Court Rulings

<p>Error to Kent; McDonald (John S.), J.</p> <p>Case by Mary A. Stapleton, administratrix of the estate of Thomas J. Stapleton, deceased, against the Furniture Exhibition Building Company for the negligent killing of plaintiff’s decedent. Judgment for plaintiff. Defendant brings error.</p> <p>Plaintiff brought this suit as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Thomas. J. Stapleton, and recovered a verdict of $21,702.62 as damages. The defendant company was the lessee of the Furniture Exhibition Building in the city of Grand Rapids, Michigan, where regular semi-annual furniture exhibitions were'shown. These exhibitions seem to have extended over a number of years, although each one lasted little more than one month, so that the building was practically idle during the remainder of the year. On July 8, 1916, one of these semi-annual displays was in progress and the plaintiff’s decedent, a furniture salesman, had gone to the sixth floor of the building on a matter of business. On the completion, of his errand, he stepped into the elevator to descend, to the main floor, when the cage dropped the full distance to the bottom of the shaft, instantly killing Mr. Stapleton and the operator, the only other occupant of the elevator.</p> <p>The investigation showed that the elevator, which, had been installed 17 or 18 years previous to this time, was a cage weighing about a ton and that it was hoisted in the shaft with a 30 H. P. motor which controlled the cables attached to its top. It was at this important point in the mechanism that the primary trouble occurred..- The object to which the cables were fastened was a large, wrought-iron bolt (known as a “draw-bolt” or “king-bolt”), about one inch in diameter. The portion of the bolt which was plainly in sight was U-shaped or clevis-shaped, and it was to the prongs of this clevis that the cables for hoisting the elevator and also the cables connected with the counterweight were attached. Immediately below the U o

<p>Appeal from the chancery court of Hinds county.</p> <p>Hon. Lamar F. EastebliNg, Chancellor.</p> <p>Attachment in Chancery, under Code 1906, section 537 (Hemingway’s Code, section 294), in which A. M. Redmond was complainant and the Illinois Central Railroad Company the principal defendant. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals.</p> <p>The statutes of Tennessee involved in this case are as follow's:</p> <p>“3073 (4927e) 2363. Seating of Passengers. — It shall he the duty of the conductor to see that no passenger occupies more room than he pays for, and that each passenger is provided with a seat as long as one remains vacant on his train. (Id. section 5.)</p> <p>“3074. Separate Coaches or Apartments for White and Colored Races. —All railroads carrying-passengers in the state (other than street railroads) shall provide equal but separate accommodations for the white and colored races, by providing two or more passenger cars for each passenger train, or by dividing the passenger cars by a partition, so as to secure separate accommodations; hut any person may he permitted to take a nurse in the car or- compartment set aside for such persons. This law shall not apply lfc> mixed and freight trains which only carry one passenger or combination passenger and baggage car, bnt, in such cases, the one passenger car so carried shall always be partitioned into apartments, one apartment for the whites and one for the colored. (1891, ch. 52, section 1.)</p> <p>“3075. Conductors must Separate Passengers.— The conductors of such passenger trains shall have power, and are hereby required, to assign to the ear or compartments of the car, when it is divided by a partition, used for the race to which such passengers belong, and, should any passenger refuse to occupy the ear to which he or she is assigned by such conductor, said conductor shall have power to refuse to carry such passenger on his train; and, for such refusal, neither he nor the railroad company shall be lia

<p>Appeal from the circuit court of Hinds county.</p> <p>HoN. E. L. BeieN, Presiding Judge.</p> <p>Suit by Ruby Taylor, by her next friend, Dick Taylor,, ag’ainst the Jackson Light & Traction Company. Prom a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.</p> <p>This action was instituted in the circuit court of Hinds county by Ruby Taylor, a minor of the age of ten years, suing by her next friend, to recover damages for the alleged negligence of the Jackson Light & Traction Company in carrying plaintiff beyond her destination. Ap-pellee was allowed to recover punitive damages, and from a judgment awarding the sum of five hundred dollars appellant appeals.</p> <p>The record shows that the plaintiff and another little girl by the name of Tutt were in company with plaintiff’s mother, Mrs. Ada Taylor; that the three boarded one of the regular street cars of appellant at the Old Capitol station in the city of Jackson and paid three fares for their transportation north to Euclid street. According to the testimony of Mrs. Taylor, when the car was about half way from Pairview to Euclid, and half a block before they reached their destination, “the little girls gave the signal;” that this signal was given by raising the hand, and was the usual signal then employed by the company; that although they gave the signal, the car did not stop at Euclid street, hut ran for half a block beyond the point where they desired to alight from the car; that when she saw they had passed the stopping place, she “got up and began walking towards the back end, and he (the conductor) spoke in this manner: ‘Do you want to get off at this stop?’ and I says, H do; will you please back up?’ and he says, ‘No, you will get off right here.’ ” She further testified that the conductor “spoke rough;” that he refused to hack the car to Euclid crossing, saying that “he didn’t have time;” that the street in the middle of the block where the car actually stopped was muddy and wet, and that in getting off the ear s

<p>Appeal, No. 143, Oct. T., 1906, by R. H. Murray, executor et al., from decree of O. O. Clarion Co., distributing royalties from sale of coal under a coal lease in Estate of W. P. Murray.</p> <p>Exceptions on adjudication upon issue awarded by tbe orphans’ court to the common pleas.</p> <p>In the common pleas Wilson, P. J., found the facts to be as follows:</p> <p>A dispute has arisen between the widow and collateral heirs of W. P. Murray, late of Callensburg, Pennsylvania, deceased, as to the distribution of the royalty from a certain coal lease, dated February 1, 1899, from W. P. Murray to E. N. Miller and alleged to have been in full force at the time of the death of W. P. Murray, on July 7, 1901. An issue was framed and certified from the orphans’ court into the court of common pleas to determine the validity of said lease; a jury was waived and the ease submitted to the court for trial under the Act of April 22, 1874, P..L. 109. The widow, Elizabeth A. Murray, claims against the will and alleges that she is entitled to one-half of the royalty from the aforesaid lease which was a sale of the coal in place and converted it into personalty.</p> <p>There are various questions of fact and law raised by the respective requests for findings, but independent of everything else in the case, the fact that the lease had not been forfeited in the lifetime of W. P. Murray, and that upon his death one-half of the royalty thereof descended to his widow, Elizabeth A. Murray, and that as against her, R. H. Murray, executor, had no right to declare a forfeiture and substitute a new lease therefor, is decisive of the present controversy.</p> <p>The following indorsement appears on the lease in controversy :</p> <p>“ June 2nd, 1900, for value received I hereby extend the provisions of this lease until August 1st, 1900.</p> <p>“ Signed: W. P. Murray,</p> <p>“ H. F. Miller.”</p> <p>This sentence as it stands alone is plain and free from ambiguity, but as applied to the lease upon

<p>From: the circuit court of Chickasaw county.</p> <p>Horn EugeNe 0. Sykes, Judge.</p> <p>Appellant and her husband, Leroy Harper, were jointly indicted on the charge of murdering one A. B. Bichardson. A severance was had, and appellant was tried and convicted of manslaughter. Appellant and her husband were employed to work on the farm of deceased, and were absent from their work on the day before the difficulty occurred which resulted in the death of deceased. On the day the difficulty occurred deceased went to the house of appellant and her husband to find out why they had been absent from their work, and while there a difficulty arose between the parties, in which Leroy cut deceased with a knife, and appellant struck him a severe blow with a club, from 'which injuries he died. Appellant was convicted aud sentenced to the penitentiary. From this judgment she appealed to the supreme court. The opinion of the court contains a further statement of the facts.</p>

<p>ERROR TO THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS NO. 1 OF ALLEGHENY COUNTY.</p> <p>No. 246 October Term 1886, Sup. Ct.; court below, No. 608 September Term 1886, C. P.</p> <p>In the court below an action in case for negligence was instituted by Ann Lynch against the Chartiers Valley Gas Company and the Philadelphia company, to recover damages for injuries received from an explosion of natural gas.</p> <p>At the trial on May 11, 1887, the facts appeared: The Chartiers Valley Gas Company, a corporation organized under the act of May 29, 1885, P. L. 29, on May 4, 1886, entered into a written contract with Martin Joyce to lay down between certain points a twenty inch cast-iron pipe upon certain streets in Pittsburgh; inter alia, upon Penn Street, passing by the Hotel Anderson. The contract bound the said Joyce to lay the pipe, etc., refill the ditch, pave the same, and clean up streets, “all in accordance with the specifications which accompany and are a part of this agreement,” and to give bond in $10,000, with approved sureties, for the faithful performance of his contract. A provision of the specifications was as follows : “ All the work is to conform to the requirements of the city ordinance, regulating the laying of natural gas pipes, and to be done in a manner satisfactory to the city engineer and to the superintendent of the first party. The work shall not be considered finished, or any money due thereon, until fully approved and certified to by said superintendent.” There were provisions in the natural gas ordinance referred to, that no more than two sqriares of a street should be open at once ; that the city should in no event be liable for injury or damage to property by reason of assuming control and direction of the work; nor for any loss or damage sustained by any person by reason of the laying or using of such pipes, but the same should be paid by the gas company who should indemnify the city from all loss and costs therefrom; that the work should be discontinued at

<p>No. 186 July Term, 1886, Supt. Ct.; court below, No. 32 March Term, 1885.. Q. S</p> <p>Samuel Thompson and Robert Thompson were indicted in the Quarter Sessions uppn an information made by Mrs. Ada Krepps for forcible entry and detainer. On the trial the court below, James Inghram, P. J., submitted to the jury to find from the evidence of facts, which are sufficiently stated in the opinion below, whether the defendants were guilty or not guilty. After verdict for the commonwealth, the defendants made a motion in arrest of judgment upon the ground inter alia that “the evidence did not support the charge”; which motion being overruled the defendant, Samuel Thompson, took this writ, assigning for error the order overruling said motion.</p>

<p>Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Yorlc county: Of May Term 1879, No. 114.</p> <p>Trover and conversion by F. E. Metzgar and Rufus Krug against John M. Hershey, Henry Swartz and George T. Forrey. The defendants pleaded “not guilty.”</p> <p>In 1870 Forrey purchased from Metzgar and Krug, a farm in York county, and gave to them, in part payment of purchase-money, a judgment-note for $4000. A writ of fi. fa. was issued to January Term 1874, and all the defendant’s stock of horses, cattle, farming implements and grain in the ground, and also the real estate, were levied upon. When the sheriff came with his writ, the defendant claimed the benefit of the exemption law, demanded an appraisement of $300 worth of personal property, and elected to take one field of wheat growing in the ground and one field, partly wheat and partly rye, growing in the ground, as part of his exemption. These growing crops had been levied on under the fi. fa., and they were appraised by the appraisers summoned by the sheriff, and set apart to him. Krug, one of the plaintiffs, was present and made no objection, nor was any motion made afterwards in court to set aside the appraisement. All the grain growing on the premises was levied upon as personal property, and the remaining field of wheat, not taken by Forrey, was sold at the sale of the personal property. After the condemnation of the real estate, a venditioni was issued and the real estate was sold to Metzgar and Krug.for $4000, the amount of their judgment as entered. When in the following summer, Forrey went to cut his wheat and rye, he was met by the claim of Metzgar and Krug, to the growing grain, which had been appraised to them. Nevertheless, along with Hershey and Swartz, Forrey cut the grain and removed it from the premises. The plaintiffs below then brought this suit to recover the value, alleging that the grain passed to them by the sale of the land.</p> <p>At the trial, before Eisher, P. J., the plaintiffs submitted the fol

<p>Error to the District Court of Allegheny county.</p> <p>This was an. application to the District Court of Allegheny county for an injunction to restrain the defendants from the use of certain works, and from prosecuting certain improvements specified in the bill, over and through a portion of the South Common of Allegheny City. On the hearing of the ease in this Court, one of the judges was absent, and the four judges, who heard it, were equally divided — the decree of the District Court was therefore affirmed.</p> <p>The point decided in the opinion of the chief justice was not made below, nor argued in this Court. The report of the case, is therefore confined to the opinion of the District Judge, which contains an abstract of the bill and answer, and a clear view of all the facts necessary to the understanding of the grounds upon which the decree was founded.</p> <p>In the opinion of the District Court the following principles were held:—</p> <p>That at the time? this company (the defendants) was chartered, the right of a commoner in the premises in dispute, was vested in the complainant, the right of sale or title to the commons was vested in the city of Allegheny, and the right of eminent domain in the state.</p> <p>When the legislature has granted common ground to a city for public purposes, the right of eminent domain, existing' in the state, is not thereby exhausted, but may be abridged and devoted to other purposes.</p> <p>The right of eminent domain is inalienable and inexhaustible, and may be exercised as often as the sovereign power may choose, within the provisions of the constitution as to compensation.</p> <p>Of the occasions proper for the exercise of this power, the legislature is to judge, limited only by the public utility of the object.</p> <p>If the principle applies to a grant of land, a fortiori it will apply to a mere easement issuing out of land.</p> <p>Where there has been no exercise of the right of common for more than twenty years, quc

The Court addresses whether the Texas Legislature's amount-in-controversy threshold reduction gives the Texas Business Court jurisdiction to hear a previously remanded action and whether the subsequent removal of the action was proper and timely. The Court examines the statutory construction of House Bill 40 and determines removal was both proper and timely under Texas Government Code 25A.006(f). Granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against defendants' counterclaims for declaratory relief because each requested declaration either duplicates issues already joined by the pleadings or seeks relief beyond this Court's jurisdiction. Granting Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/Third-Party Plaintiff TMC's Traditional Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Termination against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant City Choice. Although City Choice's termination notice was clear and unequivocal; its tender of its termination notice was not the exercise or acceptance of an option, and is therefore, not subject to the "strict compliance" standard applicable to the exercise or acceptance of options; and it substantially complied with notice provisions in exercising its right to terminate, it estopped from obtaining specific performance of the contract it purported to terminate. Denying TMC's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Third Party Defendant City Select Title for Release of the Independent Consideration. TMC does not seek a simple declaration from this Court that TMC is entitled to receipt of the Independent Consideration at the execution of the final judgment in this case. Instead, TMC seeks the immediate (i.e., pre-judgment) release of the Independent Consideration. But it must instead comply with the statutory requirements for a writ of attachment. Granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 91a because the pleadings fail to state a legally cognizable claim for breach of contract or for veil piercing, and the fraud claim is adequately plead

MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE — INFORMED CONSENT — FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION — CIV.R. 42 — JOINT TRIALS — COMMON QUESTIONS OF LAW OR FACT — JURY INSTRUCTIONS — ADVERSE INFERENCE — EXPERT TESTIMONY — EVID.R. 601 — DAMAGES — CIV.R. 19 — PAST MEDICAL EXPENSES — PUNITIVE DAMAGES — R.C. 2315.21 — PREJUDGMENT INTEREST — R.C. 1343.03 — GOOD-FAITH EFFORT — R.C. 2323.43 — SETOFF — R.C. 2307.28 — R.C. 2307.25: The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it ordered joint trials for two plaintiffs because common questions of law and fact existed where the plaintiffs asserted the same causes of action against the same defendants and the expert testimony presented at trial focused on whether the surgeries performed on the plaintiffs were medically indicated, and because the record does not indicate that the jury ignored the trial court's instruction to consider each case on its own merits. [But see CONCURRENCE: Concurring in the majority's opinion on this issue subject to a caveat regarding the proper postjudgment considerations when assessing prejudice from the joinder of trials under Civ.R. 42.] The trial court did not err in admitting the testimony of an expert medical witness where the witness satisfied the active-clinical-practice requirement in the July 2023 version of Civ.R. 601(B)(5)(b), which assessed the competency of a witness to testify at the time of the alleged medical negligence, because plaintiffs' cases were pending at the time that the trial court applied the amended rule. The trial court did not commit reversible error in issuing an absent-defendant jury instruction advising that defendant doctor's absence from trial gave rise to a negative inference where it also instructed the jury that it retained the discretion to make or reject inferences. The trial court did not err in allowing the jury to consider and award damages for past medical expenses to plaintiffs where it conditioned the receipt of those damages on the requirement that plaintiffs obtain releases fr

In this force-majeure dispute arising out of a contract for the purchase and sale of natural gas based on the North American Energy Standards Board base-contract form, the parties dispute (a) whether the transaction confirmations are part of their contract and (b) which one controls over the other. The Court holds that, although the seller's transaction confirmation identifies a delivery term on which the buyer's confirmation is silent, the two confirmations do not materially conflict. Thus, both transaction confirmations combine with the base contract to form a single, integrated agreement, and neither confirmation trumps the other. This opinion addresses when statutes of limitations accrue and the application of the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment principles regarding claims of fraudulent statements contained in a securities purchase agreement. On a renewed motion to remand, the Court holds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the action as pleaded in the plaintiff's Fourth Amended Petition and remands the case. The Court concludes that it (a) cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the plaintiff never agreed that the action could proceed in this Court; (b) does not have qualified-transaction jurisdiction because the value of the consideration for the alleged prospective contract, determined at the time of the transaction, would be below the minimum; and (c) does not have trade-regulation jurisdiction because the alleged negligence per se claim, if recognized in Texas, would be a tort claim rather than a trade-regulation claim. Granting a special appearance due to no minimum contacts in Texas. This case presents two issues: (i) whether the Business Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's application for an involuntary winding-up of a limited liability company, and, if so, (ii) whether an earlier-filed lawsuit in district court between the same parties requires dismissal or abatement of this action under the doctrine

R.C. 4117.11—The test for jurisdiction of State Employment Relations Board (\SERB\) is whether one party filed charges with SERB alleging an unfair labor practice under R.C. 4117.11 or whether one party filed before a common pleas court a complaint alleging conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice specifically enumerated in R.C. 4117.11—When a party does not allege an unfair labor practice or conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice but instead raises a claim that is independent of the rights created by R.C. Ch. 4117, jurisdiction is not exclusive to SERB and may be exercised by a common pleas court—Because appellants did not allege that appellee engaged in an unfair labor practice or conduct that constitutes an unfair labor practice, SERB does not have exclusive jurisdiction over this case and jurisdiction was properly exercised by common pleas court—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded to court of appeals.

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to appellee-hospital on appellants' claim for violation of the Ohio Consumer Sales Practices Act. The hospital had no duty to inform appellants about the billing practices of an independent contractor physician who treated appellants after they came to the hospital's emergency room. However, the court did err in granting summary judgment to appellee-physician on appellants' fraud claims. There were genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the physician acted fraudulently and with actual malice, in conscious disregard of appellants' rights. The court also erred in granting the physician summary judgment on appellants' claims for breach of the physician's contracts with the hospital. Appellants were clearly intended third-party beneficiaries of those contracts and could assert breach of contract claims. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.

¶0 Plaintiff filed a petition in the District Court for Creek County and alleged a wrongful death caused by defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss the petition and the Honorable Douglas W. Golden, District Judge, granted defendant's motion to dismiss and also granted leave for plaintiff to amend the petition. Plaintiff did not amend and appealed the trial court's order granting dismissal and leave to amend. The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the District Court, released its opinion for publication, and defendant filed a petition for certiorari to review the appellate court. We granted certiorari. We hold : Plaintiff appealed an interlocutory order, created a premature appeal, and appellate jurisdiction is absent; The Court vacates the opinion by the Court of Civil Appeals and withdraws it from publication; The Court recasts plaintiff's petition in error to an application to assume original jurisdiction and petition for prohibition; The Governmental Tort Claims Act makes licensed medical professionals to be employees of this state, regardless of the place in this state where duties as employees are performed, when the licensed medical professionals are under contract, including when under contract as an independent contractor, with city, county, or state entities and providing medical care to inmates or detainees in the custody or control of law enforcement agencies; The Court assumes original jurisdiction and denies the petition for writ of prohibition.

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defendant, rendered following its grant of the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the plaintiff's complaint alleging, inter alia, employment discrimination based on disability. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court improperly concluded that a genuine issue of material fact did not exist with respect to whether the defendant's reasons for its termination of her employment were pretextual in nature. Held: The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judg- ment on the plaintiff's claim of disability discrimination, as it properly applied the burden shifting framework of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green (411 U.S. 792) to evaluate the discrimination claim, and, after the defendant presented unrefuted evidence that its termination of the plaintiff's employ- ment was not based on her disability, the burden shifted to the plaintiff, and the plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the defendant's reasons for terminating her employment were pretextual. The trial court properly granted the defendant's motion for summary judg- ment on the plaintiff's claim that the defendant failed to provide her with a reasonable accommodation for her disability, as the plaintiff failed to present evidence to raise a genuine issue of material fact that she initiated a request for a reasonable accommodation or that the defendant had a position available to which she could have been reassigned prior to the termination of her employment. Argued September 9, 2024—officially released February 11, 2025

Former city manager appeals from decision granting summary judgment in favor of employer and dismissing city manager's claims for age, sex, and race discrimination, and retaliation under R.C. Chapter 4112. City manager failed to establish prima facie case of discrimination or retaliation. City manager failed to establish cat's paw theory of discrimination and retaliation. Reverse race discrimination claim rejected.

DOMESTIC RELATIONS – VISITATION – termination of visitation rights; abuse of discretion standard of review; the trial court reviewed the factors in R.C. 3109.051(D) and concluded it was in the minor child's best interest to terminate Appellant's visitation; however, the court did not make the required initial finding that there was clear and convincing evidence of extraordinary circumstances that would justify such termination; R.C. 3109.051(C); recorded statement should not have been accepted or considered; in camera interview; reversed and remanded.

The plaintiff appealed from the trial court's order remanding its administra- tive appeal from the decision of its human rights referee, which concluded that the defendant employer had discriminated against its former employee, M, on the basis of her disability but that M failed to establish that she had been constructively discharged. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the court erred by remanding the matter to the referee without sustaining the appeal. Held: The trial court erred in remanding the matter to the referee for an amended decision while retaining jurisdiction over the appeal because, pursuant to statute (§ 4-183), there was no legal basis for the remand, as there was no ambiguity in the referee's decision that required a clarification or an articulation. The trial court should have dismissed the appeal because there was substan- tial evidence in the record to support the referee's finding that M failed to prove that she was constructively discharged. Argued October 16, 2024—officially released January 7, 2025

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had reversed the decision of the Compensation Review Board. The board had upheld an award of statutory (§ 31-307 (a)) total incapacity benefits to the plaintiff in connection with injuries that he sustained during the course of his employment with the defendant police department. The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that he was not eligible for total incapacity benefits because his total incapacity did not occur until after his voluntary retirement and because he did not intend to return to the workforce. Held: The issue of whether a claimant is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits when the total incapacity occurred after the claimant's voluntary retirement from employment was resolved in the companion case of Cochran v. Dept. of Transportation (350 Conn. 844), in which this court held that a claimant who sustains a compensable workplace injury under the Workers' Compen- sation Act (§ 31-275 et seq.) is eligible to receive total incapacity benefits under § 31-307 (a) even when the total incapacity occurs after his or her voluntary retirement. Insofar as the Appellate Court did not reach the defendants' two alternative claims in its decision, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment and remanded the case to that court so that it could consider those claims on remand. Argued September 23—officially released December 24, 2024

Motion to compel arbitration; unconscionability; abuse of discretion; App.R. 16(A)(7). Plaintiff alleged causes of action regarding a contract with defendant. Defendant moved to compel arbitration based on arbitration clause in contract. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by ordering arbitration. Plaintiff did not show why the arbitration agreement in the contract was unconscionable nor did he cite authority or argue such on appeal in contravention of App.R. 16(A)(7).

The defendant, in her individual capacity and as the executrix of the estate of the decedent, the former fire chief of the plaintiff city, appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendant claimed that the trial court improperly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment and improperly denied her motion for summary judg- ment. Held: The trial court properly granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the decedent, under the terms of his employment contract, was entitled to receive pension benefits under the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and the plaintiff's municipal administrators association, rather than the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff and the firefighters union. In light of the record and the plain and unambiguous language in the dece- dent's employment contract, this court concluded that the trial court prop- erly denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment as no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the plaintiff's retirement board possessed authority under the city charter to unilaterally confer a pension benefit on the decedent pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement with the firefighters union. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for reargument and reconsideration on the ground that the defendant did not properly preserve her claim that the plaintiff was not permitted to utilize the decedent's pension benefits to offset heart and hypertension benefits due to him, and the defendant did not demonstrate that the trial court committed plain error. Argued February 5—officially released September 24, 2024

Trial court did not err in granting motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Complaint alleged claim for defamation based on statement contained in eviction filing, but statements made in a judicial proceeding are absolutely privileged against a defamation action so long as they are reasonably related to the proceeding. Complaint generally referred to the Americans with Disabilities Act but failed to allege the facts necessary to state a claim under that law.

The tort of negligent selection of an independent contractor exists under the common law of Minnesota. Affirmed.

Summary judgment Civ.R. 56 expanding allegations on summary judgment disparate treatment sex discrimination hostile work environment constructive discharge appellant's burden on appeal App.R. 12(A)(2) App.R. 16(A)(7). It was appellant's burden, as the appellant, to affirmatively demonstrate reversible error in the record and to substantiate her arguments in support thereof. Appellant did not show that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's claims of sex discrimination, hostile work environment, constructive discharge, violation of public policy, or intentional infliction of emotional distress. Appellant made no mention of her claims for violation of public policy or intentional infliction of emotional distress in her appellate brief. As to her remaining claims, while appellees met their burden under Civ.R. 56(C), presenting evidence of specific facts in the record demonstrating their entitlement to summary judgment based on the lack of evidence of essential elements of each of appellant's claims, appellant did not meet her reciprocal burden of demonstrating the existence of a genuine issue of material fact for trial on her claims. Appellant did not apply the applicable legal standards and did not show, based on evidence in the record, that a reasonable factfinder could find in favor of appellant on her sex discrimination, hostile work environment, or constructive discharge claims. Review of the record did not reveal any genuine issues of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in favor of appellees.

JUVENILE PARENTAGE AND CUSTODY COMPLAINT – WARRANT TO TAKE PHYSICAL CUSTODY OF MINOR CHILD – R.C. 3127.41 – EX PARTE TEMPORARY ORDER: In a juvenile parentage and custody matter, juvenile court committed procedural error in issuing a warrant to take physical custody of the minor child where father admittedly failed to file a petition and verified application in accordance with R.C. 3127.41 and 3127.38. However, mother could not appeal from juvenile magistrate's ex parte temporary order designating father as the temporary residential parent and legal custodian of minor child pending a full hearing and determination on father's complaint because the magistrate's temporary order is not a final appealable order and has since been superseded by final custody determination entered by the juvenile court following trial on father's complaint. Order issuing warrant to take physical custody vacated cause remanded.

Trial court committed reversible error by selecting de facto termination date without providing its rationale, ordering a division of assets and liabilities in absence of competent, credible evidence, and failing to calculate the proportionate share of retirement benefits that accrued during the marriage. Moreover, trial court did not demonstrate how the award was equitable or that it considered the factors set forth in R.C. 3105.171(F). Judgment reversed and remanded.

Signatory arbitration agreement jurisdiction mistake defense vacate appeal Civ.R. 60(B) confirmation award contract. The trial court did not commit reversible error by denying defendant's motion to vacate the trial court's confirmation order. The trial court did not commit reversible error by denying defendant's motion to vacate or modify an arbitration award.

Distribution of marital property de facto termination date of marriage R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b) abuse of discretion R.C. 3119.82 award of deduction to nonresidential parent. Wife and Husband separated in 2012, and Husband obtained a child support order and paid that order from that time. The parties lived apart and did not intertwine their finances. Husband paid child support from March 23, 2012. The trial court used the date of the child support order as the de facto date of termination of the marriage for the purposes of dividing property and thus awarded Husband his pension, which he obtained interest in after the de facto date of termination. Further, although a disparity in Husband's and Wife's reported incomes existed, the trial court awarded Husband the federal tax deductions for their children. The date of termination of marriage is presumed to be the date of the final hearing in the divorce case, but the trial court may select dates that it considers equitable in determining the division of marital property pursuant to R.C. 3105.171(A)(2)(b). The trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a de facto date of termination where the parties' finances were not intertwined, they did not seek to reconcile the marriage other than for the sake of the children, where the parties lived apart for years, and husband obtained an order for and continually paid child support for over a decade. Because the trial court did not abuse its discretion by using a de facto termination date, it did not abuse its discretion by awarding Husband the entirety of his pension where he obtained interest in the pension after the de facto termination date of the marriage. R.C. 3119.82 provides that a court may award the ability to claim children as dependents for federal income tax purposes to a nonresidential parent if the court determines it would further the best interest of the children and payments for child support are substantially current. Wife argued that because she is the re

The trial court did not err by granting appellee a civil stalking protection order against appellant pursuant to R.C. 2903.214(C)(1) where the trial court's finding appellant had engaged in a pattern of conduct that either knowingly caused appellee to believe that appellant would cause her physical harm or knowingly caused appellee to suffer mental distress was supported by sufficient evidence and was not against the manifest weight of the evidence given appellant's repeated harassment of appellee over the preceding two years

To prove negligence, a plaintiff must establish the existence of a duty, breach of that duty, and an injury proximately caused by the breach of duty. The employer of an independent contractor who retains control of part of the work owes a duty of care to the independent contractor' s employees to exercise the retained control with reasonable care. A property owner who hires an independent contractor may be held liable to the independent contractor and its employees for injuries resulting from hazards at the workplace when the property owner retains control over the work.