Court Rulings

Mandamus to compel State Employment Relations Board to issue a complaint and conduct a hearing on University of Cincinnati's unions' unfair labor practice charge granted, when—Mandamus appropriate remedy to obtain judicial review of orders by SERB dismissing unfair labor practice charge for lack of probable cause.

Petitioner Bentley, a noncompetent ward of the Federal Government and a tribal Indian, raised cattle on tribal lands by authority of a permit issued by the tribe. He had acquired the cattle with a loan obtained pursuant to a \rehabilitation\ program operated by the tribe for its members through a grant by the Federal Government. Petitioner disposed of the cattle in 1958 and contended that the income derived therefrom was exempt from Federal income taxation. Held, the absence of any provision in a treaty or Act of Congress exempting from taxation income so derived results in its taxation. Squire v. Capoeman, 351 U.S. 1 (1956), distinguished.

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OE QUARTER SESSIONS OE NORTHAMPTON COUNTY.</p> <p>No. 85 July Term 1888, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. . . . .....Term 1888, Q. S.</p> <p>On April 11, 1888, the grand jury returned as a true bill an indictment charging Dr. Henry M. Cox, George B. Evans and three others with having procured an abortion upon the person of Jennie R. Osborne.</p> <p>On April 12, 1888, a severance having been ordered, Dr. H. M. Cox was called to the bar and pleaded not guilty, when issue was joined. The testimony of the commonwealth established that Jennie R. Osborne, a young unmarried woman, had died on February 16, 1888, at a hotel in Easton, from an abortion committed, as was claimed, on February 11th. The testimony implicating the defendant on trial was circumstantial only, and the chief witness for the commonwealth was George E. Evans, a co-defendant who came upon the stand to testify under a promise of immunity. This witness was a salesman for a New York house, but resided in Jersey City. He visited Easton in a business way about every two weeks. Among his customers in other places was a merchant in Connecticut, in whose behalf he had arranged with the defendant and the proprietor of the hotel at Easton, that the young woman should be brought to the hotel to have the operation performed. According to the witness’s testimony he had met the defendant at the hotel at Easton on January 16th, and arranged with him then to perform the operation and to procure a nurse; and he had met the defendant a second time at the hotel on January 30th, when the young woman was brought there. This witness did not further implicate the defendant, who, as a witness in his own behalf, denied his guilt and called a number of patients whom he had visited at different hours on January 16th, some of whom had paid their bills, producing also the railroad time tables, to show that it was impossible for him to have been at Easton on that day. The defendant called also a witness, the holder of

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring unconstitutional the statute (§ 52-190a [a]) that requires a complaint sounding in medical malpractice to be accompanied by a good faith certificate and a letter authored by a similar health care provider opining that there appeared to be evidence of medical negligence. In 2006, following the suicide of his wife, the plaintiff had brought a medical malpractice action against his wife's treating psychiatrist, A, and his employer, C Co., but failed to append to the complaint the good faith certificate and opinion letter required by § 52-190a (a). Although the plaintiff subsequently obtained an opinion letter and amended his complaint, the trial court dismissed the counts of the amended complaint sounding in medical negligence on the ground that the original complaint failed to comply with § 52- 190a (a). The trial court subsequently rendered judgment for A and C Co. on the remaining counts. Thereafter, in 2011, the plaintiff com- menced two additional actions against A and C Co., their telephone answering service, T Co., and its owners, and other governmental offi- cials, employees and entities, among others, in which he challenged the dismissal of his medical malpractice action. Those actions, both of which included the claim that § 52-190a is unconstitutional, ultimately were resolved against the plaintiff. In 2016, the plaintiff, representing himself, commenced the present action against A, C Co., T Co. and its owners, the state, the Appellate Court, and five Superior Court judges. Thereafter, the trial court granted A and C Co.'s motion for summary judgment on the ground that the claims directed against them were barred by the doctrine of res judicata, as the plaintiff previously had or could have raised and litigated those claims in one of the 2011 actions. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss filed by T Co. and its owners, concluding that the plaintiff's claims against them were barred by the prior

Civil law—Civ.R. 23(A)—In a class-certification case, when the case originates with a single named plaintiff and that plaintiff is not subject to an arbitration agreement that was entered into by unnamed putative class members, the defendant need not raise a specific argument referring or relating to arbitration in the answer—Defendant may raise an argument that relates to arbitration against putative class members at the class-certification stage of proceedings—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded.