Court Rulings

R.C. 4112.14 to successfully assert an age discrimination claim, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case plaintiff failed to demonstrate that she had been replaced by a substantially younger person.

Taxation-Charitable-use exemption of real property from taxation-R.C. 5709.12 and 5709.121-Nondiscrimination, rather than quantum of charitable care, is the criterion for charitable-use exemption-Board of Tax Appeals' denial of claim for charitable-use exemption affirmed as to tax year 2006 and reversed as to tax year 2007.

Breach of contract and unjust enrichment claims brought by commissioned salesman were properly dismissed where sales compensation plan provided a formula by which commissions were calculated, and plaintiff failed to provide evidence that employer failed to follow the plan. Allegation that employer "cooks the books," without more, is insufficient to create an issue of fact.

CIVIL - Trial court erred in reversing the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission which determined that Mr. Parrett was discharged for just cause due to him losing his status as a commissioned deputy sheriff.

The trial court did not err in imputing minimum wage pursuant to the Federal minimum wage standard by finding the defendant to be voluntarily unemployed and by averaging defendant's income to arrive at its award of support. Judgment affirmed.

In this workers' compensation case, Charles Kilburn sustained several injuries from a motor vehicle accident. He underwent cervical spine surgery to resolve his neck injury complaints. His authorized physician also recommended lumbar spine surgery to combat his back pain, but that request was denied through the utilization review process. Mr. Kilburn took oxycodone to alleviate his back pain, and his treating physician referred him to a pain management clinic. Six months after the cervical spine surgery, Mr. Kilburn died due to an overdose of oxycodone combined with alcohol. After a bench trial, the chancery court found that the death was compensable. Mr. Kilburn's employer appealed. The appeal was initially referred to a Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel, but we later transferred the case to the Supreme Court for review. After examining the record, the parties' arguments, and the applicable law, we reverse the judgment of the chancery court.

Hearing Officer Subpoenas Due Process Manifest Weight of the Evidence Credibility. Where the officer issued a subpoena to obtain evidence relevant to determining whether claimant was terminated for just cause, and the claimant had an opportunity at the hearing to present evidence that he was entitled to unemployment benefits, there was no denial of due process in the hearing officer's failure to issue all of the claimant's requested subpoenas the Commission's decision that claimant was terminated for just cause was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Judgment affirmed. Because the evidence demonstrated that the doctor was not engaged in clinical teaching when she rendered treatment to the plaintiff-patient, the doctor was acting manifestly outside the scope of her State employment and was therefore not entitled to personal immunity under R.C. 9.86 and R.C. 2743.02(F). The Court of Claims did not shift the burden of proof to the doctor.

Prejudgment Interest under CRS § 13-21-101(1). Munoz was injured in a collision with an uninsured motorist (UM). Munoz opened a UM claim with his insurer, American Family Mutual Insurance Co. (American Family). American Family made settlement offers to Munoz but maintained it was not required to pay prejudgment interest because it was only required to do so after a judgment had been entered by a court. Munoz accepted American Family's final offer, understanding that it did not include interest. Munoz then sued American Family and the UM. Munoz moved under CRCP 56(h) for a determination whether American Family was required to include prejudgment interest as part of its UM claim settlement. The trial court ruled, as a matter of law, that the insured is entitled to such interest only when a judgment has been entered and interest is awarded as a component of damages assessed by the jury's verdict or the court. On appeal, Munoz argued that the trial court erred because prejudgment interest is a necessary element of compensatory damages that makes an injured party whole. American Family countered that the plain language of CRS § 13-21-101 states that prejudgment interest can only be awarded after a judgment, based on a damages award determined by a trier of fact, has been entered. The Court of Appeals determined the plain language of the statute requires, prior to prejudgment interest being awarded, that (1) an action must be brought (2) the plaintiff must claim damages in the complaint (3) there must be a finding of damages by a jury or the court and (4) judgment is entered. The judgment was affirmed.

Workers' Compensation —Personal Jurisdiction—Specific Jurisdiction. In this case, the Supreme Court considered whether Colorado has jurisdiction to award benefits for out-of-state work-related injuries and impose a statutory penalty on an employer under CRS § 8-41-204 when the employer is not a citizen of Colorado and has no offices or operations in Colorado but hired a Colorado citizen within the state. The Court concluded that under the facts of this case, Colorado lacks personal jurisdiction over the employer and therefore the employer cannot be subject to the Workers' Compensation Act of Colorado, CRS §§ 8-40-101 to 8-47-209. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 workers' compensation R.C. 4123.01 arising out of employment causal connection idiopathic injury. In order to survive defendants-appellees' motion for summary judgment, plaintiff-appellant had the burden of producing evidence demonstrating that a condition, risk, or hazard of her employment caused or contributed to her injuries. The record reflects that appellant failed to meet her burden. Accordingly, the trial court properly granted appellees' motion for summary judgment.