Court Rulings

Arbitration—Labor relations—Ohio has no dominant and well-defined public policy that renders unlawful an arbitration award reinstating a safety-sensitive employee who was terminated for testing positive for a controlled substance.

<p>Appeal from Caldwell Circuit Court. — Hon. F. H. Trimble, Judge.</p> <p>(1) Until a will is probated it is not effective to pass title. Shaffer v. Howerton, 123 Mo. 637; Dublin v. Chadbourn, 16 Mass. 433; Bacon v. Railroad, 145 HI. App. 502. (2) Probate in common form is as final ,...and conclusive after the lapse of the statutory period for contest as probate in solemn form. Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. 330; Wells v. Wells, 4 T. B. Monroe, 152; Duncan v. Duncan, 23 111. 324; Parker v. Parker, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 519. (3) Contest must be in courts where probated. Crippen v. Dexter, 79 Mass. 330; Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U. S. 43; Coming’s Will, 159 Mich. 474; Rachnan v. Taylor, 204 Mass. 394; Bryan v. Nash, 110 Ya. 329. (4) Admission of will, to probate is a special proceeding and not governed^by the usual rules of pleading and practice. Wells v. Wells, 4 T. B. Monroe, 152; Clearchrings Twp. v. Blough, 88 N. E. 611. (5) Where the probate act is silent, resort may be had to the general code as to parties and practice in contest cases. Lilly v. Tobein, 103 Mo. 477; State es reí. v. Guiño tte, 157 Mo. 513. (6) Answers in a contest case, averring that defendants had no sufficient information to affirm or deny the allegations of the petition, are equivalent to a general denial. Pomeroy on Remedies, sec. 640; Bliss on Code Plead., sec. 326; Walsor v. Hawkins, 60 Mo. 560; Humphrey v. McCall, 70 Am. Dec. 626. (7) More was required in the Sloan contest to give the circuit court jurisdiction than merely filing a petition and getting service on defendants. Heady v. Crouse, 203 Mo. 100. (8) .The relief granted ought not to be broader than issues tendered by the pleadings. Powell v. Crow, 204 Mo. 481. Howard v. Brown, 197 Mo. 53. (9) The defendants to the contest suit were adversaries of Mrs. Sloan, but not of each other. Badeau v. Logan, 2 Paige, 209; Glasner v. Weusberg, 43 Mo. App. 244; Roselle v. Bank, 119 Mo. 84. (10) A decree is only conclusive on adversary parties. McMahon v

Divorce marital property separate property tracing abuse of discretion credibility lost future wages expert marital debt R.C. 3105.171 proportional share tracing methodology Evid.R. 702 marital labor spousal support R.C. 3105.18 attorney fees Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(b)(iii) Loc.R.27 supplemental objections praecipe Civ.R. 24(A) motion to intervene Civ.R. 75(B) contempt order sanction credit personal property loss child support. Wife's settlement proceeds from a former employer are marital property because the settlement was executed during the marriage, payments would begin within seven days of execution of the agreement, and the proceeds from the settlement reflected lost future wages-- income Wife would have earned during the marriage. Where the trial court found Wife's expert witness credible and his testimony helpful, and where Husband failed to submit expert evidence demonstrating that Wife's expert's proportional share tracing methodology is faulty or that the purportedly "missed" deposits or incomplete report resulted in the expert's inability to accurately trace Wife's separate property, the trial court did not err in permitting the expert's testimony. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that Husband failed to rebut Wife's expert testimony concerning Wife's traceable separate property and Husband's marital labor did not contribute to the growth of Wife's financial accounts. To the extent the trial court based its award of Wife's separate property interests in the properties located on Bendemeer, Brentwood, and Edgewood on its erroneous conclusion that the settlement proceeds are Wife's separate property, the trial court erred. The trial court did not err in finding Husband had an ownership interest in the Antisdale property where Husband provided only his self-serving testimony regarding his sister's interest in the property and the magistrate found Husband's testimony not credible. The court's allocation of the marital debt was supported by t

Political-subdivision liability—Former R.C. 2744.07(A)(2), now R.C. 2744.07(B)—The right to indemnification set forth in R.C. 2744.07 may be asserted only by an employee of a political subdivision—Court of appeals' judgment affirmed.

The United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee has submitted a certified question of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 23 regarding the interpretation of two insurance policies: "Under Tennessee law, may an insurer in making an actual cash value payment withhold a portion of repair labor as depreciation when the policy (1) defines actual cash value as 'the cost to replace damaged property with new property of similar quality and features reduced by the amount of depreciation applicable to the damaged property immediately prior to the loss,' or (2) states that 'actual cash value includes a deduction for depreciation?"' Based on Tennessee law regarding the interpretation of insurance contracts, we conclude that the language in the policies is ambiguous and must be construed in favor of the insured parties. Therefore, we answer the district court's question in the negative: The insurer may not withhold a portion of repair labor as depreciation.