Court Rulings

Domestic relations—Child support—Annual gross income—Income from commissions earned by a parent is included under R.C. 3119.05(D) and therefore must be treated the same as income from bonuses and overtime when calculating a parent's total annual gross income—Court of appeals' judgment reversed.

Baum sustained work-related injuries that caused him to be temporarily totally disabled. United Airlines (UAL) paid Baum full pay under its wage continuation plan after he sustained an admitted work-related injury, but UAL also claimed a credit on its final admission of liability (FAL) for the comparable temporary total disability (TTD) benefits it would have otherwise been statutorily required to pay Baum. This credit increased Baum's reported TTD benefits, pushing them over the statutory cap. Baum challenged UAL's right to take the credit. The Division of Workers' Compensation director concluded that benefits paid under the wage compensation plan are not similar to vacation or sick leave. Therefore, their accrual and exercise did not bar UAL from taking the claimed TTD credit. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the Panel) affirmed on review. On appeal, Baum argued that CRS § 8-42-124 is unconstitutional on its face and as applied because the plan was approved by the director without the opportunity for injured workers to challenge it in court. UAL's plan was adopted and approved before Baum sustained any injury. Baum could not meet the threshold test of being deprived of a property interest without due process when the plan was approved because he had no such interest when the plan was approved. Baum also argued that this absence of appellate review of wage continuation plans violates separation of powers. The separation of powers doctrine does not guarantee that the judicial branch will be given oversight over every action taken by a governmental entity. In adopting CRS § 8-24-124, the legislature made wage continuation plans subject to the director's, not its own, approval. Further, the judicial branch is not excluded from reviewing these plans through court review of agency actions. The approval of CRS § 8-42-124 did not violate the separation of powers doctrine. Baum next contended that the Panel erroneously affirmed the director's grant of summar

Board of Higher Education policies, rules and regulations adopted as part of its policy manual govern termination of university faculty members and are part of the employment contract between the institution and the faculty member. Generally, substantial compliance with the procedural requirements for termination is sufficient if their purpose is fulfilled. The separation of powers doctrine does not permit judicial examination of the adequacy of a university president's review of the record.

Breach of contract Hospital termination of physician's employment contract Contractual right to exercise professional judgment Wrongful discharge and public policy Defamation and defense of qualified privilege

In this interlocutory appeal, we address whether the attorney-client privilege protects communications between a corporation's legal counsel and a third-party nonemployee of the corporation. After acquiring four commercial properties, a corporation filed unlawful detainer actions against the properties' tenants. The tenants subpoenaed documents from a property management company hired by the corporation to manage its properties. The corporation and the property management company objected to producing documents containing communications between the corporation's legal counsel and the property management company, arguing that the attorney-client privilege protected the documents. The trial court held that the documents were protected because the attorney-client privilege extended to the property management company as an agent of the corporation. We hold that the attorney-client privilege applies to communications between an entity's legal counsel and a third-party nonemployee of the entity if the nonemployee is the functional equivalent of the entity's employee and when the communications relate to the subject matter of legal counsel's representation of the entity and the communications were made with the intention that they would be kept confidential. Applying this framework, we hold that the property management company was the functional equivalent of an employee of the corporation, that the communications related to the subject matter of counsel's representation of the corporation, and that the communications were made with the intention that they would be kept confidential. We affirm the ruling of the trial court and remand to the trial court for further proceedings.

summary judgment – gender discrimination – legitimate business reason – pretext – retaliation – judgment based on arguments not asserted

Health Care Availability Act—Statutory Construction—Alternative Dispute Resolution. CRS § 13-64-403 of the Health Care Availability Act governs arbitration agreements between patients and healthcare providers. Under CRS § 13-64-403(4), such agreements must contain a certain notice to patients to help ensure that they enter the agreements voluntarily, and the notice must be emphasized by at least 10-point font and bold-faced type. The agreement here contained the notice in 12-point font, but it was not bold-faced. The Court of Appeals determined the statute requires strict compliance and that the agreement therefore failed for lack of bold-faced type. The Supreme Court held that CRS § 13-64-403 requires only substantial compliance. The Court further concluded the agreement here substantially complied with the formatting requirements of CRS § 13-64-403, notwithstanding its lack of bold-faced type. Accordingly, the Court reversed the Court of Appeals' judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the opinion.

The Supreme Court considered whether and when a civil protection order is available to a victim of alleged domestic abuse who comes to Colorado seeking refuge from a non-resident. The Court concluded that an out-of-state party's harassment of, threatening of, or attempt to coerce an individual known by the non-resident to be located in Colorado is a tortious act sufficient to establish personal jurisdiction under the state's long-arm statute, CRS § 13-1-124. The Court also concluded that such conduct creates a sufficient nexus between the out-of-state party and Colorado to satisfy the requisite minimum contacts such that the exercise of jurisdiction by a Colorado court to enter a protection order comports with traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. The Court reversed the district court's order vacating the permanent civil protection order and remanded the case for further proceedings.

Administrative Law, Just Cause, State Employee

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Plaintiff's Exhibits 29 and 36 into evidence during trial because the probative value of the exhibits substantially outweighed any danger of any prejudice to the appellants. The jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff with respect to his claims for breach of contract, discrimination, and retaliation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err when it overruled the appellants' motions for directed verdicts and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the appellants' untimely motion for leave to amend their answer to include the after-acquired evidence defense. Judgment affirmed.

Motor Vehicle Insurance—Uninsured/Underinsured—Summary Judgment. Airth was seriously injured in an accident while operating a semi truck owned by his employer, Sole Transport LLC, d/b/a Solar Transport Company (Solar). He was struck by a negligent, uninsured driver. Solar had uninsured/underinsured motorist (UM/UIM) insurance coverage of $50,000 for its employees through a policy issued by Zurich American Insurance Co. Airth brought a claim for declaratory relief, seeking to reform Solar's policy to provide UM/UIM coverage of $1 million. He alleged he was entitled to the higher amount because Zurich had failed, as required by CRS § 10-4-609, to (1) offer Solar UM/UIM coverage in an amount equal to its bodily injury liability coverage ($1 million), and (2) produce a written rejection by Solar of such an offer. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court entered judgment for Zurich ruling, as a matter of law, that (1) Zurich's documents adequately offered Solar UM/UIM coverage in an amount equal to the bodily injury liability limits of the policy, and (2) there is no requirement that the rejection of UM/UIM limits in an amount equal to liability limits be in writing. On appeal, Airth contended that both of the district court's rulings were incorrect and the court therefore erred in granting Zurich's summary judgment motion and denying Airth's cross-motion. CRS § 10-4-609(1)(a) prohibits an insurer from issuing an automobile liability policy unless a minimum amount of UM/UIM coverage is included in the policy, except where the named insured rejects UM/UIM coverage in writing. CRS § 10-4-609(2) requires an insurer, before a policy is issued or renewed, to offer the insured the right to obtain UM/UIM coverage in an amount equal to the insured's bodily injury liability limits. The facts here were undisputed. Before renewing Solar's policy, Zurich sent a package of documents pertaining to Solar's rights related to UM/UIM coverage and Solar's counsel affirmed

Workers' compensation-Violation of a specific safety requirement ("VSSR")-Claimant's failure to follow employer's safety policy was proximate cause of injury-Writ of mandamus granted ordering Industrial Commission to vacate its order and issue new order denying application for VSSR award.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 election database moot drafts format create new record reasonably identify organize policy. Overview: Requester sought Ohio voting results in machine-readable format from eight congressional elections, in a single, comprehensive file. The special master found that requester had reasonably identified the records sought. Respondent eventually provided all existing responsive data in a separate machine-readable spreadsheet file for each election, but testified that none of its database software was programmed to produce a single, comprehensive file. The special master recommended the court find that the request for the underlying data was moot, and that the demand for respondent to aggregate all responsive data into a single file was an improper request to create a new record. The special master found that the court cannot impose optional record-management policies or practices that are not required by law.

Prohibition-Respondent appellate court patently and unambiguously lacks jurisdiction to review trial court's credibility determinations-Writ granted.