Breach of Contract Cases

intentional infliction of emotional distress, severe and debilitating, wrongful discharge, public policy, child abuse, remittitur, attorney fees, lodestar calculation, contingency fee agreement, deviation, sanctions, frivolous conduct, R.C. 2323.51, media. Trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion for directed verdict or JNOV where sufficient evidence was presented that defendant's conduct caused plaintiff severe and debilitating emotional distress whether plaintiff's evidence actually proved her case was for the jury to determine. Plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy survived defendant's motion for directed verdict and JNOV because the plaintiff did not have an adequate remedy for wrongful termination when the defendants terminated her for not dissuading the report of child abuse. Trial court abused its discretion by ordering remittitur without considering any of the criteria that must be met before a court may grant remittitur, including that the plaintiff agreed to the reduction in damages. The trial court abused its discretion in limiting the review of attorney fees to only those incurred by the lead attorney and then deviating from the lodestar amount based solely on the contingency fee agreement. Contacting a media outlet to cover a trial does not constitute frivolous conduct in violation of R.C. 2323.51 where the information provided is protected speech and does not violate the ethical rules.

EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE/EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS - breach of contract R.C. 3319.17 age discrimination R.C. 4112.14 in an indirect evidence case courts employ a four-part test to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination constructive discharge.

Civ.R. 56/summary judgment motion for extension discovery. The trial court's grant of summary judgment for appellee as to appellant's employer intentional tort claim was proper. The record does not show any evidence to support the claim of intentional tort. The trial court erred in denying appellant's motion for summary judgment where a genuine issue of material fact existed as to appellee's duty to indemnify under appellant's negligence and product liability claims. Additionally, appellant should have been permitted to conduct further discovery.

Trial court's determination that money was a loan and not a gift supported by the record.

Breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims brought by commissioned salesman were properly dismissed where sales compensation plan provided a formula by which commissions were calculated, and plaintiff failed to provide evidence that employer failed to follow the plan. Allegation that employer "cooks the books," without more, is insufficient to create an issue of fact.

This is a breach of contract action in which the issues hinge on the meaning of several provisions in the agreement. In 1999 and again in 2009, BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee, Inc. ("BlueCross") and Individual Healthcare Specialists, Inc. ("IHS") entered into a general agency agreement that authorized IHS to solicit applications for individual insurance policies through IHS's in-house agents and outside "subagents." The commission rates to be paid were stated in a schedule, which was subject to modification by BlueCross. During the first eleven years, BlueCross modified the commission schedule several times and each modification was prospective only. In 2011, BlueCross modified the commission schedule and, for the first time, applied the commission schedule retrospectively. At the same time, IHS determined that BlueCross had been underpaying commissions since 1999. As a consequence, it commenced this action asserting claims for, inter alia, breach of contract and damages, while also claiming it was entitled to recover its attorney's fees based on the contract's indemnification provision. BlueCross denied any breach of contract. It also asserted the statute of limitations defense as a bar to recovering any commissions that accrued more than six years earlier, and asserted that IHS was not entitled to recover its attorney's fees because the indemnification provision did not apply to disputes between the contracting parties. Shortly thereafter, BlueCross terminated the general agency agreement and began paying renewal commissions directly to IHS's subagents instead of paying them to IHS as it had done since 1999. IHS then amended its complaint to assert a claim that BlueCross also breached the agreement by failing to pay commissions directly to IHS. Following a bench trial, the court denied BlueCross's statute of limitations defense on the ground that IHS's claims were "inherently undiscoverable." The court also determined that BlueCross breached the contract by und

The plaintiff, Terry Andoscia, appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of North Smithfield, by and through its finance director, Cheryl Ficarra, and the town administrator, Paulette Hamilton (collectively, the defendants). The matter arose from the plaintiff's termination from employment during his fourth consecutive two-year term appointment as assistant zoning inspector in the Town of North Smithfield. The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that his appointment constituted a contract of employment and, therefore, his termination without cause constituted a breach of contract and a violation of his constitutional rights. The Superior Court subsequently entered final judgment for the defendants. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in finding that no contract of employment existed under the facts as presented. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and returned the record thereto.

The plaintiff, Terry Andoscia, appealed a Superior Court judgment in favor of North Smithfield, by and through its finance director, Cheryl Ficarra, and the town administrator, Paulette Hamilton (collectively, the defendants). The matter arose from the plaintiff's termination from employment during his fourth consecutive two-year term appointment as assistant zoning inspector in the Town of North Smithfield. The plaintiff thereafter filed a complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that his appointment constituted a contract of employment and, therefore, his termination without cause constituted a breach of contract and a violation of his constitutional rights. The Superior Court subsequently entered final judgment for the defendants. After reviewing the record, the Supreme Court concluded that the trial justice did not err in finding that no contract of employment existed under the facts as presented. The Supreme Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court and returned the record thereto.

Appellant failed to plead fraud with particularity, and accordingly the trial court was correct in dismissing his complaint because his fraud claim failed, his derivative claim of civil conspiracy failed as well.

Stay arbitration vehicle purchase Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act CSPA negligent misrepresentation Magnusson Moss Warranty Act unconscionable procedural substantive adhesion unequal bargaining public policy due process protocol R.C. 2711.02 hearing discretion. Trial court's decision to stay case pending arbitration was upheld. All claims surrounding the purchase of a vehicle fell within the scope of the arbitration agreement, which was neither procedurally or substantively unconscionable. A trial court has discretion to hold a hearing on the motion to stay pursuant to R.C. 2711.02, and the court did not abuse that discretion where it ordered supplemental briefing and had an adequate record upon which to make a determination without a hearing.