Court Rulings

Attorney fees litigation costs Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act R.C. 1345.09(F) Magnuson Moss Warranty Act 15 U.S.C. 2310(d) settlement agreement stipulation Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(a) basis for fee determination duplicative time attorney travel time and expenses. Trial court's award of attorney fees and litigation costs did not constitute an abuse of discretion. Parties stipulated that plaintiff was entitled to recover his reasonable attorney fees and litigation costs as part of their settlement agreement. Trial court's explanation of its fee award was a sufficient statement of the basis for its fee determination to enable appellate court to conduct a meaningful review where trial court referenced the test in Bittner v. Tri-County Toyota, Inc., 58 Ohio St.3d 143, 569 N.E.2d 464 (1991), addressed each of the specific objections raised by defendant to the amounts requested by plaintiff, and clearly explained how it arrived at the amounts it awarded for attorney fees and litigation costs, including each of the specific adjustments made to the amounts requested and why. Trial court did not act unreasonably, arbitrarily, or unconscionably in concluding that it was unreasonable for plaintiff's counsel to bill the same hourly rate for their travel time as they billed for providing substantive legal services and awarding 50 percent — and only 50 percent — of plaintiff's attorneys' duplicative time, attorney time prosecuting motion for attorney fees and litigation costs, and attorney travel time and travel expenses.

The Supreme Court considered whether the Eighth Amendment's prohibition on the government imposition of "excessive fines" applies to fines levied on corporations. Concluding that this Eighth Amendment protection does apply to corporations, the Court held that the proper test to assess the constitutionality of government-imposed fines requires an assessment of whether the fine is grossly disproportional to the offense for which it is imposed, as articulated in United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998). The Court of Appeals' ruling was thus reversed and the case was remanded to that Court for return to the Division of Workers' Compensation to determine whether the per diem fines at issue are proportional to the harm or risk of harm caused by each day of the employer's failure to comply with the statutory requirement to carry workers' compensation insurance.

Workers' compensation—Violation of specific safety requirement—Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in granting additional award—Record contained evidence supporting commission's finding that specific safety requirement applied, that employer violated it, and that violation was proximate cause of injury—Court of appeals' judgment denying of writ of mandamus affirmed.