Breach of Contract Cases

In this attorney disciplinary appeal, upon petition by the Tennessee Board of Professional Responsibility, this Court ordered the temporary suspension of the attorney from the practice of law based on the threat of substantial harm he posed to the public. For a time, the attorney was placed on disability status later he was reinstated to suspended status. Subsequently, after an evidentiary hearing, a hearing panel found multiple acts of professional misconduct, including knowing conversion of client funds with substantial injury to clients, submitting false testimony and falsified documents in court proceedings, engaging in the unauthorized practice of law, violating Supreme Court orders, and defrauding clients. The hearing panel determined that the attorney should be disbarred. On appeal to the chancery court, the attorney argued inter alia that the disbarment should be made retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension. The chancery court affirmed the decision of the hearing panel. On appeal to this Court, the attorney does not question the disbarment but argues that it would be arbitrary and capricious not to make his disbarment retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension, in order to advance the date on which he may apply for reinstatement of his law license. We disagree. In contrast to suspension, which contemplates that the lawyer will return to law practice, disbarment is not a temporary status. Disbarment is a termination of the individual's license to practice law in Tennessee. Therefore, we decline to make the effective date of the attorney's disbarment retroactive to the date of his temporary suspension. Accordingly, we affirm.

These consolidated cases came before the Supreme Court on an appeal and a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari for review of a November 5, 2015 bench decision in Providence County Superior Court in favor of the plaintiff, John R. Grasso. The defendants, Governor Gina Raimondo, Frank Karpinski, the Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, and the State of Rhode Island, contended before the Supreme Court that the trial justice erred in determining that Mr. Grasso need not comply with G.L. 1956 §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 in order to continue receiving his accidental disability pension because, in his view, those sections were not applicable to his pension. The Supreme Court held that Mr. Grasso was indeed required to comply with §§ 45-21-23 and 45-21-24 and, as such, could be required to undergo independent medical examinations and disclose information with respect to gainful employment as conditions of his accidental disability pension under G.L. 1956 § 45-21.2-10. Accordingly, the Supreme Court vacated the decision of the Superior Court.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted Plaintiff's Exhibits 29 and 36 into evidence during trial because the probative value of the exhibits substantially outweighed any danger of any prejudice to the appellants. The jury's verdict in favor of the plaintiff with respect to his claims for breach of contract, discrimination, and retaliation were not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The trial court did not err when it overruled the appellants' motions for directed verdicts and motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the appellants' untimely motion for leave to amend their answer to include the after-acquired evidence defense. Judgment affirmed.

In a case stemming from liens due to nonpayment of condominium association dues, the trial court's verdict in the association's favor was not against the weight of the evidence. Award of full amount of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion. Motion to dismiss R.C. Chapter 5311 negligence fiduciary duty breach of contract summary judgment motion in limine discrimination spoliation.

Arbitration R.C. Chapter 2711 modification jurisdiction trial court's authority execution of judgment Civ.R. 52 findings of fact some evidence. Where the arbitrator's award of "reasonable and demonstrable lost back pay" was confirmed by the trial court and affirmed on appeal, the arbitrator lacked jurisdiction to revisit the award. The trial court's award thereafter of a sum certain was not a modification of the arbitrator's award but rather a proper exercise of the court's inherent authority to interpret and enforce judgments. The trial court's damage award was supported by some evidence. We therefore must presume regularity and affirm the trial court's award.

This case involves the dismissal of a Tennessee Human Rights Act (THRA) action filed by Jamal Watson against the Tennessee Board of Regents (TBR) and Pellissippi State Community College (PSCC) (collectively the defendants). PSCC offered Watson a fulltime, tenure-track position, but subsequently rescinded the offer. Watson filed a THRA case in the Circuit Court for Knox County (the trial court) against the defendants alleging race discrimination. He later filed a notice of claim for breach of contract in the Tennessee Claims Commission against the same entities. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court alleging that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The defendants asserted that Watson waived his cause of action against "any state officer or employee," pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 9-8-307(b), by filing a claim against the state in the Tennessee Claims Commission. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Watson appeals. We reverse.

ARBITRATION - EMPLOYER/EMPLOYEE - COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: The trial court did not err in vacating the arbitrator's award where the arbitrator had exceeded his power by crafting an award that did not draw its essence from the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement. The arbitrator's determination that a part-time police officer's probationary period could not be extended absent the officer's personal consent was in conflict with the express terms of the collective bargaining agreement, which recognized the Fraternal Order of Police, Ohio Labor Council, Inc., ("FOP") as the sole and exclusive representative for all employees in the bargaining unit and gave the FOP authority to act on behalf of its members and therefore, to agree to an extension of the officer's probationary period. [See CONCURRENCE: As the exclusive bargaining agent for the police officers, the union was empowered to make a decision that adversely impacted the part-time officer and he was bound by that decision.] [But see CONCURRENCE IN JUDGMENT ONLY: To the extent that the union, as the "exclusive representative" in the collective bargaining agreement, was an "agent" in the traditional legal sense, it was only as an agent for the entire employee unit in negotiations with the employer, and not as an agent for each individual employee in every matter related to his or her employment.]