Court Rulings

Employment relations—Age discrimination by employer—At-will employee discharged allegedly on the basis of her age is entitled to maintain common-law tort action against employer for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy.

Public employment—Teachers—Collective bargaining—Section 4(A) of Am.Sub.S.B. No. 133 does not deprive State Employment Relations Board of jurisdiction to consider petition jointly filed by employer and an exclusive representative requesting SERB to amend composition of deemed certified bargaining unit.

<p>Appeal, No. 187, Oct. T., 1912, by defendants, from judgment of O. P. Somerset Co., Sept. T., 1907, No. 116, on verdict for plaintiffs in case of Henry B. McCormick and Vance C. McCormick, Trustees of tbe Estate of Henry McCormick, Deceased, v. John A. Berkey and John R. Boose.</p> <p>Issue framed under tbe Act of June 10, 1893, P. L. 415, to determine title to minerals underlying tract of land in Quemakoning Township. Before Holt, P. J., specially presiding.</p> <p>The opinion of the Supreme Court states the case.</p> <p>The jury found a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs for the real estate in dispute, upon which judgment was entered.</p> <p>On a rule for a new trial and for judgment n. o. v., Holt, P. J., filed the following opinion:</p> <p>In this case an issue was framed between the plaintiffs and the defendants, to determine the right and title of the respective parties in and to a tract of mineral land in the Township of Quemahoning, in said county, bounded by lands of Jacob Lohr, and others, containing 192 acres and 118 perches strict measure.</p> <p>On the 14th day of May, 1887, the Johnstown Lumber Company became the owners in fee simple of a certain tract or piece of land in said township, containing 245 acres and 134 perches; and the Johnstown Lumber Company, on the 25th day of April, 1889, being so seized of said tract of land, executed and delivered unto one John Holsopple a deed for 192 acres and 134 perches of the said tract of land, reserving the right of the grantors to all the minerals underlying the same, with the usual mining privileges. The Johnstown Lumber Company, by another deed, dated October 28, 1891, conveyed unto the Cambria Land Company, by metes and bounds, the whole of the said tract of land containing 245 acres and 134 perches, excepting and reserving,, however, out of the operation of the grant, the 192 acres and 134 perches of the surface of said tract heretofore conveyed by the Johnstown Lumber Company to John Holsopple.</p> <p

<p>CASE 13. — ACTION BY Z. T. PROCTOR AGAINST THE I. C. R. R. CO. AND OTHERS FOR DAMAGES FOR PERSONAL INJURIES. — November 8, 1905.</p> <p>Appeal from Grayson Circuit Court.</p> <p>Weed S. Chele, Circuit Judge:</p> <p>Judgment for plaintiff. Defendants appeal.</p> <p>POINTS AND AUTHORITIES.</p> <p>1. Admission of incompetent testimony of statements of someone in overalls not shown to be an employe of appellant.</p> <p>2. Misconduct of counsel in his closing argument. (McHenry, &-c., Co. v. Sneddon, 98 Ky., 684; L., H. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 23 Ky. Law Rep., 121; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Hull, 24 Ky. Law' Rep., 379; 113 Ky., 572; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Jolly, 27 Ky. Law Rep., 118.)</p> <p>3. The jury should have been instructed peremptorily to find for Ihe defendant. (Prance’s Admr. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 15 Ky. Law</p> <p>Rep., 244; 22 S. W., 851; Ward’s Admr. v. I. C. R. R. Co., 22 Ky. Law Rep., 191; 56 S. W., 807; Yates v. I. C. R. R. Co. (not yet reported), September 21, 1905; Manning v. I. C. R. R. Co., 27 Ky. Law Rep., 142.)</p> <p>4. This action has been removed to the United States Circuit Court ior the Western District of Kentucky, and the Circuit Court erred in assuming jurisdiction of this action after the petition and bond for removal were filed. (C. & O. Ry. Co. v. Dixon, 179 U. S.; I. C. R. R. Co. v. Jones, 26 Ky. Law Reg., 31; 80 S. W., 484; Daughtry v. R. R. Co., 138 U. S., 299 (34 L. Ed., 963); B. C. R. & N., &c., Co. v. Dunn, 122 U. S., 513 (30 L. Ed., 1160); Durkee v. I. C. R. R. Co., 81 Fed., 1; Kelly v. Co., 122 Fed., 286; Gustafson, &e., v. Co., 128 Fed., 85; Crawford v. I. C. R. R. Co., 130 Fed., 395; Dishon’s Admr. v. C., N. O. &T. P., 133 Fed., 471; Wharton on “Agency and Agents,” section 536, p. 350; Blackstone, Vol. 1, p. 431; Wharton’s Agency, section 535; Shear. & Red. on Neg., 5th Ed., p. 52; Colvin v. Holbrook, 2 N. Y./129; Murray v. Usher, 117 N. Y., 549; Kelly v. Chicago, &c., Ry. Co., 122'Fed., 290; Davenport v. Southern Ry. Co., 124 Fed

<p>Cas® 78 — PETITION ORDINARY —</p> <p>APPEAL FROM JEFFERSON CIRCUIT COURT, LAW ANT) EQUITY DIVISION.</p> <p>1. In a suit on a judgment of a court of a sister State the judgment is always open to attack, no matter what the jurisdictional avermentsof the record. (Wood v. Wood, 78 Ky., 624; Public Works v. Columbia College, 17 Wall., 84; Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall., 457; Knowles v. Gas-light Co., 19 Wall., 58; St. Clair v. Cox, 106 IT. S., 350.)</p> <p>The exhibit filed with the plaintiff’s petition shows that in the-process the time for defendant to appear and plead is blank. Such a summons is a nullity. (Kilsmiller v. Kitchen, 24 Iowa, 1G3.)</p> <p>The filing of a now record with the blanks filled out ought not to-aid the matter.</p> <p>2. The plea of limitation should have been sustained. Although plaintiff’s action may have been properly commenced here, it can not be maintained if by reason of lapse of time it can not be maintained in Tennessee. The difference between commencing an action and maintaining an action is marked, and the change of expression in the-statute is evidently intentional. (Gen. Stats., chap. 71, art. 4, sec. 18; Judiciary Act of 1790.)</p> <p>3. Allowing plaintiff to testify to conversations with Father. Fortune, Father Walsh and Mrs. Mary Reynolds, all of whom are dead, was in violation of subsection 2 of section 606 of Civil Code. (Hurry v. Kline, 14 Ky. Law Rep., 330.)</p> <p>4. The admission of evidence as to the identity of Reynolds ■ with the person intended to be sued in Tennessee was prejudicial. The only question of identity is whether Reynolds was the person served with process</p> <p>5. The issue ot fact as to the Tennessee court’s jurisdiction of the subject-matter was triable by a jury under instructions from the court, and the withholding of that issue from the jury is prejudicial error.</p> <p>6. On the face- of the papers, the judgment of the Tennessee court, by a clerical misprision, is for too much.</p> <p>7. While by sec

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OE COMMON PLEAS OE WASHINGTON COUNTY.</p> <p>No. 105 October Term 1887, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 175 February Term 1887, C. P.</p> <p>The proceeding was a scire facias to revive et quare executionem non, by Wm. Smith & Son, for use of James H. Hopkins, against John M. Stockdale, upon a judgment to No. 228 February Term 1886.</p> <p>On January 12, 1886, to the number and term last referred to, a judgment was entered in favor of Wm. Smith & Son against John M. Stockdale, for $751, with interest from February 28, 1885, under the warrant of attorney contained in the following note:—</p> <p>Washington, Pa., February 27,1885.</p> <p>One day after date I promise to pay Wm. Smith & Son, seven hundred and fifty-one dollars, value received, and I authorize judgment to be entered against me for said sum with costs, with five per cent, attorney’s commissions. Waiving inquisition, exemption and stay of execution.</p> <p>John M. Stockdale.</p> <p>On March 29, 1886, Wm. Smith & Son assigned $374.19 of said judgment to James H. Hopkins, and on November 30, 1886, they assigned the remaining part of the judgment to Wm. E. Clarke. On December 18,1886, Mr. Hopkins caused to issue the scire facias in this proceeding. The writ recited the original entry of the judgment, its parties, date of entry and amount; the assignment to James H. Hopkins of the said $374.19; averred that execution remained to be done, and required the defendant “ to show if anything for himself he has or knows to say why the said plaintiff, the said James H. Hopkins, to the extent of his interest for his debt and damages aforesaid, should not have the above-stated judgment revived to continue the lien, and also why the said defendant should not have execution against him for the debt and damages aforesaid according,” etc.</p> <p>Mr. Hopkins having filed an affidavit of claim under the rules, setting forth that the defendant was indebted to him in the sum of $374.19 as of date March 29, 1886,

<p>After the decision of this court (30 Minn. 528) holding the complaint insufficient, the cause was remanded to the district court for Murray county, and plaintiff served an amended complaint, in substance as follows: The defendant is owner in fee of a described quarter-section of land. On January 20, 1881, the defendant was indebted to one Darms in a sum exceeding $1,866.70, and on that day, for part of the debt, executed and delivered to Darms his promissory note payable two years thereafter, with interest at 10 per cent. On November 30, 1881, plaintiff, defendant and Darms made an oral agreement to the following effect: Darms agreed to pay defendant $100 for entering into the agreement, and paid him $65 on account, and at plaintiff’s request and for his account, sold and transferred the above described note, without recourse, to J. G. Townsend, plaintiff’s son, and also released defendant from the residue of the debt and from all demands of Darms against him. In consideration of which, the defendant agreed that as soon as he should make final proof of his claim to the land, (which he had entered under the homestead laws of the United States,) and on surrender to him of his note, he would convey the land in fee-simple to the plaintiff. And in consideration of the premises the plaintiff paid Darms the face of the note and interest, and accepted the transfer without recourse, and agreed that on conveyance of the land he would deliver the note to the defendant.</p> <p>At the time of this contract, the defendant was, and was known ”by Darms and plaintiff to be insolvent, and plaintiff was induced to make the agreement, accept the transfer without recourse, and make the payment to Darms, relying on the defendant’s promise to pay the note by a conveyance of the land, and would not otherwise have taken the note or made the payment. The land is not worth more than $1,200; the defendant is still insolvent; the land, being a United ■States homestead, is not liable for paym

<p>Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna county: Of January Term 1879, No. 83.</p> <p>Trover by E. C. Decker, against Silas Hartley, to recover damages for the conversion of a quantity of bark, which had been cut on the land of plaintiff.</p> <p>The plaintiff was the owner of a farm and entered into a written agreement with B. E. Decker, by which it was agreed that said “ B. E. Decker is to peel all the hemlock timber, from eight inches up to the largest, and start all the bark on said farm, and is to have one-half the bai'k after it is started to pay him for his labor. The bark is to be divided when started, and to be started as soon as the middle of March 1874, in good order and shape — to be measured in rack, and on good roads to the tannery.”</p> <p>B. F. Decker being indebted to the defendant sold his interest in the bark to Hartley and assigned his interest in the contract to him. Hartley was to get out the bark, and after disposing of his half, was to allow B. E. Decker the amount received for it over the debt and expenses. Hartley afterwards obtained a confession of judgment from B. E. Decker, upon which. B. E. Decker’s interest in the bark was sold at constable’s sale, and bid in by Hartley. The latter it appeared had hauled out and started the bark in accordance with the terms of the contract before the middle of March 1874.</p> <p>At the trial before Jessup, P. J., the plaintiff claimed, that Hartley had acquired no interest in any of the bark, because some trees had been left standing which should have been peeled, and the bark was not gathered up cleanly, and, therefore, the contract had not been fully complied with; and further, that being a sale of an unascertained quantity of bark Hartley could claim no title to or interest in it until measured and divided.</p> <p>The evidence upon the question of full performance of the contract was conflicting. Defendant claimed, that, as soon as there was a severance of the timber by B. E. Decker so as

<p>Error to the Court of Common Pleas of JElh county: Of January Term 1873, No. 22.</p> <p>This was an action of ejectment, brought December 17th 1870, by John G. Reading and Charles Bartles against A. C. Einney and others, for a tract of land in Jay township, containing 154 acres more or less.</p> <p>The tract is part of warrant No. 4896 to Wilhelm Willink, surveyed July 18th 1794, as 990 acres, in Clearfield county. The survey was interfered with by other warrants surveyed in 1785, known as the “ Creek Surveys,” so that warrant and survey No. 4896 could hold but 790 acres. The plaintiffs claimed the 154 acres under one Joel Woodworth, who they alleged had marked off from the east side of the 790 acres and occupied this tract which he estimated to contain 150 acres; it was sold for taxes in 1852, in Elk county, in which it then was; Elk county having been erected in 1844 and this part of Clearfield county included in it, the plaintiffs claimed under that sale.</p> <p>Warrant No. 4896 had been assessed as 559 acres in Clearfield county, sold for taxes in 1832, bought by the commissioners of that county; in 1838 the commissioners sold it to Josiah W. Smith, by metes and bounds, describing the whole of warrant No. 4896, except that part covered by the “ Creek Surveys.” The defendants claimed the 150 acres as part of warrant No. 4896, and as included in the tax sale to the commissioners, and the sale of the commissioners to Mr. Smith.</p> <p>The question was whether the 150 acres were so separated from the rest of the survey, as to exclude them from the operation of the tax sale of the warrant as 559 acres in 1832.</p> <p>The case was tried August 6th 1872, before Vincent, J.</p> <p>The plaintiffs gave in evidence the warrant and survey to Willink, of No. 4896; assessment in Clearfield county for 1826, No. 4896; 150 acres to Joel Woodworth and for 1829, same. They gave evidence that this 150 acre tract was sold for taxes for the years 1845 and 1846 in the name of Peter

Slip and fall; premises liability; open and obvious; unnatural accumulation; black ice; summary judgment; actual or constructive notice. The judgment of the trial court, granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee Apple Ohio LLC, is affirmed. The undisputed facts in the record indicate that the icy patch that plaintiff-appellant Madaras slipped on was an open-and-obvious condition that did not constitute an unnatural accumulation. Moreover, the record does not indicate that the patch of ice was "substantially more dangerous" than Madaras should have reasonably anticipated, and even so, Applebee's did not have actual or constructive notice of such condition.

The defendants, J and his company, F Co., appealed from the judgments of the trial court rendered following jury verdicts for the plaintiffs in three underlying consolidated actions that arose out of the 2012 mass shooting at the Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown. The court had defaulted the defendants as a sanction for their repeated, wilful failure to fully and fairly comply with the plaintiffs' discovery requests and for violating a protective order. The cases then proceeded to a hearing in damages, after which the plaintiffs were awarded compensatory damages, attorney's fees and costs and, pursuant to the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA), General Statutes § 42-110a et seq., punitive damages. On appeal, the defendants claimed, inter alia, that the court incorrectly concluded that the plaintiffs' allegations were sufficient to support a legally viable CUTPA claim. Held: The trial court properly exercised its discretion in defaulting the defendants as a sanction for their violations of its discovery orders and a protective order. The trial court's default order was a sanction that was proportional to the defendants' wilful noncompliance and misconduct in repeatedly failing to produce critical documents that the plaintiffs needed to prosecute their case and in making highly confidential information about the plaintiffs avail- able on the Internet. The plaintiffs had no responsibility, as the defendants claimed, to prove the cause of the harm they suffered, as the effect of the trial court's default order was to conclusively establish the defendants' liability, thereby leaving the plaintiffs with only the burden of establishing their damages. The defendants' inadequately briefed claim that the trial court improperly limited the scope of J's testimony was deemed abandoned. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion for remittitur, as the evidence was sufficient to support the jury's damages award, which did not s

Workers' compensation—Temporary-total-disability compensation—R.C. 4123.56—Employee who had already been terminated for violation of employment policies before his shoulder surgery was not "unable to work" as "direct result of an impairment arising from an injury or occupational disease" under plain language of R.C. 4123.56(F) and thus was not entitled to receive temporary-total-disability compensation—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and writ granted.

The trial court erred in part by granting summary judgment to appellees, a commercial applicator and his employer, on the landowners' claims for damages to their vineyard as a result of herbicide drift from an herbicide application to a neighboring farm. While summary judgment was properly entered in appellees' favor on the landowners' common-law negligence, private nuisance, and negligent hiring, supervision, and training claims, the trial court improperly disregarded some Civ.R. 56 evidence, ignored issues of fact, and weighed conflicting evidence in awarding summary judgment to appellees on the landowners' claims for negligence per se, indirect trespass, and punitive and treble damages. Issues of material fact remained as to whether the appellees violated R.C. 921.24 by spraying herbicides in a manner inconsistent with their labeling requirements, whether the applicator acted recklessly or with actual malice when he elected to finish spraying the neighboring farm after noticing the wind had picked up and the chemicals he was applying had started to drift, and whether substantial damages were sustained to the landowners' grapevines as a result of the chemical application to the neighboring farm.

The defendant appealed from the judgment of the trial court awarding sole legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child, O, to the plaintiff and imposing certain restrictions on his visitation with O. After the plaintiff initiated the underlying marital dissolution action, the parties filed numerous motions with the court, and, given the volume and nature of the motions, the court ordered that neither party could file any additional motions without first requesting leave from the court, with an exception for ex parte emergency requests approved by the guardian ad litem. The parties thereafter entered into an agreement to dissolve their marriage, which indicated that, although they agreed upon the division of their marital property and debt and the issue of alimony, they had been unable to resolve issues related to custody, access and care of O and that those issues should be resolved by the court in subsequent proceedings after completion of a custody evaluation by S, a clinical psychologist. The court subsequently rendered a judgment of dissolution of marriage that incorporated the parties' agreement. S filed her custody evaluation with the court, and the custody hearing was scheduled to commence in March, 2020, but, due to the COVID-19 pan- demic, it did not go forward as scheduled. When the trial ultimately commenced, the court heard testimony from L, a social worker from the Department of Children and Families, over repeated objections by the defendant. L testified that she had investigated an anonymous call made to the department concerning the plaintiff's purported physical removal of O from a baseball game in which he was participating. During L's testimony, a redacted version of the relevant department investigation protocol was admitted into evidence as a full exhibit. L testified that her investigation included, among other things, interviews with O and conversations with G, O's former therapist, and that, as a result of her investigation, the dep

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for its allegedly tortious interference with contractual relations and its alleged violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.). The parties are home care service providers that participate in the Connecticut Home Care Program for Elders, which is operated by the Department of Social Services. In connection with that program, the parties each entered into a provider enrollment agreement with the department, pursuant to which the department matched each party with elderly individuals who were at risk of being placed in nursing homes, to whom the parties' employees provided nonmedical personal, home- making and companion care. In 2016, the department notified program participants that they would be required to use a new electronic billing system effective January 1, 2017. The plaintiff invited other program participants to join in a lawsuit challenging the implementation of the new billing system, which the defendant and three other program partici- pants accepted. The defendant's chief executive officer, G, represented to the plaintiff that the defendant had operational concerns about the new system and had not been given enough time to train its employees, and he personally approved the filing of a legal action against the depart- ment. In that action, the program participants alleged that they were unable to implement the new system and sought injunctive relief. The plaintiff subsequently learned that the defendant had been using the new system to bill the department, but G assured the plaintiff that the defendant had only been testing the system and was convinced that it was unworkable. In December, 2016, the program participants were denied prejudgment relief against the department, and, after G confirmed that the defendant would like to continue participating in the lawsuit, the plaintiff filed an appeal that included the defendant as an appellant. The day after the

Summary judgment judgment on the pleadings retaliation R.C. 4112.02(I) adverse employment action breach of fiduciary duty wrongful termination in violation of public policy self-serving affidavits notice of appeal. Summary judgment in favor of defendants affirmed where plaintiff-employee failed to establish a materially adverse employment action beyond a mere inconvenience, which is not actionable. Trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff's claim for breach of fiduciary duty where there was no legal basis on which to bring such a claim for an employment action taken against her by a public-school board. Trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings on plaintiff's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy where plaintiff had an adequate legal remedy for retaliation pursuant to R.C. 4112.02(I).

Wrongful termination in violation of public policy judgment on the pleadings summary judgment R.C. 4101.11. Trial court properly granted judgment on the pleadings to employer on wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim due to workplace safety, where Appellants failed to cite to an Ohio public policy that governed the employer's conduct, failing to establish the clarity element of the claim. Trial court properly granted summary judgment to employer on wrongful termination in violation of public policy claim due to workers' compensation where Appellant failed to establish a nexus between his injury and his termination.

The trial court did not err in finding that the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's decision, denying appellant's claim for unemployment compensation benefits, was not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence. Evidence in the record supported the commission's finding that appellant resigned from employment without just cause. Judgment affirmed.