Court Rulings

Trial court erred when it reversed the commission's order denying appellee's application for renewal of her expiring casino gaming employee license upon erroneously concluding appellee was not an "applicant" for purposes of R.C. Chapter 3722. Judgment reversed and cause remanded for the trial court to determine if the commission's order was supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence and was in accordance with law.

summary judgment – R.C. 4112.02(I) – retaliation – but-for cause – ineffective assistance of counsel in civil case

summary judgment, at-will employment, promissory estoppel, governmental function, implied contract, specific representation, discharge in violation of public policy, civil service, loss of consortium

Under State ex rel. McKee v. Union Metal Corp., 150 Ohio St.3d 223, 2017-Ohio-5541, ¶ 9-11, the commission's order denying permanent total disability compensation was supported by some evidence in the record showing that relator voluntarily abandoned the workforce and was therefore not eligible for benefits. As a result, relator was not entitled to relief in mandamus. Id. at ¶ 11. Objections sustained writ denied.

Summary judgment res judicata federal court R.C. 4112.02 statute of limitations retaliation breach of contract R.C. 4117.02 State Employee Relations Board. Trial court properly awarded transit authority and union summary judgment where plaintiff's discrimination claims were previously rejected in federal court, retaliation and breach of contract claims were barred by the statute of limitations, claims for breach of rights set forth in the collective bargaining agreement were never arbitrated, were not filed with the State Employment Relations Board, and were also outside the statute of limitations.

The trial court did not err in affirming the decision of the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission on the basis that Appellant quit employment without just cause. The record supports the Review Commission's determination that Appellant's decision to resign was voluntary.

The trial court did not abuse its discretion by entering default judgment against appellant and dismissing his counterclaims and third-party complaint as a sanction for discovery violations. Emails involving appellant, his former employer, and that employer's customers were highly relevant to issues disputed among the parties. After the trial court ordered appellant to produce for forensic examination a laptop computer he used for such emails, appellant reformatted that computer and installed software updates that deleted all information the employer sought through discovery requests. Although appellant belatedly claimed to have preserved the deleted information on "backups" held by his attorney, the employer's computer expert testified that such backups would not necessarily contain all data originally removed from the computer. The employer's motion seeking default judgment and dismissal as discovery sanctions provided adequate notice to appellant of the prospect of those sanctions. The sanctions imposed by the trial court also were not an abuse of discretion or disproportionate to the nature of appellant's violation, as evidence presented at the sanctions hearing supported the trial court's determination that appellant deliberately destroyed evidence, prejudicing the employer's ability both to prove its own claims and defend against appellant's claims. The court acted within its discretion in declining to require that employer's computer expert re-examine the computer after appellant's expert purportedly "restored" the missing data. Judgment affirmed.

In this appeal arising out of Anderson County Council's approval of a severance agreement, the Court vacates the decision of the Court of Appeals finds the Severance Agreement invalid due to the County's lack of a quorum and remands to the circuit court to determine the exact amount that Preston must refund the County.

Board of Education, termination of contract, abuse of discretion, referee's report, findings of fact and recommendation, R.C. 3319.16

R.C. 2323.51, sanctions, frivolous conduct, competent credible evidence, wet basement, magistrate's decision, Civ.R. 53, plain error

Business invitee negligence summary judgment actual notice duty constructive notice hazard affidavit genuine issue of material fact slip fall authentic medical records burden. The trial court did not err by entering summary judgment in favor of defendant. The plaintiff presented no evidence to create an issue of fact regarding whether defendant's employees had actual or constructive notice of the alleged hazard.

The petitioner, Wanda I. Trinidad, filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of certiorari with this Court, seeking review of a decision by the Retirement Board of the Employee Retirement System of Providence denying her application for accidental-disability benefits, and we granted her petition. The petitioner contends that the medical examinations establish that she qualifies for accidental-disability benefits instead of ordinary-disability benefits. Moreover, petitioner argues that the board erred in placing more weight on one doctor's opinion than those of two others and therefore erred in denying her application for accidental-disability benefits. The Supreme Court reviewed the board's decision and concluded that, on the facts of this case, the decision was supported by legally competent evidence and that the board was entitled to weigh the opinion of one doctor more heavily than others. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the decision of the board denying petitioner accidental-disability retirement benefits.

107412 Final judgment R.C. 3929.06 vacated void summary judgment. Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to insurers on appellant's R.C. 3929.06 supplemental petition because appellant did not have a final judgment as required by R.C. 3929.06 where the trial court's judgment rendered after jury trial was vacated after appeal.

Arbitration agreement motion to stay motion to compel arbitration R.C. 2711.02 R.C. 2711.03 hearing. Judgment reversed and remanded for a hearing. The trial court's grant of defendants' motion to compel arbitration without a hearing was improper. A party may choose to move for a stay, petition for an order to compel arbitration, or seek both. A motion to compel arbitration and a motion to stay proceedings are separate and distinct procedures that serve different purposes. In enforcing motions to compel arbitration under R.C. 2711.03, the trial court must engage in a two step process. First, the court is mandated to hold a hearing to determine whether the validity of the arbitration provision is in issue an the case at hand. Second, if the court finds this is an issue, "it shall proceed summarily to the trial." In the instant case, there was no discovery or evidence before the trial court for it to adequately determine if the arbitration clause applies, even though there is a separate disputes provision stating that claims and disagreements shall be subject to legal proceedings in any court having jurisdiction over the matter. Defendants acknowledged this inconsistency in the contract.

The trial court did not err in dismissing an Ohio company's declaratory judgment action where the complaint, in part, did not set forth a live controversy and, where there was a live controversy between the Ohio company and the defendant-Illinois corporation, the resolution of the controversy depended greatly upon a determination of the facts of the case and the same facts were at issue in a pending action an Illinois court. The trial court also did not err in dismissing the complaint on the basis of forum non conveniens where the court, in balancing the private interests of the litigants and the public interest involving the courts and citizens of the forum state, noted the underlying contract involved in the dispute was an employment contract entered into between an Illinois citizen and an Illinois corporation, the dispute involved the application of Illinois law, resolution of the issues would likely require witnesses who reside in Illinois to be called at trial, and the same issues raised in the Ohio case were already pending in an Illinois court.

motion to compel arbitration – arbitration agreement - R.C. 2711.03

Workers' Compensation—Maintenance Medical Benefits—Intervening Cause. Claimant sustained admitted work-related injuries when she fell backward to the ground. Physicians diagnosed a concussion as well as cervical and lumbar strains. Within a few months claimant developed clinical depression related to the work injury. Employer admitted the compensability of the depression treatment. In October 2015, a physician who performed a division-sponsored independent medical examination placed claimant at maximum medical improvement. Pursuant to a settlement agreement that was approved by an administrative law judge (ALJ), employer paid claimant a lump sum for her permanent partial disability award. In addition, employer agreed to continue paying for maintenance care through authorized providers that was reasonable, necessary, and related to the compensable injury. The primary care that claimant was receiving was psychological. Several months later, employer retained a psychiatrist to examine claimant, and he and several other health care providers concluded claimant had returned to baseline and required no further maintenance care related to the work injury. Employer petitioned to terminate claimant's maintenance medical benefits. An ALJ agreed that claimant had returned to baseline and that any further treatment was related to claimant's pre-injury condition, not to her work-related injury. A panel of the Industrial Claim Appeals Office (the Panel) affirmed. On appeal, claimant argued that because her claim had closed, employer could only modify her maintenance medical benefits by first seeking to reopen the claim. Future maintenance medical benefits are by their nature not yet awarded, so those benefits remain open and are not closed by an otherwise closed final admission of liability. Here, claimant was entitled to receive future ongoing maintenance medical benefits for her depression. The issue was not closed, and reopening was not required to assess the continuation of t

motion to dismiss, employer intentional tort, particularity, R.C. 2745.01, summary judgment, statute of limitations, evidence, prior proceeding, judicial notice

Civ.R. 56 summary judgment R.C. 4123.01(C) workers' compensation benefits "coming-and-going rule" "zone of employment" totality of the circumstances. The trial court correctly found that Parrish was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits, and properly granted appellee's motion for summary judgment and denied Parrish's partial motion for summary judgment. Parrish was not within the "zone of employment" when he was injured. Further, there is no causal connection between Parrish's injury and his employment based upon the totality of the circumstances surrounding the accident.

The trial court did not err by denying appellant's motion to vacate an arbitration award or by granting appellee's application to confirm the award. The arbitrator's interpretation of procedural rules, interpretation of the parties' collective bargaining agreement, and interpretation of Ohio law were all within the scope of his powers. Judgment affirmed.

Negligence liability duty open and obvious causation comparative negligence damages parental consortium magistrate. Plaintiff brought this negligence action after suffering injuries on Defendant's premises. Plaintiff's son also asserted a claim for the loss of parental consortium. Plaintiff suffered a puncture injury to her leg after tripping on a curb and landing on a metal bolt protruding from a mulched area in Defendant's parking lot. The magistrate found that Defendant owed a duty of care to Plaintiff as an invitee. Plaintiff did not exceed the scope of her invitation by walking through a mulched area of the parking lot, because the area was obviously worn down by pedestrian use and Defendant's employees walked through the mulched area. Defendant did not breach a duty of care to Plaintiff with respect to the curb, because the danger of the curb should have been open and obvious to the Plaintiff. However, Defendant did breach a duty of care with respect to the protruding bolt, because Defendant knew or should have known it presented a danger. Defendant's breach of care was a proximate cause of Plaintiff's injury. However, Plaintiff's comparative negligence warranted a 50 percent reduction of any award for damages. The magistrate determined that Plaintiff was entitled to damages for medical expenses, lost wages, and pain and suffering. The magistrate also determined Plaintiff's son was entitled to damages for the loss of parental consortium.

Administrative Procedure Termination Just Cause Due Process Findings of Fact Conclusions of Law Attorney's Fees Back Pay

The trial court erred in granting Appellees' complaint seeking to enjoin the OHSAA's enforcement of its determination of ineligibility to participate in interscholastic athletics.