Breach of Contract Cases

<bold>1. Trade Secrets — silvering solution — consent agreement</bold> <bold>— patent expired</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err by determining that plaintiffs' use of a certain silvering solution in making mirrors was a trade secrets case even though the patent for the substance already expired, because regardless of whether the substance is technically a trade secret, plaintiffs are bound by their agreement that they would treat it as one.</block_quote><page_number>Page 327</page_number> <bold>2. Trade Secrets — silvering solution — reversal of oral ruling in</bold> <bold>written order</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not commit prejudicial error by reversing in a written order its earlier oral ruling that a certain silvering solution used to make mirrors was not a trade secret, because: (1) plaintiffs were not prevented from introducing evidence as a result of the order; and (2) the primary focus of plaintiffs' case at trial was to show that the use of the substance in silvering solutions was not a trade secret.</block_quote> <bold>3. Trade Secrets — silvering solution — violation of consent</bold> <bold>judgment — willfulness</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err by finding plaintiffs willfully violated a consent judgment based on plaintiffs' conduct of using a certain silvering solution to make mirrors, because: (1) a mistaken belief that the use of the chemical came under an exception does not negate the purposefulness or deliberateness of plaintiff individual's acts; and (2) plaintiffs may not be relieved of their duty to comply with a consent judgment's provisions based on their mistaken interpretation or finding the judgment difficult to interpret.</block_quote> <bold>4. Trade Secrets — silvering solution — appropriate relief</bold> <bold>under consent judgment</bold> <block_quote> The trial court did not err by determining that defendant's relief under a consent judgment, stating that a certain silvering so

Employer and employee—Arbitration—Arbitrator exceeded his authority by relying on rules extraneous to the collective bargaining agreement to determine the eligibility of union employees to receive paid injury leave for carpal tunnel syndrome, when—Arbitration award vacated, when—R.C. 2711.10(D), applied.