Court Rulings

CIV.R. 56(C) — SUMMARY JUDGMENT — NEGLIGENCE — TRIP AND FALL — INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR: The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant plumbing contractor in a trip-and-fall case because plaintiff failed to show that defendant created or knew about the allegedly hazardous condition. Without knowledge of the risk, defendant did not have a duty to warn plaintiff of it or to correct it. Thus, construing all issues of fact in a light most favorable to plaintiff, plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case for negligence against defendant. Judgment affirmed.

Complaint filed in court of common pleas alleging unfair labor practice of deducting union dues after employee withdrew from the union; dismissed on the pleadings; unfair labor practices are under exclusive jurisdiction of State Employment Relations Board ("SERB"); R.C. 4117.11; framing dispute in terms of contract law claims does not remove case from jurisdiction of SERB; Darling v. Am. Fedn. of State, Cty., & Mun. Emp., 2024-Ohio-2181 (10th Dist.); affirmed.

Granting Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment against defendants' counterclaims for declaratory relief because each requested declaration either duplicates issues already joined by the pleadings or seeks relief beyond this Court's jurisdiction. Granting Defendant/Counter-Plaintiff/Third-Party Plaintiff TMC's Traditional Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Termination against Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant City Choice. Although City Choice's termination notice was clear and unequivocal; its tender of its termination notice was not the exercise or acceptance of an option, and is therefore, not subject to the "strict compliance" standard applicable to the exercise or acceptance of options; and it substantially complied with notice provisions in exercising its right to terminate, it estopped from obtaining specific performance of the contract it purported to terminate. Denying TMC's Motion for Summary Judgment Against Third Party Defendant City Select Title for Release of the Independent Consideration. TMC does not seek a simple declaration from this Court that TMC is entitled to receipt of the Independent Consideration at the execution of the final judgment in this case. Instead, TMC seeks the immediate (i.e., pre-judgment) release of the Independent Consideration. But it must instead comply with the statutory requirements for a writ of attachment. Granting in part and denying in part Defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 91a because the pleadings fail to state a legally cognizable claim for breach of contract or for veil piercing, and the fraud claim is adequately pleaded. This opinion addresses Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction which challenged the Court's jurisdiction over Plaintiff's third-party claims filed against multiple subcontractors who performed work on a construction project. The Court denied Defendant's plea to the jurisdiction, concluding the third-party claims met the definition of an "action arising out of a qualified transaction" under Sectio

Trial court did not err by denying motion for relief from judgment that sought relief from appellate court decision. When appellant did not appeal that prior decision to the Supreme Court of Ohio, the appellate court's determinations became final. Under the law-of-the-case doctrine, the trial court lacked authority to grant relief from the appellate court's decision.

Granting in part and denying in part Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment contending that Plaintiff's tortious interference with contract, defamation, and business disparagement claims are barred by the limitation-of-liability provision in the parties' 2022 agreement. Granting a third-party defendant's special appearance arguing no personal jurisdiction over him because he did not commit any tortious acts while in Texas. Because the respondents did not plead or prove that this defendant has sufficient Texas contacts giving rise to the claims against him to support personal jurisdiction over him for any pled cause of action, the court granted the non-resident's special appearances and dismissed the claims against him without prejudice. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 166(g), the Court issues this decision holding that (1) fact issues preclude the Court from determining whether the liquidated-damages clause in the parties' contract is an unenforceable penalty and (2) under the circumstances of this case, the defendant's cost-basis theory is not the correct measure of the plaintiff's actual damages. In this force-majeure dispute arising out of Winter Storm Uri, parties to a contract for the sale of natural gas dispute whether the seller should have (i) purchased gas on the spot market to cover any production shortfall or (ii) bought back its delivery obligation. The Court holds that the parties' contract did not obligate the seller to take either action as a prerequisite or alternative to declaring force majeure or as a contractually required "reasonable effort." Denying defendant's motion for summary judgment arguing that a contract does not require it to pay royalty payments on "revenues actually received by [the defendant] for final disposal of solid waste in the sanitary landfill operated on the Property," where the disposal is in a part of the landfill that is not on the Property. This opinion addresses whether a party may remove a case concer

The plaintiff insured appealed from the trial court's judgment for the defen- dant insurance company on her amended complaint alleging a violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act and a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing in an insurance dispute concerning underinsured motorist benefits. She claimed, inter alia, that the court improp- erly granted the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery. Held: The trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the defendant's motion to bifurcate and stay discovery, as the court reasonably could have concluded that bifurcation of the claims served interests of convenience and judicial efficiency and may have negated the need to litigate certain other issues. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the plaintiff's motion for an order of compliance with her discovery requests, as the defendant eventually filed a notice of compliance and the plaintiff did not allege any prejudice resulting from the defendant's delay in complying with her discov- ery requests. This court declined to reach the merits of the plaintiff's claim that the trial court erred with respect to certain legal and factual determinations, as the plaintiff failed to furnish an adequate record for review. The trial court applied a proper legal standard in ruling on the counts of the plaintiff's complaint alleging that the defendant failed to act in good faith pursuant to a provision of CUTPA and that it acted in bad faith in violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, as the court reasonably could have concluded, in light of the evidence and the related findings of fact, that the plaintiff failed to satisfy her burden of demonstrating that the defendant had acted in bad faith. Argued October 29, 2024—officially released October 28, 2025

Motion to stay pending arbitration; contract; meeting of the minds; retail installment sales contract; arbitration agreement; Civ.R. 6; abuse of discretion. Trial court did not err in denying Kia's motion to stay pending arbitration. There was no meeting of the minds as the formation of the contract. Appellee was an elderly woman with vision, hearing, and mobility limitations and who was obviously ill when she purportedly signed two arbitration provisions for the purchase of a car. She told the salesperson she could not read the contract nor hear what he was saying but the dealership proceeded with the sales contract anyway. In addition, the arbitration provisions contained conflicting terms. The trial court also did not err in striking Kia's reply brief. The court expressly told the parties no reply briefs would be accepted but Kia ignored the court's order and filed a reply brief. It is well-settled that a trial court has discretion to manage its docket.

The trial court erred by granting appellees' motion for summary judgment as there is a reasonable dispute of fact whether the display of a noose in appellant's vehicle was severe enough conduct to create a hostile work environment. The trial court also erred by granting appellees' motion for summary judgment as to appellant's retaliation claim. There is a reasonable dispute of fact whether appellant's termination based on his refusal to turn over the noose to appellees, or allow them to cut a piece of it for use in the investigation, was protected activity. Judgment reversed and remanded.

The trial court erred by granting appellees' motion for summary judgment as there is a reasonable dispute of fact whether the display of a noose in appellant's vehicle was severe enough conduct to create a hostile work environment. The trial court also erred by granting appellees' motion for summary judgment as to appellant's retaliation claim. There is a reasonable dispute of fact whether appellant's termination based on his refusal to turn over the noose to appellees, or allow them to cut a piece of it for use in the investigation, was protected activity. Judgment reversed and remanded.

In this force-majeure dispute arising out of Winter Storm Uri, parties to a contract for the sale of natural gas dispute whether the seller should have (i) purchased gas on the spot market to cover any production shortfall or (ii) bought back its delivery obligation. The Court holds that the parties' contract did not obligate the seller to take either action as a prerequisite or alternative to declaring force majeure or as a contractually required "reasonable effort." Denying defendant's motion for summary judgment arguing that a contract does not require it to pay royalty payments on "revenues actually received by [the defendant] for final disposal of solid waste in the sanitary landfill operated on the Property," where the disposal is in a part of the landfill that is not on the Property. This opinion addresses whether a party may remove a case concerning trusts from statutory probate court to the business court. The court concluded it lacked jurisdiction because the claims asserted by the plaintiff arise out of Title 9 of the Property Code, and under section 25A.004(g) of the Texas Government Code, this court does not have jurisdiction over such claims unless they are part of the court's supplemental jurisdiction, which requires agreement of the parties. Here, the parties disagreed. In this force-majeure dispute arising out of a contract for the purchase and sale of natural gas based on the North American Energy Standards Board base-contract form, the parties dispute (a) whether the transaction confirmations are part of their contract and (b) which one controls over the other. The Court holds that, although the seller's transaction confirmation identifies a delivery term on which the buyer's confirmation is silent, the two confirmations do not materially conflict. Thus, both transaction confirmations combine with the base contract to form a single, integrated agreement, and neither confirmation trumps the other. This opinion addresses when statutes of limitations

Subject-matter jurisdiction; jurisdiction; asbestos; wrongful death; Bureau of Workers' Compensation; BWC; lung cancer; estate; next of kin; R.C. 2307.92; R.C. Ch. 2125; R.C. 4123.59; Industrial Commission; exclusive jurisdiction; administrative appeal; constitutionality; declaratory-judgment action; workplace injury; Article II, Section 35 of the Ohio Constitution; right to a remedy. The trial court's administrative dismissal of the Estate's wrongful-death and personal-injury claims against Ford Motor Company is vacated and the case is remanded to the trial court to enter a dismissal based on lack of subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the appeal. The Estate's claims against Ford Motor Company are based on an alleged workplace injury that resulted in the decedent's death. Accordingly, the Bureau of Workers' Compensation and the Industrial Commission have exclusive jurisdiction over the claims asserted, including the claim asserting an as-applied constitutional challenge to R.C. 4123.59. The trial court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the constitutional challenge as an administrative appeal from the agency's decision.

R.C. 2323.52 — VEXATIOUS LITIGATOR — SCOPE OF APPEAL — FIRST AMENDMENT: The classification of plaintiff as a vexatious litigator was not violative of the First Amendment and the right to seek redress of grievances where the classification does not prevent him from seeking redress for legitimate grievances. An appellant challenging a vexatious-litigator determination must set forth more than a mere conclusory assertion that the litigation pursued by him was neither frivolous nor intended to cause harm to meet the burden to demonstrate error on appeal.

In this force-majeure dispute arising out of a contract for the purchase and sale of natural gas based on the North American Energy Standards Board base-contract form, the parties dispute (a) whether the transaction confirmations are part of their contract and (b) which one controls over the other. The Court holds that, although the seller's transaction confirmation identifies a delivery term on which the buyer's confirmation is silent, the two confirmations do not materially conflict. Thus, both transaction confirmations combine with the base contract to form a single, integrated agreement, and neither confirmation trumps the other. This opinion addresses when statutes of limitations accrue and the application of the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment principles regarding claims of fraudulent statements contained in a securities purchase agreement. On a renewed motion to remand, the Court holds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the action as pleaded in the plaintiff's Fourth Amended Petition and remands the case. The Court concludes that it (a) cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the plaintiff never agreed that the action could proceed in this Court; (b) does not have qualified-transaction jurisdiction because the value of the consideration for the alleged prospective contract, determined at the time of the transaction, would be below the minimum; and (c) does not have trade-regulation jurisdiction because the alleged negligence per se claim, if recognized in Texas, would be a tort claim rather than a trade-regulation claim. Granting a special appearance due to no minimum contacts in Texas. This case presents two issues: (i) whether the Business Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's application for an involuntary winding-up of a limited liability company, and, if so, (ii) whether an earlier-filed lawsuit in district court between the same parties requires dismissal or abatement of this action under the doctrine

This opinion addresses when statutes of limitations accrue and the application of the discovery rule and fraudulent concealment principles regarding claims of fraudulent statements contained in a securities purchase agreement. On a renewed motion to remand, the Court holds that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over the action as pleaded in the plaintiff's Fourth Amended Petition and remands the case. The Court concludes that it (a) cannot exercise supplemental jurisdiction because the plaintiff never agreed that the action could proceed in this Court; (b) does not have qualified-transaction jurisdiction because the value of the consideration for the alleged prospective contract, determined at the time of the transaction, would be below the minimum; and (c) does not have trade-regulation jurisdiction because the alleged negligence per se claim, if recognized in Texas, would be a tort claim rather than a trade-regulation claim. Granting a special appearance due to no minimum contacts in Texas. This case presents two issues: (i) whether the Business Court has subject-matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's application for an involuntary winding-up of a limited liability company, and, if so, (ii) whether an earlier-filed lawsuit in district court between the same parties requires dismissal or abatement of this action under the doctrine of dominant jurisdiction. The Court concludes it has subject-matter jurisdiction and that the district court case and this case are not sufficiently interrelated to invoke dominant jurisdiction. Accordingly, the defendants' motion to dismiss, plea to the jurisdiction, and plea in abatement are denied. This case concerns whether (i) a party must file a separate removal notice, consent to removal, or join in another party's notice to argue that the case is removed as to it; (ii) claims alleging common law and statutory fraud inducing a member to enter an LLC company agreement are actions "regarding" the company's "internal affairs" or

¶ 0 State Representative Andy Fugate filed a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief and an Application for Temporary Restraining Order requesting the district court bar enforcement of Governor Kevin Stitt's Executive Order requiring full-time state agency employees to return to in-office work and find the Order to be null and void for violating the separation of powers doctrine. The district court dismissed the case finding Representative Fugate lacked standing. Representative Fugate appealed and we retained the matter. We affirm the district court's dismissal.

Jury trial; age discrimination; McDonnell Douglas analysis; motion for directed verdict; motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (\JNOV\); R.C. 4112.14(A); prima facie case; legitimate nondiscriminatory reason; pretextual; punitive damages; actual malice; motion for new trial; Civ.R. 59(A); abuse of discretion; Civ.R. 49(B); jury interrogatories; jury verdict; jury confusion and irregularities; Evid.R. 408; severance agreement; failure to object. Appellant appeals trial court's judgments entries journalizing jury verdicts and the denial of various motions and evidentiary rulings by the trial court throughout the ten-day jury discrimination trial against its ex-employee appellee. On review, we find the trial court properly denied appellant's motions for directed verdict and motion for JNOV as to appellee's claims for discrimination and for punitive damages. The case properly went to the jury who found discrimination and awarded punitive damages. The trial court also did not abuse its discretion in making evidentiary rulings against appellant or in denying appellant's several motions for a new trial. The trial court properly resolved the jury's confusion regarding the multiple interrogatories and general verdict forms.

Civ.R. 12(B)(6); Civ.R. 8; dismissal; defamation; wrongful termination. Trial court erred when it dismissed appellant's complaint pursuant to Civ.R. 12(B)(6), where appellant was only required to set forth a short plain statement of claims, that sufficiently apprised the appellee of the nature of the claims.

The trial court did not err in dismissing appellant's claim for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, because the facts alleged by appellant failed as a matter of law to establish the clarity element of her claim. The trial court also did not err in dismissing appellant's declaratory judgment claim where it and the wrongful termination claim were indistinguishable. Judgment affirmed.

COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL – MOTION TO DISMISS – CIV.R. 12(B)(7) – JOINDER – CIV.R. 19 – DECLARATORY JUDGMENT – R.C. 2721.12 – NECESSARY PARTIES – CONTRACTS – BREACH OF CONTRACT – SUBSTANTIAL PERFORMANCE – EXCUSE – SECURITY SEWAGE – IMPOSSIBILITY – REGULATORY IMPOSSIBILITY – GOOD FAITH – REMEDIES – DAMAGES: A prior determination by a federal court that a county regulation was not so "arbitrary and capricious" as to defy the Due Process Clause of the Federal Constitution did not collaterally estop plaintiff from litigating the entirely distinct issue of whether the county's application of the same regulation was "arbitrary" and therefore unforeseeable, so as to excuse plaintiff's contractual performance, regardless of similarities in terminology.

reversing the denial of summary judgment motion filed by political subdivision and employees, who were immune from liability; no evidence of negligence as required for the immunity exceptions involving the operation of a motor vehicle or the performance of a proprietary function; no duty; no recklessness as required to defeat primary assumption of the risk doctrine; employees' performance was not manifestly outside scope of employment or reckless.

The plaintiff appealed from the judgment of the trial court, which had dismissed his defamation action against the defendant, and from the court's decision to award the defendant attorney's fees and costs pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute (§ 52-196a). The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the trial court incorrectly concluded that he had failed to meet his burden under § 52-196a (e) (3) of showing that there was probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation per se claim, which was based on the defendant's statement on a social media page characterizing the plaintiff as a white supremacist. Held: The trial court properly granted the defendant's special motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action under § 52-196a. The plaintiff expressly waived any challenge to the trial court's determination that the defendant had met her initial burden under § 52-196a (e) (3) of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff's com- plaint implicated the defendant's exercise of her constitutional right of free speech on a matter of public concern. The trial court correctly determined that the plaintiff had failed to satisfy his burden of demonstrating that there was probable cause that he would prevail on the merits of his defamation claim, this court having concluded that the characterization of someone as a white supremacist, without more, is a nonactionable opinion rather than actionable defamation per se. Characterizing a person as a white supremacist, without more, is not a fact that can be objectively verified, the use of that term, without more, does not necessarily imply that the declarant knew existing, undisclosed defamatory facts, and, in the present case, given the context in which the defendant called the plaintiff a white supremacist, a reasonable reader of the comment would not have expected that the defendant was stating a fact about the plaintiff or that the defendant had private, firsthand knowledge supporting h

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court, which had affirmed the trial court's judgment dissolv- ing his marriage to the defendant, who was a partner at a large law firm. The plaintiff claimed, inter alia, that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that the defendant's interest in a potential stream of retirement payments, which was to be paid pursuant to the relevant provisions of the firm's partnership agreement, was too speculative to constitute marital property subject to equitable distribution under the statute (§ 46b-81) govern- ing, inter alia, the assignment of property in marital dissolution cases. Held: A trial court's determination of whether an asset or interest constitutes marital property for purposes of § 46b-81 presents a mixed question of law and fact subject to de novo review, the trial court's underlying factual findings are reviewed for clear error, and the question of how such determi- nations as to any particular asset fit into the mosaic of the trial court's financial orders is reviewed for abuse of discretion. The Appellate Court correctly determined that the defendant's interest in the retirement payments did not constitute property subject to equitable distribution for purposes of § 46b-81. The defendant did not have an enforceable right to receive the retirement payments insofar as the defendant's firm had a contractual right under the partnership agreement to unilaterally reduce or eliminate them at any time, even after the defendant started receiving them, and, accordingly, the defen- dant's receipt of the retirement payments was too speculative. Moreover, changes in the law firm's demographics and compensation struc- ture supported this court's conclusion that the firm's exercise of its authority to modify or terminate the retirement payments was more than a theoretical possibility, and equitable considerations weighed in favor of a conclusion that those payments should b

EMPLOYMENT – CORPORATIONS – MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS – WRONGFUL DISCHARGE – BREACH OF FIDUCIARY DUTY – CONTRACTS - RELEASES: The trial court did not err in granting a motion for summary judgment filed by defendants majority shareholders on plaintiff minority shareholder's claims for breach of fiduciary duty and wrongful discharge where the evidence showed that the termination of plaintiff's employment had a legitimate business purpose. The trial court did not err in granting plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendants' counterclaim for damages based on the terms of two releases contained in two redemption agreements, where the clear and unambiguous language of the agreements showed that they only governed the purchase of plaintiff's ownership interest in the companies, not his employment relationship with the companies.

constructive discharge, hostile work environment, reverse racial discrimination, negligent hiring/retention/supervision

The plaintiff appealed, on the granting of certification, from the judgment of the Appellate Court. The plaintiff had sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring that the defendant workers' compensation insurance carrier was legally obligated to defend and indemnify the plaintiff in connection with a claim filed by the plaintiff's employee. In granting the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, the trial court determined that the defendant did not effectively cancel a workers' compensation insurance policy that it had issued to the plaintiff because the purportedly conflicting notices the defendant had provided to the plaintiff prior to cancellation, including a notice that the plaintiff had failed to cooperate in connection with certain of the defendant's requests and a separate cancellation notice, did not consti- tute an unambiguous and unequivocal notice of cancellation. The Appellate Court reversed the trial court's judgment, concluding, inter alia, that the defendant effectively cancelled the policy prior to the employee's purport- edly compensable injuries by virtue of the defendant's compliance with the statute (§ 31-348) governing the reporting of risks by workers' compensation insurance companies and the cancellation of workers' compensation insur- ance policies. The plaintiff claimed that the Appellate Court had incorrectly concluded that the cancellation notice effectively cancelled the policy. Held: This court concluded that, although insurers must strictly comply with the requirements of § 31-348 when seeking to cancel a workers' compensation insurance policy, compliance with that statute does not supplant an insurer's obligations under otherwise applicable principles of contract law as they relate to the insurer and the insured, including the principle that a notice cancelling an insurance policy must be definite, certain, and unambiguous. The Appellate Court incorrectly limited its analysis to whether there was a definite and certain notice of cancell

This Opinion addresses the enforcement of a mandatory Buy-Sell Option clause and its specific performance remedy after the Offeror tendered the requisite buy/sell notice and the Offeree failed to respond to the notice and claimed the Offeror violated the underlying Company Agreement. The Court ultimately finds the Offeror is entitled to specific performance from the Offeree under the Buy-Sell Option clause. The Court awards the Offeror attorneys' fees. Ruling after court-ordered Rule 166(g) briefing. Ruling that Plaintiffs take nothing by their claims for declaratory relief and, with respect to one defendant, that Plaintiffs take nothing by their claims for accounting and inspection of books and records, breach of contract or an alleged partnership agreement, or for fraud and unjust enrichment. Ruling that Defendants take nothing by their claims for declaratory relief. Ruling that Plaintiffs' claims for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and fraud relating to one plaintiff and alternative claim for quantum meruit, and Defendants' claim for conversion, remain pending and will proceed to jury trial as set. Granting traditional and non-evidence summary judgment against Plaintiff's defamation claim because the complained-of statements are not objectively verifiable and therefore, as a matter of law, are not defamatory. Denying reconsideration of an order remanding the case back to district court on the grounds that the removal to business court was untimely. Denying permission to take a permissive interlocutory appeal of that order. This opinion addresses (i) whether the Property (Trust) Code bars a trustee from enforcing a punitive damages waiver; (ii) if not, whether the waiver in one bond financing contract applies to claims based on a related contract in the same financing; and (iii) whether a trustee owes continuing fiduciary duties to its beneficiaries once the trustee resigns and is replaced by a substitute trustee. The court concludes that (i) the pun

The magistrate properly determined that the Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in denying claimant's violation of a specific safety requirement ("VSSR") application. The record contains some evidence to support the commission's determinations that the seed cleaner's disengage switch disengaged the machine from its power supply and the switch would have been within easy reach of claimant at the time of the accident. Objections overruled; writ of mandamus denied.

BREACH OF CONTRACT — NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION: The trial court did not err by ruling in favor of defendant owner on plaintiff contractor's claim for breach of contract where the record supports the trial court's determination that plaintiff contractor failed to provide the requisite notice of its claim under the terms of the construction contract in order to prevail on its claim for breach of contract. The trial court did not err in dismissing plaintiff contractor's claim for negligent misrepresentation as a matter of law where the claim was based on a prior representation made during the bidding process and the construction contract ultimately stated that it "supersedes prior negotiations, representations or agreements, either written or oral."

Public Records; Community Schools; R.C. 149.011(A); R.C. 149.011(G); R.C. 149.43(A)(1); R.C. 2743.03(A)(3)(b); Adm. Code 3301-102-02(I); The functional equivalence doctrine; The quasi-agency doctrine; The governing authority of a R.C. Chapter 3314 community school is analogous to the board of education of a school district; R.C. 2743.03(A)(3)(b) grants the court of claims jurisdiction over public records disputes regardless of whether the respondent is a state entity, a political subdivision, or an employee of one of those entities; R.C. 2743.03(A)(3)(b) grants the court of claims jurisdiction over public records disputes regardless of whether the respondent is a private party; The four factors identified in the functional equivalence test adopted by State ex rel. Oriana House, Inc. v. Montgomery, 2006-Ohio-4854, are a nonexhaustive list; Out of state precedents applying the functional equivalence test are relevant to cases applying it in Ohio; Public education as a fundamental governmental function; Administrative actions taken on behalf of R.C. Chapter 3314 community schools are governmental acts; The extent of government involvement or regulation factor of the functional equivalence test can be established with proof of either a high degree of involvement with government or a high degree of regulation by government; A private entity is likely to be the functional equivalent of a public office if it is closely intertwined with a government body, even if the entity's day-to-day operations are not controlled by government; Mutual dependence between a private entity and a public office supports functional equivalence; A fiduciary relationship between a private entity and a public office supports functional equivalence; An entity that manages all aspects of a R.C. Chapter 3314 community school's operations stands in the shoes of the school; Functional equivalence is supported by large outflows of public money from the public office because the public has an interest i

The trial court properly granted summary judgment to appellee on appellant's negligence claim based on respondeat superior because the negligence claim against appellee's employee had previously been dismissed due to the expiration of the statute of limitations. The trial court properly granted summary judgment to appellee on appellant's negligence claim based on premises liability because appellee did not have possession and control of the premises where the injury occurred and appellant was engaged in inherently dangerous work. Judgment affirmed.

SUMMARY JUDGMENT — R.C. 2307.60 — CIVIL RECOVERY FOR CRIME VICTIMS — CHILD ENDANGERMENT — WITNESS INTIMIDATION — OBSTRUCTING JUSTICE — UNJUST ENRICHMENT: The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant-employer and denying plaintiff-employee's motion for summary judgment on plaintiff-employee's claim for damages as a crime victim based on defendant-employer's alleged act of witness intimidation where plaintiff-employee failed to present evidence of an underlying criminal act and was therefore not a "witness" under the meaning of the intimidation statute. The trial court did not err in granting summary judgment to defendant-employer on plaintiff-employee's civil claim for obstructing justice where plaintiff-employee failed to present evidence of an underlying crime and therefore did not establish all elements of the obstructing-justice statute and plaintiff-employee was otherwise not a "victim" of the crime of obstructing justice because the State, and not an individual, is the victim of obstructing justice. The trial court did not err in denying plaintiff-employee's motion for summary judgment and granting defendant-employer summary judgment on plaintiff-employee's unjust-enrichment claim where plaintiff-employee failed to present any evidence of her damages: plaintiff-employee was not entitled to an adverse inference against defendants-employers based on defendants-employers' claimed failure to turn over receipts submitted by plaintiff-employee where plaintiff-employee did not file a motion to compel, defendants-employers did not violate a court order, and plaintiff-employee failed to establish defendants-employers wrongfully withheld the receipts from plaintiff-employee.

Public-records requests—R.C. 149.011(G)—Township-newsletter distribution lists come under the jurisdiction of the township and document the organization, functions, procedures, or other activities of the office and are therefore subject to the disclosure requirement of the Public Records Act—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded.