Court Rulings

Motion to compel arbitration and/or stay proceedings abuse of discretion contractual interpretation de novo review R.C. 2711.02 written arbitration agreement agreement not signed intent to be bound meeting of the minds performance of contract containing arbitration clause. Appellee's performance under the purchase order constituted its acceptance of the terms contained therein, including the arbitration clause. Thus, the dispute between the parties, which arose out of the purchase order, was required to be arbitrated. The trial court erred in denying the motion to compel arbitration and stay proceedings.

Pursuant to part I of chapter 909 of the General Statutes, the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act (§§ 52-407aa through 52-407eee) governs arbitration agreements made on or after October 1, 2018, subject to certain excep- tions. Pursuant further to part II of chapter 909 of the General Statutes, titled ''Other Arbitration Proceedings,'' the provisions of other statutes (§§ 52- 408 through 52-424) govern arbitration agreements made before October 1, 2018. The plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award in favor of the defendants, P, a former police sergeant who was employed by the city, and a union, of which P was a member, arising from the termination of P's employment for allegedly violating the city's excessive force policy and related federal law. Pursuant to a municipal collective bargaining agreement, executed in 2020, the union submitted a grievance regarding P's employment termination to the state arbitration board. After a hear- ing, a three member panel of the board concluded that P's employment had not been terminated for just cause and that he should be reinstated with full back pay. The city filed in the Superior Court an application to vacate the arbitration award pursuant to the applicable statutes (§§ 52- 418 and 52-420), claiming, inter alia, that the arbitration panel exceeded its powers and misapplied the law. The defendants filed a combined objection and application to confirm the arbitration award. The Superior Court vacated the arbitration panel's award and remanded the matter to the arbitration board for a new hearing on the merits of the grievance, from which the defendants appealed to this court. The city filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that the judgment of the Superior Court did not constitute a final judgment. The city, in relying on the statute (§ 52-407bbb (a) (5)) in part I of chapter 909 that provides that an appeal may be taken from an order vacating an award without direc

SUMMARY JUDGMENT – NONCOMPETITION AGREEMENT – TRADE SECRETS – R.C. 1333.61: The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment in favor of defendant employee where the noncompete agreement was unenforceable because it was overly broad in geographic and temporal scope, and the trial court did not err when it declined to modify the noncompetition agreement because reforming the agreement to comply with the rule of reasonableness would require completely rewriting the agreement. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant on plaintiff's trade-secrets claim where there were no genuine issues of material facts that the allegedly confidential information did not qualify as trade secrets under the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act because the plaintiff employer did not take sufficient measures to maintain confidentiality of the information. The trial court did not err in declining to enforce the liquidated-damages provision of the noncompetition agreement because the agreement was unenforceable.

Relator, a bargaining unit employee, has standing under R.C. 4117.11 to pursue an unfair labor practice charge against respondent/employer alleging that the employer interfered with relator's right to arbitrate his grievance by unilaterally determining that the notice of intent to arbitrate was untimely submitted by respondent/union. SERB abused its discretion when it concluded probable cause did not exist to believe respondent/employer committed the ULP because the timeliness of a notice is a question of arbitrability that should have been submitted to the arbitrator in the first instance. SERB abused its discretion by dismissing one of relator's ULP charges against respondent/union without providing any explanation or reasoning for the decision. SERB abused its discretion in dismissing relator's ULP charge against respondent/union alleging unfair representation where the evidence showed that the union knew relator wished to arbitrate the grievance but failed to timely notify respondent/employer, as required by the CBA, based on erroneous instructions from relator's private counsel. Objections overruled, relator's motion for summary judgment granted, and writ of mandamus issued.

The plaintiff, whose prior employment as a police officer with the defendant city of Hartford had been terminated, sought to recover damages from the city for, inter alia, its failure to rehire him as a police officer because of his disability, narcolepsy. The city had posted a job listing seeking applications from nonresidents of Hartford for a police officer position. Applicants were required to apply online and to include with their appli- cations a ''CHIP'' card signifying that they had successfully completed certain physical ability tests required of police officer candidates. The plaintiff, who was not a resident of Hartford, was among fifty-two appli- cants who did not submit a CHIP card with their applications and, thus, was determined by the city to be unqualified for the police officer position. In a two count complaint alleging violations of a provision (§ 46a-60) of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act (§ 46a-51 et seq.), the plaintiff claimed that the city had discriminated against him on the basis of his disability and retaliated against him for having previously brought a lawsuit against the city in connection with the termination of his prior employment as a police officer. The city, which was aware at the time the plaintiff applied for the police officer position that he had been diagnosed with narcolepsy, moved for summary judg- ment, asserting that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to both counts of the plaintiff's complaint and that it was therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The court granted the city's motion, conclud- ing that there was no genuine issue of material fact that the plaintiff had failed to establish a prima facie case of either disability discrimination or retaliation and that, even if he had established a prima facie case as to those claims, summary judgment was warranted on both counts because the city had articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory and nonretaliatory reason for its decision not

APPELLATE JURISDICTION – PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION – FINAL APPEALABLE ORDER – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW/CIVIL – PRIOR RESTRAINT – COMMERCIAL SPEECH – R.C. 2505(B): Where a preliminary injunction restricted commercial speech in a noncompete dispute, there was no exception to the statutory requirements for appellate jurisdiction permitting immediate appellate review. The appeal must be dismissed for lack of a final appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(4) where defendants will have a meaningful and effective remedy by an appeal following final judgment.

wrongful termination, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56, reverse gender discrimination, hostile work environment, intentional infliction of emotional distress

noncompete agreement motion to enforce settlement issue of law reviewed de novo contract interpretation common words are given their ordinary meaning.

Divorce division of pension QDRO date of the termination of marriage. The QDRO issued by the trial court is affirmed. It is within the trial court's discretion to select a date for distribution purposes regarding each marital asset in order to achieve an equitable division of marital property. Furthermore, there is no merit to appellant's claim that the QDRO improperly modified the terms of the judgment entry of divorce.

Arbitration motion to stay proceedings FINRA Rule 13200 contract interpretation. Parties disagree whether dispute arising out of contract dissolving Appellee's membership and employment arises out of their business activities making it subject to mandatory arbitration under FINRA Rule 13200. Given the strong preference for arbitration and the rather broad definition of "business activities," the trial court did not err in finding that all of Appellants' claims were subject to arbitration. Additionally, the forum-selection clause in the parties' contract did not supersede the arbitration provisions already binding the parties.

The trial court correctly granted judgment on the pleadings in favor of appellee-zoning inspector on appellant's complaint for malicious prosecution. Although appellant's minor misdemeanor conviction for advertising and operating a bed and breakfast in an agricultural district was reversed on appeal, appellee was entitled to statutory immunity as an employee of a political subdivision and did not act outside the scope of his employment, with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner. Judgment affirmed.

On Requester's objections, the Court determined that the Special Master correctly applied statutory law and case law as they existed at the time of the filing of Requester's Complaint. The Court overruled Requester's objections, adopted the Report and Recommendation, and denied Requester's claim for production of records.

The defendant appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court granting the plaintiff's application for a civil restraining order pursuant to statute (§ 46b-15). At an evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff testified that there was a pending action for a dissolution of marriage between the parties and that she had been increasingly afraid of the defendant. The plaintiff testified that one evening, when she went to a restaurant with a group of people, she saw the defendant approach the hostess stand, he stared at her with a furrowed brow, locked eye contact with her, and that he seemed very agitated in his physical movements. After the defendant left the restaurant, he sent various text messages and emails to the plaintiff regarding the encounter. The trial court granted the application for a civil restraining order against the defendant, finding that the defendant's conduct created a pattern of threatening. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held that the trial court erred in failing to apply an objective standard to its determination when it issued the civil restraining order based on the pattern of threatening provision of § 46b-15 (a): the court viewed the evidence through the lens of the plaintiff's subjective reaction to the defendant's conduct, namely, her resulting fear, and stated that the plaintiff's testimony indicated a tone of hostility that she felt frightened her, and, although the reaction of an applicant can help provide context, subjective fear of an applicant is not a statutory requirement under § 46b-15, and, instead, what is required is the occurrence of conduct that constitutes a pattern of threatening; moreover, § 46b-15 does not contain any statutory language requiring a subjective-objective analysis, and there is nothing in the statutory language indicating that the legislature intended for courts to issue civil restraining orders under the pattern of threatening portion of § 46b-15 in situations other than where it is objectivel

The petitioner, who had been convicted of the crimes of felony murder and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree, sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming, inter alia, that his prior trial, habeas, and appellate counsel had provided ineffective assistance. The respondent Commis- sioner of Correction filed a motion to dismiss the habeas petition, arguing that the petitioner had released the state from all the claims set forth therein pursuant to a settlement agreement that the petitioner had entered into with the state after he filed the habeas petition. The settle- ment agreement related to an action filed by the petitioner in federal court against employees of the Department of Correction, in which he alleged that the conditions of confinement during his incarceration violated his constitutional rights. The settlement agreement contained a general release provision that released the state from all actions arising out of any matter that had occurred as of the date of the settlement agreement. The habeas court determined that the release encompassed the habeas petition and granted the respondent's motion to dismiss. Thereafter, the habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal, and the petitioner appealed to this court, claiming that the settlement agreement was unenforceable because the terms of the release provision in the agreement were unconscionable. Held that the habeas court did not err when it dismissed the habeas petition: our Supreme Court in Nelson v. Commissioner of Correction (326 Conn. 772) rejected the argument that habeas rights should never be subject to waiver, stating that constitutional and appellate rights could be waived as long as the waiver was intentional; moreover, the settlement agree- ment between the state and the petitioner was not procedurally uncon- scionable, as the petitioner's counsel conceded that the petitioner entered into it knowingly and voluntarily, the petitioner was represented by attorneys who nego

The Court of Claims of Ohio did not err in determining Ohio's savings statute, R.C. 2305.19, and Civ.R. 15(C) did not apply to save the plaintiff-appellant's R.C. 4112.02 employment discrimination claims and, as a result, granting summary judgment to defendant-appellee, Miami University, due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. Judgment affirmed.

sex discrimination, burden shifting, summary judgment, Civ.R. 56(C), pretext, R.C. 4112.02(A), motion to compel, Civ.R. 56(F)

EXPRESS WARRANTY – NEGLIGENCE – FRAUD – ACCEPTANCE – SMALL CLAIMS COURT – AS-IS WARRANTY: The trial court's determination that defendant was negligent in the repair of plaintiff's just-purchased vehicle was not against the manifest weight of the evidence because the vehicle caught fire ten minutes after plaintiff began driving it for the first time after the repair was made, and the trial court was in the best position to determine whose testimony was most credible. The magistrate's fraud finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence because the defendant disclosed the issue with the vehicle to the plaintiff. Plaintiff purchaser did not have a reasonable opportunity to inspect the vehicle after the repair was made where, after plaintiff test drove the vehicle, defendant car dealer assured plaintiff that it would repair a fuse, the repair was made with a fuse from an older model vehicle, and ten minutes after plaintiff drove her vehicle off the lot it caught fire.

The plaintiff law firm sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, breach of contract in connection with its representation of the defendant. The matter was referred to an attorney fact finder, who filed a report recommending judgment for the plaintiff on the complaint. The trial court overruled the defendant's objection to the report of the attorney fact finder and rendered judgment in accordance with it. Two exhibits, a retainer agreement and a bill for services, were considered by the attorney fact finder, but were not reviewed by the court, as they were reported missing from the clerk's office. The defendant appealed to this court, claiming that the court improperly overruled her objection to the attorney fact finder's report and improperly rendered judgment in accordance with the attorney fact finder's report because the report contained insufficient factual findings. Held: 1. The trial court improperly overruled the defendant's objection to the attorney fact finder's report because the court failed to review all of the evidence considered by the attorney fact finder: a court, on reviewing a report of an attorney fact finder, must assess all of the evidence that was presented to the attorney fact finder in order to properly consider objections challenging the report, and, here, the court could not ade- quately assess the defendant's claims that the billing was excessive and that the quantum of work claimed by the plaintiff did not correlate to the claimed time expended without reviewing the retainer agreement and billing record entered as exhibits before the attorney fact finder; moreover, faced with the fact that these exhibits were missing from the record, it would have been appropriate for the court to remand the case to the attorney fact finder or to have taken any other action it deemed appropriate pursuant to the relevant rule of practice (§ 23-58 (a)). 2. The trial court improperly rendered judgment in accordance with the report of the

The record contains competent, credible evidence to support the Commission's determination that Barrett voluntarily resigned his employment without just cause. Therefore, the Commission's decision denying Barrett's claim for unemployment benefits is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the trial court did not err in affirming the denial of the claim. Judgment affirmed.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendants for alleged discriminatory conduct. The plaintiff filed a discrimination complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities alleging that the defendant town of East Lyme discriminated against him on the basis of national origin by denying him equal services and by treating him differently than his neighbors. The commission issued a release of juris- diction, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to warrant further investigation. The Superior Court granted the plaintiff's application for a waiver of fees, and the plaintiff subsequently served the defendants with a summons and complaint. The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdic- tion pursuant to statute (§ 46a-101), because the plaintiff commenced the action more than ninety days after he received the release of jurisdic- tion. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss, concluding that the time limitation in § 46a-101 was subject matter jurisdictional and not subject to equitable tolling. The court determined that, although the plaintiff had filed an application for a waiver of fees, the plaintiff's complaint was commenced, by service of the summons and complaint, beyond the ninety day limitation period. The court also concluded that the plaintiff improperly failed to plead the continuing course of conduct doctrine in his complaint in order for it to consider its affect on the limitation period. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court erred in concluding that the ninety day limitation period for commencing an action pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 46a-100) was subject matter jurisdictional: neither the language of § 46a-101 nor its legislative history revealed any indication that the legislature intended the time limitation of that statute to be jurisdictional, the geneaology of our antidiscrimination laws suggested an ongoing leg

Because the parties' written construction contract contained an obvious typographical error regarding the contractor's damages on termination for convenience, the trial court did not err when it reformed the parties' agreement to express the true intentions of the contracting parties. Because the parties' written agreement clearly and unequivocally set fort the contractor's margin for overhead and profit, the trial court erred when it relied on extrinsic evidence in finding that a different margin applied. Judgment affirmed in part and reversed in part, and cause remanded for further proceedings.

R.C. 3319.081 termination of non-teaching employees due process R.C. 2506.03 administrative appeal abuse of discretion stipulation reliable evidence probative evidence preponderance of evidence waiver

The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee where the independent contractor was driving home, where his vehicle was regularly garaged, from the contractor's facility at the time of the accident all personal detours were minor and completed before he returned to his usual route home from the contractor's facility and the plain language of appellee's insurance policy excludes coverage in such situations.

reallocation of parental rights and responsibilities father designated residential parent Civ.R. 53(D)(4)(d) trial court conducted independent review R.C. 3109.04(E)(1)(a)(iii) evidence supported finding of change in circumstances evidence supported finding that best interest for father to be designated residential parent freedom of speech minimum wage imputed for child support

The defendant employer, G Co., and its insurer appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board affirming the Workers' Compensation Commissioner's award of survivorship benefits to the plaintiff. The plaintiff's deceased spouse, S, who had been an employee of G Co., slipped and fell while delivering oil to one of its customers. The fall aggravated S's existing knee injury to such an extent that he could no longer work or carry out his daily activities. S's physician recommended knee replacement surgery, however, S's health insurance had been canceled thirty days after the incident and he could not afford the procedure. S filed a workers' compensation claim relating to the compensability of the knee replacement surgery. Prior to the conclusion of the formal hearings before the commissioner, S died. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a claim for survivorship benefits. Following the testimony of both expert and lay witnesses, the commissioner determined that S had died by suicide as a result of depression that stemmed from compensable work injuries and that the plaintiff was entitled to survivor- ship benefits. The defendants filed a petition for review of the commis- sioner's finding and award with the board, claiming that, inter alia, in accordance with Sapko v. State (305 Conn. 360), S's consumption of an excessive amount of alcohol and medication prior to his death consti- tuted a superseding cause that broke the chain of causation between the work incident and S's death. The board disagreed and affirmed the commissioner's finding and award, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the board properly affirmed the commissioner's award of survivorship benefits to the plaintiff: the commissioner's subordinate findings that the decedent developed depression following the work incident, that his compensable injuries were a substantial contributing factor to his development of depression, that the manner of his death was a suicide, and t

CIVIL - Unemployment compensation benefits Ohio Unemployment Compensation Review Commission Review Commission due process request for review notice of reasons for request for review notice of reasons for accepting request for review allowance order no deference afforded to hearing officer's decision R.C. 4141.281(C)(6) unreasonable, unlawful, or against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Trial court erred in denying appellant's motion to stay trial court proceedings pending arbitration based on its determination that conditions precedent to arbitration had not been proven by appellant. Judgment reversed, cause remanded.

CIVIL – Fair Labor Standards Act 29 C.F.R. 785.22 overtime compensation 24-hour shift sleeping period hours worked at-will employment disclaimer employee handbook express agreement continuing to work and accept pay is not conclusive evidence of implied agreement contemporaneous protest summary judgment.

Opinion - Noncite/Memorandum - Justice Shea, affirmed.

The plaintiff sought damages from the defendant town for, inter alia, breach of contract. The plaintiff worked as a police officer for the town and retired on disability in 1986 after sustaining an injury in the course of his employment. In 1985, the town had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with a union in which the plaintiff was member. At that time, federal law did not permit municipal employees to enroll in Medicare, but the law was amended thereafter to permit or require municipal employees to participate in Medicare. The 1985 collective bargaining agreement provided that union members who retired due to disability would be entitled to town paid private health insurance. In 2016, the year after the plaintiff reached the age of sixty-five, the town informed him that he would be required to enroll in Medicare and to pay the cost of his Medicare Part B premiums. The plaintiff claimed that the town was bound to provide him with town paid private health insurance under the collective bargaining agreement or, alternatively, that it was obligated to subsidize the costs of his Medicare Part B premiums. Follow- ing a trial, the court concluded that the collective bargaining agreement did not bar the town from requiring that the plaintiff transition to Medi- care, so long as the Medicare plan did not substantially reduce the benefits provided. The court also concluded, however, that the town was bound to subsidize the costs of his Medicare Part B premiums. Thereafter, the town appealed and the plaintiff cross appealed from the trial court's judgment. Held: 1. The trial court correctly concluded that the collective bargaining agree- ment did not preclude the town from terminating the private health insurance in which the plaintiff was enrolled and requiring him to transi- tion to Medicare coverage: the collective bargaining agreement did not specifically require that the plaintiff be placed, and that he remain, on the same health insurance plan as the town's

The plaintiff, an off duty East Granby police officer, sought to recover damages for personal injuries that he sustained after being hit by a car while he was on the premises of a shopping mall owned by the defendant B Co. in Manchester. While in the parking lot of the shopping mall, he heard a radio broadcast indicating a pursuit of a suspected participant in a crime and was injured after he joined that pursuit and was struck by the car that the suspect entered, which was driven by C. The plaintiff alleged that his injuries were a result of the negligence of B Co., and A Co., which provided security services for B Co., for, inter alia, chasing the suspect into the mall parking lot. Following a jury verdict and judgment for the defendants, the plaintiff appealed to this court, claiming that the trial court improperly instructed the jury on superseding cause, improperly instructed the jury on the statutory (§ 54-1f) duties of off duty police officers, and failed to instruct the jury on the duties owed by a possessor of land to invitees. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on his claim that the trial court's charge to the jury on the doctrine of superseding cause was improper and harmful, as it was not reasonably probable that the jury was misled by the trial court's instruction on the doctrine; the court's charge, read as a whole, was correct in law, adapted to the issues, and was sufficient for the guidance of the jury, as the court charged the jury that, in order for the defendants to prevail on their special defense that C's conduct was a superseding cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the defendants had to demonstrate that C had intentionally or criminally struck the plaintiff with his car, and, the jury, on the interrogatories, found that C's conduct was both intentional or criminal and not foreseeable, and there was ample evidence presented to show that C's conduct was intentional or criminal, including the plaintiff's testimony and his statement to the pol