Court Rulings

P is a trust created under a collective bargaining agreement between the Teamsters Union (U) and the Contractors Association (A). When operational, P proposes to award grants to eligible employees and their families for the purpose of furthering their education. P's only source of funds is contributions received from members of A under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement. During the negotiations between A and U prior to the completion of the collective bargaining agreement, representatives of U requested the establishment of P as part of the allocation of an agreed financial settlement between wages and indirect compensation. Under the bargaining agreement, members of A are required to make contributions to P in the amount of 5 cents per hour of employment of covered employees; if contributions are not paid, members of U are authorized to strike. Held, because its primary purpose is to provide a form of indirect compensation to employees covered by the collective bargaining agreement, P is not operated \exclusively\ for any of the purposes described in sec. 501(c)(3), I.R.C. 1954, notwithstanding that P's proposed activities will to some extent further charitable purposes.

<p>Appeal, No. 485, Jan. T., 1894, by plaintiff, from judgment of C. P. Luzerne Co., March T., 1894, No. 299, in favor of defendant, in case tried by the court without a jury.</p> <p>Amicable action in trespass. Before Rice, P. J.</p> <p>The case was tried without a jury under the act of April 22,, 1874. The material facts appear by the opinion of the Supreme Court.</p> <p>Plaintiff’s point was among others as follows:</p> <p>“1. Under the exception and reservation as to the coal contained in the deed from Thomas Wright to Henry Courtwright, the exclusive ownership of the coal under the land therein described was vested in Thomas Wright.” Refused. [1]</p> <p>Judgment was entered for defendant. Plaintiff appealed.</p> <p>Errors assigned were, among others, (1) rejection of point, quoting it; (13) in not entering judgment for plaintiff for value of coal mined.</p>

The plaintiff, who was an undergraduate student at Yale College, sought to recover damages in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut in connection with statements the defendant D, a classmate of the plaintiff, made during a disciplinary hearing conducted by the named defendant university's committee on sexual misconduct (commit- tee). In 2015, D accused the plaintiff of sexually assaulting her in her dormitory, and the university suspended the plaintiff. The committee, however, stayed the disciplinary proceedings against the plaintiff pend- ing the outcome of a criminal case that the state had filed against him. The plaintiff subsequently was acquitted on multiple counts of sexual assault, and, in 2018, he resumed full-time student status at Yale. Shortly thereafter, however, as a result of the reporting in a student newspaper of additional allegations of sexual assault involving the plaintiff, the plaintiff agreed to undergo a mental health consultation, but he refused a request that he meet with university administrators. Subsequently, the university again suspended the plaintiff on the ground that it was necessary for the safety and well-being of the plaintiff and the university community. Thereafter, the committee convened a hearing in connection with D's 2015 sexual assault complaint. At the hearing, D, who had since graduated, provided a statement via teleconference, but she did not testify under oath or provide any sworn statement. The plaintiff and his counsel were not permitted in the hearing room when the hearing panel questioned D and, instead, listened to an audio feed from an anteroom. The plaintiff's counsel was not permitted to speak, question D or any other witness, or raise objections, and the hearing panel denied the plaintiff's request for a recording or transcript of the hearing. Addition- ally, the committee's procedures allowed the parties to submit questions that they wanted the hearing panel to ask and to request tha

The plaintiff, whose marriage to the defendant had been dissolved, appealed from the trial court's postdissolution decision to grant the plaintiff's motion for modification of alimony and the defendant's motion for contempt, and to award the defendant past due alimony and attorney's fees. When the parties' marriage was dissolved in 2009, the plaintiff was employed as the chief executive officer of a major corporation and was paid a base annual salary and bonuses. The parties' separation agreement, which had been incorporated into the judgment of dissolu- tion, required the plaintiff to pay the defendant alimony in the amount of 30 percent of his ''gross annual base income from employment'' and 25 percent of his gross cash bonus. The plaintiff subsequently left that corporation and, in 2015, began working as a commercial real estate broker for C Co. Under C Co.'s compensation plan, the plaintiff received annual draws on future commissions, initially in the amount of $35,000 a year, and, if he did not earn commissions sufficient to cover the draws, he was obligated to pay the difference back to C Co. The plaintiff elected to have the draws deposited into a bank account in the name of a limited liability company, S Co., that he had created in 2014. The plaintiff also deposited into that account money he earned in connection with certain consulting work he performed on the side. The plaintiff notified the defendant when his employment at C Co. began, and she initially agreed to accept monthly alimony in the amount of $875, or 30 percent of the $35,000 annual draw. The plaintiff, however, continued to pay her only $875 per month, even though his annual draw rate increased significantly between 2015 and 2019. In response, the defendant filed her motion for contempt and sought payment of accrued, unpaid alimony that purport- edly was owed under the separation agreement. The plaintiff, on the other hand, sought to modify his alimony obligation due to a substantial change in

EMPLOYER-EMPLOYEE – INJUNCTIVE RELIEF – CONTRACT – NONCOMPETITION RESTRICTIONS: The trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting a cardiothoracic surgeon's motion for a preliminary injunction to prevent his employer from enforcing the noncompetition restrictions in his employment agreement that prevented him from working in contiguous counties for a 12-month period following the termination of his employment where there was no evidence that the surgeon possessed or used the employer's confidential information, and thus no evidence that unfair competition would result from the surgeon's hiring by a hospital within the restricted area and restricted period.

Torts—Negligent hiring, retention, or supervision of an employee—Summary judgment—A plaintiff need not show that an employee has been adjudicated civilly liable or found guilty of a crime for the plaintiff to maintain a negligent hiring, retention, or supervision claim against the employer—Judgment affirmed and cause remanded to the trial court.

educational service center, treasurer, special audit, findings for recovery, breach of contract, duty to defend, severance pay, vacation leave, sick leave, summary judgment, performance incentives, motion to stay discovery, consideration, illusory, public policy, R.C. 3313.22, R.C. 3319.16, liquidated damages, unenforceable penalty, unconscionability, performance, R.C. 117.36, Civ.R. 59(A)(8), newly discovered evidence

Mandamus—Public records—R.C. 149.43(B)(8)—The custodian of a public record has no clear legal duty to produce a record requested by an incarcerated person who failed to request a finding that the record is necessary to support what appears to be a justiciable claim of the incarcerated person—Denial of writ affirmed but cause remanded for resolution of a motion for statutory damages.

A district court's denial of a motion for new trial is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. A court abuses its discretion if it acts in an arbitrary, unreasonable, or unconscionable manner its decision is not the product of a rational mental process leading to a reasoned determination or it misinterprets or misapplies the law. Unopposed jury instructions become the law of the case. A party on appeal cannot complain about error that is of their own making. A district court considering a new trial motion based on insufficiency of the evidence may not substitute its own judgment for that of the jury, or act as a thirteenth juror when the evidence is such that different persons would naturally and fairly come to different conclusions, but may set aside a jury verdict when, in considering and weighing all the evidence, the court's judgment tells it the verdict is wrong because it is manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Absent statutory or contractual authority, the American Rule assumes parties to a lawsuit bear their own attorney fees.

In this foreclosure action, the defendants, Michele Perretta and Anna M. Perretta, appeal from a Superior Court order granting partial summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff, Note Capital Group, Inc. First, the Perrettas argued that an appeal from the Superior Court's interlocutory order was appropriate because the grant of partial summary judgment had an element of finality, as that order allowed Note Capital to foreclose on the Perrettas' property. Second, the Perrettas contended that Note Capital was not entitled to enforce the note because the chain of title of the note was tainted by an improper transfer. Third, the Perrettas proffered that, due to the existence of several versions of the lost note, the hearing justice had erred in granting summary judgment. Fourth, the Perrettas averred that Note Capital was not entitled to enforce the note evidencing a debt owed on their property because the note had been lost by the previous holder of the note, American Residential Equities, LIX, LLC, prior to its assignment to Note Capital. The Supreme Court first held that the Perrettas' interlocutory appeal was proper because it fell into the exception permitting appeals from interlocutory orders regarding a sale of real or personal property. Second, the Court held that the Perrettas lacked standing to contest the allegedly tainted transfer because the doctrine of estoppel by deed rendered that transfer voidable and not void. Finally, the Court held that summary judgment was inappropriate because the hearing justice had made an impermissible factual determination regarding the validity of the lost note, in light of the fact that several versions of the note had been entered into the record below. Accordingly, the Court vacated the order of the Superior Court and remanded the case, with instructions that the Superior Court may consider, inter alia, the Supreme Court's opinion in SMS Financial XXV, LLC v. Corsetti, 186 A.3d 1060 (R.I. 2018).