Court Rulings

Petitioner recovered $ 18,030.90, after expenses and attorneys' fees, in settlement of a job discrimination suit under title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Petitioner reported half of that amount as income under sec. 61, I.R.C. 1954, and excluded the other half as personal injury damages under sec. 104(a)(2), I.R.C. 1954. Held, the entire amount recovered constitutes income under sec. 61, I.R.C. 1954.

<p>Street railroads. Independent contractors. Negligence. Verdict. .Before Judge Van Epps. City court of Atlanta. March term, 1891.</p> <p>Reported in the decision.</p>

While this Court defers to a tribe on its membership determinations, without consistent and clear factual findings supporting the application of ICWA and North Dakota heightened review for Indian families, this Court is unable to determine the father's issues on appeal. The Court retains jurisdiction and remands for the juvenile court to clarify its findings on ICWA and heightened state law and to hold additional evidentiary proceedings if necessary.

In this interlocutory appeal, the trustee of a trust executed an investment/brokerage account agreement that included a provision requiring the arbitration of disputes. The trust beneficiary filed a lawsuit asserting claims against the investment broker, and the defendant broker sought to compel arbitration under the arbitration provision in the account agreement. The trial court granted the motion to compel arbitration and granted permission for this interlocutory appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed. On appeal, we are asked to determine whether the signature of the trustee on the account agreement binds the beneficiary of the trust to the predispute arbitration provision. We hold that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code is intended to give trustees broad authority to fulfill their duties as trustee. We also hold that the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code gives trustees the power to enter into predispute arbitration agreements, so long as doing so is not prohibited under the operative trust instrument. We hold that the trust instrument in this case gives the named trustee broad authority and does not prohibit the trustee from entering into a predispute arbitration agreement. As a result, we interpret the trust instrument as authorizing the trustee to execute the account agreement with the defendant broker, including the predispute arbitration provision therein. Thus, under both the Tennessee Uniform Trust Code and the operative trust instrument, the trustee had authority to enter into the arbitration agreement contained within the account agreement. The question of whether the trust beneficiary in this case is bound by the arbitration provision is governed by the principle that a third party who seeks the benefit of a contract must also bear its burdens. Applying this principle, the trust beneficiary in this case may be bound to arbitrate claims against the investment broker that seek to enforce the account agreement. We reverse the decision of the Court of Appeals and va

Plaintiffs petitioned to present a ballot initiative to the residents of Sheridan. Sheridan's City Clerk, Sagee, rejected some of the signatures plaintiffs had collected, leaving them short of the number required for the initiative to be considered. Plaintiffs contested the decision, and the City Clerk upheld it after a protest hearing. Plaintiffs filed a complaint in district court 35 days later pursuant to CRS § 31-11-110(3). The district court dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because plaintiffs failed to file within the CRCP 106 28-day time limit. On appeal, plaintiffs conceded that the 28-day jurisdictional bar applied and they filed 35 days after the relevant final decision. They argued that strict application of the time limit to them as pro se parties deprived them of their constitutional right of initiative. The Court of Appeals construed plaintiffs' argument to be an as-applied challenge to the constitutionality of the statutory time bar. The Court found plaintiffs pro se status irrelevant pro se parties must comply with procedural rules to the same extent as parties represented by attorneys. The Court concluded that applying CRCP 106(b)'s jurisdictional deadline to plaintiffs' Rule 106(a)(4) petition does not deprive them of or unduly burden their constitutional right of initiative. The judgment was affirmed.

The Supreme Court held that where the Division of Unemployment Insurance determines a claimant was mentally unable to perform assigned work under CRS § 8-73-108(4)(j) of the Colorado Employment Security Act, CRS §§ 8-70-101 to 8-82-105, neither the text of CRS § 8-73-108(4)(j) nor related case law contemplates further inquiry into the cause of the claimant's mental condition, and such an inquiry is beyond the scope of the simplified administrative proceedings to determine the claimant's eligibility for benefits. Here, the Court concluded that the Division's hearing officer erred in determining that claimant committed a volitional act to cause her mental incapacity and thus was at fault for her separation from employment and was disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits. The Court of Appeals' judgment was affirmed.

(1) Significant similarities between statements submitted by applicants in different proceedings can be considered by an Immigration Judge in making an adverse credibility determination if certain procedural steps are undertaken to preserve the fairness of the proceedings. (2) When relying on inter-proceeding similarities, the Immigration Judge should give the applicant meaningful notice of the similarities and a reasonable opportunity to explain them prior to making a credibility determination that is based on the totality of the circumstances.