Court Rulings

The plaintiff sought to recover damages for personal injuries that she sus- tained when her vehicle was struck by a vehicle driven by the defendant B, an employee of the defendant Department of Administrative Services. The plaintiff alleged that her injuries were the result of B's negligence. Following a trial to the court, the court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff and awarded damages. The plaintiff filed a motion for reconsideration as to her claimed future medical expenses, and attached to that motion a letter from her treating physician, G, which had been admitted as a full exhibit at trial. The letter stated that it was more probable than not that the plaintiff would require future medical treat- ment. The court granted the plaintiff's motion, awarded additional dam- ages, and the defendant Department of Administrative Services appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defendant Department of Administrative Services could not prevail on its claim that the trial court erred in declining to apply the unavoidable accident doctrine, which was based on its claim that B was not negligent because she experienced a sudden emergency caused by the blowout of her left front tire: because the court found that B was negligent and caused the collision with the plaintiff's vehicle, the accident could not be considered unavoidable as a matter of law; the court determined that B was negligent in the way in which she operated the vehicle and that her actions were the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries, and, because these findings were inapposite to a determination that the record could support a finding that the negligence of neither party was involved, the court correctly determined that its finding of negligence necessarily precluded a finding that the accident was unavoidable. 2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the plaintiff's motion for reconsideration after it determined that she had presented sufficient evidence to support an award o

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, her former employer, for alleged discrimination and the creation of a hostile work environment on the basis of her gender in violation of the applicable provision (§ 46a-60) of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. The plaintiff, who had been a finance manager at the defendant's car dealership, claimed that she had been paid less than male employees who performed the same job and that she had been subjected to mistreat- ment by four male managers, which included sporadic incidents of yelling. She further alleged that male employees made remarks in the workplace that were crude and demeaning to women. The plaintiff initially brought an action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, in which she alleged that the defendant had violated the federal Equal Pay Act of 1963 (29 U.S.C. § 206 et seq.). While the federal action was pending, the plaintiff filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, in which she alleged violations of § 46a-60. The commission thereafter issued to the plaintiff a release of jurisdiction letter that authorized her to bring this action in the Superior Court. During the pendency of that action, the District Court rendered summary judgment for the defendant. The trial court then granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim was barred by the doctrine of res judicata and that the evidence she presented was insufficient to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to her hostile work environment claim. On the plaintiff's appeal to this court, held: 1. The trial court correctly determined that res judicata barred the plaintiff's gender discrimination claim: contrary to the plaintiff's assertion that the statute of limitations for Equal Pay Act claims required her to litigate that claim before her gender discrimination claim, there was no genuine issue of materi

The trial court did not err by granting appellee's motion for judgment on the pleadings. Appellant's complaint did not establish the elements necessary to support his claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. Judgment affirmed. (Tucker, P.J., concurring.)

BWC did not abuse its discretion in reclassifying OKI as a public employer for purposes of workers' compensation premium rates because OKI did not qualify as a private employer/public service corporation under R.C. 4123.01(B)(1)(b) as it did not provide services directly to the public. BWC did not act arbitrarily or unreasonably in adopting manual code 9443 as a means to adequately reflect the risk associated with the operation of special public authorities, such as OKI, that have many characteristics of public employers/taxing districts but do not have taxing authority. Objections sustained writ denied.

Arbitration agreement motion for order compelling arbitration. The trial court erred where it denied appellants' joint motion to compel arbitration. Appellee's claims, under the terms of the operating agreement, fall within the scope of the arbitration clause.

Trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's age discrimination claim.

Appeal of a judgment entry denying a motion to stay pending arbitration and granting a motion for a hearing under R.C. 2711.03 for the purpose of determining whether an arbitration agreement exists and, if so, whether it is enforceable, is dismissed for lack of a final appealable order as the judgment entry leaves issues unresolved and contemplates further action.

Mandamus—Writ sought by public employee ordering retirement board to transfer her from one type of retirement plan to different type of plan—No provision in R.C. Chapter 145 establishes clear legal right for public employee to obtain relief sought or imposes clear legal duty on retirement board to grant it—Court of appeals' denial of writ affirmed.

In this breach of warranties and breach of contract action brought by appellant for damages caused by an allegedly defective product purchased from appellee, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment to appellee based on the court's determination that appellant had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Based on the record and construing the facts of the amended complaint in favor of appellant, this Court finds that the record contains evidence that support facts entitling it to at least recovery of direct damage, and therefore the trial court's dismissal under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) was improper under law. Judgment reversed cause remanded.

APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL – JURISDICTION – SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – R.C. 2744.02: An appellate court is without jurisdiction to review an order that does not qualify as a final appealable order under R.C. 2744.02(C): the trial court's order allowing plaintiffs to amend their complaint against defendant political subdivision and its employee to include allegations of recklessness did not foreclose the political subdivision's ability to demonstrate alleged immunity, and therefore, it was not a final order. The trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to an employee of a political subdivision where genuine issues of material fact as to whether the employee acted recklessly precluded summary judgment. The trial court did not err in denying summary judgment to a political subdivision where the political subdivision did not meet its burden on summary judgment to establish affirmative defenses to an exception to the general grant of immunity to reinstate sovereign immunity.

Appellant mistakenly gave appellee a cashier's check to which appellee was not legally entitled. Nonetheless, appellant was not justified in later exercising a right of setoff or self-help by debiting appellee's bank account, into which the funds had been deposited. However, appellee failed to present any evidence concerning her detrimental reliance on appellant's mistake or any damages that ensued. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting judgment on the pleadings with respect to appellee's damages. Judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings relating to damages. (Froelich, J., concurring.)

The plaintiff sought to collect, inter alia, unpaid wages on behalf of two employees of the defendant W Co. A state marshal served two copies of the summons and complaint on the defendant B, W Co.'s president, in both his individual capacity and as president of W Co. Following the defendants' failure to respond to the plaintiff's pleadings, the trial court granted the plaintiff's motion for default and rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. Thereafter, the defendants filed a motion to open the default judgment pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 52-212), claiming that they had been deprived of actual notice of the proceedings by the plaintiff's failure to serve the summons and complaint on W Co. The court denied the defendants' motion to open, and the defendants appealed to this court. Held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendants' motion to open, as the defendants failed to comply with the requirements of § 52-212 in that the motion was not verified under oath by either the defendants or their attorney; furthermore, the defen- dants' claim that they lacked actual notice of the plaintiff's action because the summons listed a nonparty individual as W Co.'s registered agent for service was unavailing, the record having unequivocally indi- cated that both defendants were properly served with legal process by service in hand to B. Submitted on briefs September 17—officially released November 24, 2020

Despite respondent-appellee's failure to follow the statutory termination procedures prior to terminating relator-appellant's teaching contract, relator-appellant had an adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law by way of an appeal to the court of common pleas under R.C. 3319.16. Therefore, the trial court did not err by granting respondent-appellee's motion for summary judgment or by declining to issue a writ of mandamus.

The trial court erred in granting a writ of possession to the landlord because the grounds for termination listed in the notice of termination were different from the grounds for termination that the landlord relied on in the judicial eviction proceedings, in violation of the terms of the parties' lease and the controlling HUD regulations.

The defendant, whose marriage to the plaintiff previously had been dis- solved, appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court, claiming, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it went beyond the scope of this court's remand order in a prior appeal involving the parties when construing their separation agreement, which had been incorpo- rated into the dissolution judgment, and calculating the alimony arrear- age the plaintiff owed to the defendant. In her prior appeal to this court from the judgment dissolving her marriage, the defendant claimed that the dissolution court erred in calculating the plaintiff's alimony obliga- tion on the basis of his W-2 income without considering the K-1 distribu- tions to him from A Co., of which he was an owner. This court concluded that the separation agreement was ambiguous as to whether the K-1 distributions from A Co. were to be included in the plaintiff's pre-tax income from employment and, if so, to what extent. This court further concluded that the dissolution court had improperly granted the plain- tiff's motion to modify alimony. In its rescript, this court thus reversed the dissolution court's granting of the plaintiff's motion to modify ali- mony and the court's calculation of his alimony arrearage, affirmed the judgment in all other respects and remanded the case to the trial court to determine the parties' intent and to determine the plaintiff's alimony arrearage accordingly. On remand, the trial court first determined that the intent of the parties was that some K-1 distributions to the plaintiff from A Co. should be included in the plaintiff's pre-tax income. The court then found that the parties had adopted the reasonable compensation calculation to establish the plaintiff's pre-tax income for alimony pur- poses and modified his alimony obligation for the nearly four years prior to the plaintiff's motion to modify alimony. Held: 1. The trial court acted within the scope of this court's remand order

The trial court properly granted summary judgment where there were no genuine issues of material fact because appellant failed to demonstrate any evidence that the decedent's employer or co-employees deliberately intended to cause his death as is required by R.C. 2745.01.

CIVIL - vexatious litigator R.C. 2323.52 leave to proceed direct appeal from vexatious litigator determination failure to seek leave dismissed.

APPELLATE REVIEW – DAMAGES – MITIGATION — R.C. 3319.16: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in reversing the board of education's decision to terminate a teacher's employment where the court conducted its own review of the evidence as permitted by R.C. 3319.16 and determined that the board's finding of good and just cause to terminate was not supported by the weight of the evidence. Although the trial court's statement that a former teacher whose employment was wrongfully terminated was not obligated to mitigate her damages was not a correct statement of law, the court properly declined to diminish the teacher's back pay award because the board failed to meet its burden to prove that substantially-equivalent positions had been available or the amount that the former teacher could have earned in appropriate employment in mitigation of damages.

Arbitration Agreement waiver scope. Trial court properly found that the parties' dispute was not governed by arbitration plaintiff's claims existed independently of the employment relationship and her R.C. Chapter 4112-based claims were not subject to arbitration due to lack of sufficient evidence of assent and/or waiver.

The petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance for failing to hire or to consult with a defense expert in arson investigation before trial. The petitioner had been convicted of various offenses in connection with his role in planning and recruiting two brothers, J and F, to burn the shed of the victim, G, with whom he quarreled over used car transactions. After G had removed two cars from the petitioner's used car lot, the petitioner took various actions that G interpreted as threats to his safety and his wife's safety. G testified that the petitioner left two sealed envelopes with ''funny money'' inside on G's lawn, indicating to G an intent to retaliate. When he thereafter observed two men near his shed just before it burst into flames, he fired a gun at the men as they fled, striking one man in the arm. J sought treatment that evening in a Massachusetts hospital for a gunshot wound to his arm; DNA from his blood was recovered outside G's home. At the criminal trial, J testified that the petitioner had hired him and F to burn the shed, had given them the gas can containing gasoline to use, and had telephoned him twice the evening of the fire. The state presented evidence that the DNA recovered from the saliva on the envelopes left on G's lawn had come from the petitioner. The state also presented the testimony of an expert, a state chemist, that the accelerant used to start the fire was not gasoline, but a compound often found in various substances used in the car repair business. Defense counsel, who had not hired an arson investigation expert, learned for the first time at trial, through the state's expert, that the accelerant was not gasoline, after he had cross-examined G. Defense counsel, because he had not known that the accelerant was a compound that G may have used to repair autos in his shed, had not questioned G regarding his access to such an accelerant to start the fire. The habeas cou

The common pleas court correctly determined that the state board of education failed to fulfill its statutory obligation to identify its reason or reasons for disapproving the hearing officer's recommendation of the requested territory transfer. The state board's generalized reference to diffuse school district "objections" did not suffice. But because the record may contain evidence that could support the state board's result, depending on what the basis for that result was, the case is remanded so that the trial court may return the matter to the state board for appropriately reviewable disposition of the transfer petition in light of the hearing officer's recommendation. Judgment reversed and cause remanded with instructions for remand to the state board of education for further determination.

Slip and fall summary judgment duty independent contractor primary assumption of risk gutter and downspout. Where a resident fell on an accumulation of ice allegedly caused by a gutter's downspout draining water directly onto a driveway, the trial court improperly applied the primary assumption of risk to grant summary judgment in favor of an independent contractor who installed the gutter.

Husband was properly served with wife's objections at his address in India by regular mail and email pursuant to Civ.R. 5. Trial court erred in prorating the severance pay husband received in 2015 through the first half of 2016 and calculating husband's child support obligation based upon that extrapolation. Trial court did not err in awarding wife $13,636.59 in attorney fees incurred in lengthy postdecree litigation regarding the division of husband's retirement accounts by QDROs.

Attorneys at law—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Solicitation of professional employment by in-person contact when a primary motive is pecuniary gain—Public reprimand.

Summary judgment immunity negligence storm sewer system duty maintain R.C. 2744.01(G)(2)(d) R.C. 2744.02(B)(2) R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) discretionary creek retention basin pipe right of way sediment drainage ditch easement purchase agreement hold harmless indemnify city third-party beneficiary R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b) employee reckless bad faith punitive damages attorney fees R.C. 2744.05(A). Reversed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of the city upon finding there are genuine issues of material fact concerning whether the storm sewer-drainage ditch easement area in the subdivision and/or the retention basin on plaintiffs' property are part of the city's storm sewer system and, if so, as to whether the city exercised ordinary care in maintaining and repairing the storm sewer system. Affirmed the trial court's decision to grant summary judgment in favor of city engineer on plaintiffs' claim of individual liability upon finding he is entitled to immunity under R.C. 2744.03(A)(6)(b). Affirmed the denial of the claim for punitive damages and attorney fees.

Trial court did not err in granting appellees' motion to dismiss appellant's complaint based on court's determination that PUCO had exclusive jurisdiction over the claims.

Arbitration agreement race discrimination retaliation motion to stay litigation pending arbitration non-class action claims procedurally unconscionable substantively unconscionable. - Trial court abused its discretion in granting employer's motion to stay litigation pending arbitration where the arbitration agreement was both substantively and procedurally unconscionable.

The plaintiff K sought to recover damages from the defendants for medical malpractice in connection with the alleged failure of the defendant D, a podiatrist, to rule out the possibility of impaired blood flow to K's feet and to refer K to a vascular specialist, resulting, inter alia, in the partial amputations of K's feet. K filed an expert witness disclosure identifying G as an expert on the standard of care and causation, and later filed an amended expert witness disclosure. The defendants filed a motion to preclude the amended expert witness disclosure, which the court denied without prejudice, but also ordered, on January 13, 2016, that K was precluded from disclosing additional experts. After the court denied K's motion for reargument and reconsideration of that order, K filed a motion to modify the court's scheduling order dated January 19, 2016, and filed an expert witness disclosure identifying R as an additional expert. The court sustained the defendants' objections thereto and granted their motion to preclude R's testimony, stating that it was adher- ing to its January 13, 2016 order. The court subsequently precluded G from offering expert testimony and rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendants, from which K appealed to this court. Thereafter, S, the administratrix of K's estate, was substituted as the plaintiff. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in ordering that K could not disclose addi- tional experts: a. S could not prevail on her claim that the trial court's January 13, 2016 order constituted a sanction of preclusion subject to the applicable rule of practice (§ 13-4 [h]), which establishes procedures for the disclosures and depositions of experts in civil matters: the order was a case manage- ment decision that the court had the inherent authority to enter, as the court had expressed concern during argument on January 13, 2016, concerning a representation made by K's counsel that he might seek to disclose additional experts, because at

Common pleas court did not abuse its discretion in finding reliable, probative, and substantial evidence supported the determination of the director Ohio Department of Medicaid in the administrative appeal decision that a good-faith dispute existed between the parties for purposes of applying the affirmative defense of accord and satisfaction to bar appellant's claim for reallocation of settlement proceeds under R.C. 5160.37.

CIVIL - frivolous conduct R.C. 2323.51(A)(2)(a)(iii) and (iv) factual determinations competent, credible evidence no evidentiary support not warranted by the evidence Fed.R.Civ.P. 11(b)(3) denial of motion for directed verdict incredible demonstrably false.