D's actions did not constitute intentional misconduct. The trial court granted the defendant's motion to strike, concluding that the plaintiff's complaint did not state a legally sufficient cause of action that fell within the intentional tort exception to the exclusivity provision of the act. In its memorandum of decision, the court concluded that the plaintiff did not allege the level of control required by the instrumentality rule or the unity of ownership interest required by the identity rule to disregard the defendant's corporate structure, but merely attempted to impose liability on the defendant for the alleged intentional acts of D, as a supervisor, on the basis of her appare

SUMMARY JUDGMENT — BREACH OF CONTRACT — CONDITION PRECEDENT — ANTI-WAIVER CLAUSE — INDEMNIFICATION — TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE WITH A CONTRACT: The trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of plaintiff where it was undisputed that defendants waived a condition precedent to the party's agreements by failing to enforce an "invoice requirement" for seven years. The trial court properly found that the anti-wavier clause contained within the agreements was not triggered as non-performance of a condition precedent is not a breach of contract and plaintiff did not violate the agreements. The trial court properly concluded that defendants were entitled to summary judgment on defendants' indemnification claims where the record reflects that plaintiff was required to indemnify the defendants against any losses arising out of plaintiff's services and defendants' losses related those services began to incur before defendants breached the agreements. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to the amount of damages that plaintiffs owed on the indemnification claim because defendants were not entitled to include its own employees' salaries as expenses and plaintiff disputed the reasonableness of the defendants' claimed damages. The trial court properly denied plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff's tortious interference claim where co-defendants have an agency relationship.

An intermediate court lacks authority to disqualify a trial judge or to void a judgment based on a claimed conflict of interest (here involving a judicial law clerk who had been counsel for one of the parties). The divorce decree here sufficiently allocated the relevant property. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in establishing a de facto termination date for the marriage, but should have used the same date consistently. The trial court's allocation of a salary bonus earned over time that extended beyond the marriage was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court also did not err in refusing to allocate as the wife's separate property money that had been placed into a custodial account for the benefit of the couple's minor child. The trial court did not err in concluding that statutory formula required a child support award of $37,710 per month for the young girl. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in partcause remanded.

Pursuant to statute (§ 46a-58 (a)), ''[i]t shall be a discriminatory practice . . . for any person to subject, or cause to be subjected, any other person to the deprivation of any rights, privileges or immunities, secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of this state or of the United States, on account of . . . sex . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (b)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory employment practice, the [human rights referee] may order the hiring or reinstatement of employees, with or without back pay . . . .'' Pursuant further to statute ((Supp. 2012) § 46a-86 (c)), ''upon a finding of a discriminatory practice prohibited by section 46a-58 . . . the [referee] shall determine the damage suffered by the complainant . . . as a result of such discriminatory practice and shall allow reasonable attorney's fees and costs.'' The named defendant, G, who is employed as a judicial marshal by the plaintiff, the Connecticut Judicial Branch, filed a complaint with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities in connec- tion with her allegations that another judicial marshal, M, had subjected her to severe and pervasive sexual harassment while they were stationed together at a particular courthouse. Specifically, G alleged that the branch discriminated against her on the basis of her gender by subjecting her to a hostile work environment, failing to investigate her allegations and to take remedial steps to protect her, and retaliating against her for making her complaint by reassigning her to courthouses farther from her residence. G claimed that the branch's misconduct violated the employment discrimination statute (§ 46a-60), as well as the general antidiscrimination statute, § 46a-58 (a), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.), as a predicate for G's claim under § 46a-58 (a), insofar as § 46a-58 (a) includes within its ambit