Court Rulings

<p>Appeal from Saline Circuit Court; W. H. Evans, Judge;</p> <p>The gas company was not liable for the acts of its independent contractors, or its agents or employees, even if injury resulted from their negligence. Pitts was an employee of appellant, but in opening the gates of the gas main and failing to close them or shut off the gas he was acting under the orders of the contractors’ agent, and was their agent. • 54 Ark. 424; 77 Id. 552; 156 N. Y. 75; 60 N. E. 87; 166 Mass. 268; 35 N. E. 101; 20 Moak, Eng. Rep. 469. The test is who directs the movements of the person committing the injury. 156 N. Y. 75. Pitts was simply lent to independent contractors and doing their work, under their orders. L. R. 6 C. P. 24. Under these authorities the court erred in its' charge to the jury.</p> <p>1. Booth & Flinn were not independent contractors, as found by the jury upon a proper charge..</p> <p>2. Pitts was the agent and employee of appellant on duty and subject to its orders. 62 N. Y. Supp. 1086; 46 Fed. 506; 63 Pac. 177; 10 N. Y. Supp. 927 ; 83 Ark. 302. The relation of master and servant never existed between Booth & Flinn and Pitts. 83 Ark. 302; 133 N. W. 888; 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 973; 203 N. Y. 191; 38 L. R. A. (N. S.) 481. There is no error in the court’s charge.</p>

Domestic relations—Child support—R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)—R.C. 3119.01(C)(17) requires that the domestic-relations court's child-support order include an express determination of voluntary unemployment or underemployment as a condition precedent to imputing potential income for child-support-calculation purposes—Domestic-relations court's lack of express determination of voluntary employment was reversible error—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded to domestic-relations court.

Taxation—Time period for appealing from the tax commissioner's determinations to the Board of Tax Appeals was tolled by 2020 Am.Sub.H.B. 197, which tolled certain time limitations because of the COVID-19 global health emergency—Decisions reversed and causes remanded.

Voluntary satisfaction of judgment garnishment stay of execution age discrimination R.C. 4112.02(A) Age Discrimination in Employment Act 29 U.S.C. 623 motion for directed verdict Civ.R. 50(A)(4) failure to preserve issue for appeal plain error failure to object to jury instructions inconsistent jury verdicts back pay and front pay damages punitive damages Civ.R. 61. Appeal was not moot based on appellant's partial voluntary satisfaction of judgment through garnishment. Appellant failed to preserve the issue of trial court's denial of motion for directed verdict for appeal where it did not renew the motion at close of all evidence. Appellant forfeited all but plain error regarding improper jury instructions and inconsistent verdicts where it failed to raise issues below. Appellant failed to demonstrate plain error. Trial court did not improperly permit plaintiff to reference indictment of a third-party during cross-examination of a defendant. Trial court promptly sustained objection once defendants objected and gave appropriate instruction to the jury regarding the issue. Appellant did not demonstrate that trial court abused its discretion in allowing plaintiff to use Ohio Department of Job and Family Services document during his cross-examination of a defendant or that it was materially prejudiced thereby.

Workers' compensation—Voluntary abandonment is an affirmative defense—If evidence of voluntary abandonment has been brought into issue, a hearing officer's failure to address the issue constitutes a mistake of law—The employer has the burden to raise and produce evidence of voluntary abandonment—Court of appeals' judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.

Prohibition—Elections—R.C. 519.12(H)—Zoning-referendum petition was valid and board of elections correctly denied protest—Writ denied.

Civ.R. 12(C) motion for judgment on pleadings legal malpractice failure to return documents statute of limitations time-barred R.C. 2305.11(A) cognizable event termination of attorney-client relationship - Trial court did not err in granting attorneys' motion for judgment on the pleadings on grounds that legal malpractice claim was time-barred under R.C. 2305.11(A) where legal malpractice claim was based on attorneys' alleged failure to return documents plaintiff requested 14 years before filing his complaint.

Workers' compensation-Appeal-R.C. 4123.512-Decision that preexisting condition substantially aggravated by workplace injury has returned to preinjury level is a decision regarding the extent of a claimant's disability and is not appealable-Court of appeals' judgment reversed.

These consolidated appeals arose from a judgment of the Superior Court regarding the statutory interpretation of the manner in which state education aid funds that the Bristol Warren Regional School District (BWRSD) received should be calculated and apportioned to its constituent towns, Bristol and Warren. The defendants, the BWRSD, the Bristol Warren Regional School Committee (BWRSC), and the Town of Bristol, appealed from a Superior Court judgment granting the Town of Warren's petition and complaint for declaratory judgment. The defendants argued that the trial justice misconstrued the Rhode Island Board of Education Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 7 of title 16 (Education Act) and the Rhode Island Education Equity and Property Tax Relief Act, G.L. 1956 chapter 7.2 of title 16 (Funding Formula Act). The defendants further maintained that the trial justice failed to accord proper deference to the Rhode Island Department of Education's (RIDE) interpretation of those statutes. In a separate argument, the Town of Bristol posited that the Superior Court did not have jurisdiction over this declaratory judgment action because the Town of Warren failed to join all interested parties and further that the Town of Warren's claims were barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The Supreme Court held that no identity of issues existed between the two cases and that, therefore, the doctrine of res judicata did not bar the Town of Warren's claims. The Supreme Court further held that the trial justice did not err when he declined to dismiss the declaratory judgment action because other school districts had not been joined, reasoning that the judgment did not hold any other regional school district or municipality responsible for reimbursing the Town of Warren. With respect to the defendants arguments regarding deference to RIDE, the Supreme Court held that it was not required to defer to RIDE's reading of the Education Act and the Funding Formula Act because the relevant section of the stat