Court Rulings

Ohio Civil Rights Commission discrimination disability R.C. 4112.06 R.C. 4112.05 Americans with Disabilities Act, App.R. 12 App.R. 16 abuse of discretion OCRC record pre-complaint investigation no probable cause finding. Pro se appellant filed a complaint with the Ohio Civil Rights Commission against the Cleveland Clinic Foundation alleging that the hospital discriminated against her based on her disability because the hospital denied her provider of choice after the appellant sent numerous inappropriate messages to her doctor through the hospital's MyChart messaging system. The OCRC made a finding of no probable cause and dismissed her complaint. On appeal to the trial court, the court upheld the commission's decision. On appeal to this court, appellant argued that the OCRC submitted an incomplete record to the trial court, the trial court ignored her evidence, and the OCRC misinterpreted the law. The OCRC did not submit an incomplete record to the trial court and the trial court did not err when it did not consider the pro se appellant's additional filings because they were not part of the commission's record and the trial court determined that it would only consider the commission's record and the parties' briefs. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that the OCRC's finding of no probable cause is not unlawful, irrational, arbitrary or capricious. Appellant did not show that her behavior was caused by her alleged mental disability, but even if she had so shown, the hospital did not terminate the physician-patient relationship because of appellant's alleged disability. The hospital offered to assist appellant to find another provider within the hospital system that could provide more suitable treatment.

In a hostile-work environment, sexual harassment case the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment where the school board took timely, corrective action to prevent the harassment, had no constructive knowledge that the individual was a habitual harasser, and where a reasonable person would not have felt compelled to resign while the investigation was still pending. R.C. Chapter 4112.

Administrative appeal principal terminated from employment

CIV.R. 60(B) The trial court abused its discretion in granting defendant's motion for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B) where the trial court failed to make a factual determination as to the alleged grounds for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B)(1) through (5), and where the record contained no evidence to support defendant's assertion of excusable neglect.

The Industrial Commission erred in its determination of Cogan's pre-injury visual baseline, and we grant a limited writ of mandamus remanding the matter to the commission to exercise the discretion afforded to it to determine the appropriate pre-injury visual baseline and use that updated pre-injury visual baseline to determine whether the medical evidence supports an award for loss of vision compensation under R.C. 4123.57(B).

Summary judgment notice pleading Civ.R. 8(A) negligence open-and-obvious doctrine nuisance comparative negligence. The trial court erred by granting summary judgment in this negligence and qualified-nuisance case. Plaintiff tripped over a board that was keeping a door from shutting at the YMCA. The board was placed there by an employee of University Hospitals, who worked at the physical therapy center adjacent to the YMCA. University Hospitals owed plaintiff a duty, and there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether University Hospitals breached that duty and whether plaintiff was comparatively negligent.

While this Court defers to a tribe on its membership determinations, without consistent and clear factual findings supporting the application of ICWA and North Dakota heightened review for Indian families, this Court is unable to determine the father's issues on appeal. The Court retains jurisdiction and remands for the juvenile court to clarify its findings on ICWA and heightened state law and to hold additional evidentiary proceedings if necessary.

Chapter 4117, collective bargaining, subject matter jurisdiction, SERB

CIVIL - Motion to Dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(6) Civ.R. 12(B)(1) R.C. Chapter 4117 R.C. 4117.03 grievance procedure jurisdiction of the Court State Employment Relations Board has exclusive jurisdiction to resolve unfair labor practices claims brought under 42 U.S.C. 1983 do not fall under exclusive jurisdiction of SERB Standing to bring claim Collective Bargaining Agreement controls grievance procedure Union and employer, not Union members individually, are parties to CBA Right to present grievance without Union involvement terminated at arbitration step under CBA Ohio Adm.Code 4117-1-01(B) First Amendment Arbitration is one of those "more traditional collective bargaining activities between union and employer CBA may create exclusive arbitration representation clause preventing individuals from pursuing their own arbitration with their own counsel and without union involvement R.C. 4117.09(B)(1).

The plaintiff employer, V Co., appealed to the trial court from the decision of the Employment Security Board of Review, which upheld the decision of an appeals referee of the Employment Security Appeals Division that a tattoo artist, S, was V Co.'s employee and that V Co. was liable under the Unemployment Compensation Act (§ 31-222 et seq.) for contributions to the state's unemployment compensation fund based on S's wages. V Co. leased retail space in a shopping mall, where it sold body jewelry and provided body piercing and body art services. Since 2013, S provided tattoo services to the customers of V Co. from a back room on V Co.'s premises. In 2016, the defendant, the administrator of the Unemployment Compensation Act, audited V Co. and determined that S was V Co.'s employee rather than an independent contractor, as V Co. had claimed. The appeals referee sustained that decision classifying S as an employee, finding, inter alia, that S did not pay rent to use the back room, S performed tattoo services only during store hours, which were estab- lished by V Co., and V Co. advertised on its website and Facebook page that customers could receive tattoo services at its store. Thereafter, V Co. appealed to the board of review, which concluded that V Co. had failed to satisfy any of the three prongs of the ABC test, as set forth in § 31-222 (a) (1) (B) (ii), which governs the determination of whether services performed by an individual constitute employment under the act. Specifically, the board of review determined that the tattoo services provided by S were performed within V Co.'s usual course of business, as required by part B of the ABC test, and noted that V Co. described itself on its website as a one-stop destination for piercing and tattoo services and that S was the only individual performing tattoo services for V Co. Thereafter, the trial court rendered judgment dismissing V Co.'s appeal from the decision of the board of review, concluding that V Co. had fai

The plaintiff sought, inter alia, a declaratory judgment from the trial court determining the manner in which the plaintiff's buy out of the defendant's interest in certain parcels of real property pursuant to their settlement agreement was to be calculated. The settlement agreement provided that the buyout amount would be based on the fair market value of each property multiplied by the defendant's interest in each property. The parties disagreed as to whether ''interest,'' as used in the settlement agreement, meant equitable interest or a percentage of the fair market value of the property, without taking into account any existing mort- gages. This court, in a prior action between the parties, had determined that the settlement agreement was ambiguous with respect to the calcu- lation of the buyout amount. In the present case, the trial court, noting that it was bound by this court's prior decision, determined that the term ''interest'' meant ''equitable interest'' and, accordingly, that the calculation of the buyout amount required consideration of the existing mortgages on the properties. On the defendant's appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly determined that the buyout amount for the defendant's interests in the properties was to be calculated by multiplying his percentage interest in each property by the difference of its fair market value minus any outstanding mortgage debt: contrary to the defendant's claim, the trial court's reliance on § 201 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts in resolving the underlying action, rather than § 220 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, was not improper because § 220 was not applicable, as the word ''interest'' as used in the settlement agreement had no habitual or customary meaning, § 201 was applicable because the parties attached different meanings to the term ''interest,'' and there was ample evidence to support the trial court's determination that the defendant had reason to know that the pla

The plaintiff taxpayers, J and B, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant Commissioner of Revenue Services disallowing in part their claims for certain income tax refunds. The plaintiffs resided in Connecticut, but J performed services for his employer, U Co., in both Connecticut and New York. As part of his compensation for those ser- vices, J received stock options and restricted stock from U Co. For the 2005, 2007 and 2008 taxable years, the plaintiffs filed Connecticut resi- dent income tax returns on which they reported compensation that J had received from his exercise of stock options and the vesting of restricted stock that U Co. previously had granted to him. They also sought a credit for taxes paid to New York during those years for services J performed for U Co. that occurred both in Connecticut and New York. The commissioner allowed the credit pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 12-704 (a)). Following an audit conducted in New York, the plaintiffs paid additional taxes to New York for compensation that J had received from U Co. for the 2005, 2007 and 2008 taxable years. The plaintiffs filed amended Connecticut resident income tax returns for those years and sought a credit for the additional taxes they paid to New York. The commissioner disallowed in part the requested credit and the plaintiffs' claims for refunds of the taxes paid to New York for the subject taxable years on the ground that the plaintiffs were required to allocate income from the exercise of stock options and the vesting of restricted stock between Connecticut and New York in accordance with the relevant state regulations (§§ 12-711(b)-17 (c) and 12-711(b)-18 (c)). In determin- ing the apportionment and the credit to which the plaintiffs were entitled, the commissioner applied the methodology set forth in those regulations, which he construed as requiring a computation of the total compensation received by J during the relevant periods, including deferred compen

The plaintiff R, who sustained injuries after he was injured in a motor vehicle collision involving an uninsured motorist, sought to recover uninsured motorist benefits allegedly due under an automobile insurance policy issued by the defendant W Co. At the time of the accident, R was operating a vehicle owned by a car dealership and covered by a commer- cial garage insurance policy issued by W Co. The trial court granted W Co.'s motion to bifurcate the issues of the insurance coverage limits and damages. A bifurcated trial before the court followed, limited to the issue of uninsured motorist coverage provided by the policy. During the trial, the sole witness, B, the owner of the dealership, testified credibly that he did not have education or formal training on risk loss and insurance purchasing but wanted to have the minimum amounts of uninsured motorist coverage required by state law as the dealership was not in the business of loaning or renting cars. B consulted with an insurance professional, C, to provide him advice, which he considered in determining the scope of coverage for the dealership. B attested that he received a waiver form from C, which listed $100,000 in uninsured motorist coverage, reviewed it, knowingly approved his selection, and signed his name on the last page of the form and sent it back to C. In its memorandum of decision, the court determined, inter alia, that the dealership, the only named insured on the policy, knowingly made an informed decision to reduce the uninsured motorist coverage from $1 million, the amount of liability coverage under the policy, to $100,000 on the waiver form, and, although the waiver form did not contain a statement of premium costs for each of the uninsured motorist coverage options available as required pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 38a- 336 (a) (2)), which permits the named insured to request a lesser amount of uninsured motorist coverage in writing, such noncompliance was excused because the policy w

Opinion and Order The Petitioner's request to overrule the AG's legal sufficiency determination is GRANTED. The AG's rejection of I-33 is VACATED, and the Secretary of State is directed to return the proposal to Petitioner for the purpose of gathering signatures.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages and other relief for, inter alia, fraudulent misrepresentation in connection with an alleged conspiracy by the defendants, the city and two of its former employees, to fill the position of police chief in the defendant city's police department. The plaintiff, a former officer in the city's police department, had previously brought a separate action against the city alleging wrongful termination. The parties reached a settlement agreement with respect to the termina- tion action. The plaintiff thereafter filed the complaint alleging a conspir- acy, and the city filed a motion to dismiss the counts of the complaint against it, which alleged fraudulent misrepresentation during settlement negotiations and computer crime, on the basis that the claims were barred by absolute immunity under the litigation privilege. The trial court denied the motion with respect to the claim of computer crime, and the city appealed to this court. Held that the trial court properly denied the city's motion to dismiss the count alleging computer crime on the basis of the city's failure to establish a nexus between the allega- tions of that count and any activity falling within the bounds of the litigation privilege; the count did not contain any allegations with respect to communications involving the city and the conduct alleged could not reasonably be construed as stemming from the plaintiff's prior action against the city, but, rather, the allegations set forth in the count concern the mechanics of how the city's employees carried out a cheating scheme using computers, not any fraud or concealment thereof that occurred during the prior settlement negotiations. Argued January 20—officially released May 17, 2022

The plaintiffs, retired city firefighters, filed a motion for contempt alleging that the defendant city had violated a judgment of the trial court incorpo- rating a settlement agreement in which the defendant had agreed to provide a health benefits package administered by A Co., and that the package would not change without the plaintiffs' written consent or a legislative mandate. The defendant thereafter replaced the plan adminis- tered by A Co. with a health insurance plan administered by C Co. and a prescription drug plan administered by V Co. The plaintiffs claimed that, by making this change, the defendant had diminished the health insurance benefits to which they were entitled pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. Following a hearing on the contempt motion, the trial court concluded that the agreement was clear and unambiguous and that the defendant violated the judgment by changing the plaintiffs' health insurance plan administrators without their written consent. The court, however, denied the motion for contempt because all of the claims submitted by the plaintiffs under the C Co. plan were paid in a manner identical to the A Co. plan and, therefore, the court concluded that the defendant had not wilfully violated the judgment. On the plaintiffs' appeal and the defendant's cross appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for contempt: this court concluded that the trial court incorrectly determined that the defendant violated the agreement by changing the third-party administrators because the reference to the A Co. plan in the agreement was used to establish the health-care benefits to which the plaintiffs were entitled, the agreement did not state that a specific third party must administer those benefits in perpetuity, the defendant's agreement that it would not change or diminish the benefits that comprised the entire health- care package did not extend to the question of which entity would operate as

CIVIL STALKING PROTECTION ORDER - Appellate court must defer to trial court on credibility determinations and trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding Appellant engaged in a pattern of conduct which caused Appellee mental distress and thus did not abuse its discretion in granting Appellee's request for civil stalking protection order.

civil stalking protection order manifest weight of the evidence presumption in favor of judgment menacing by stalking mental distress credibility determination conflicting evidence.

Pursuant to State ex rel. Klein v. Precision Excavating & Grading Co., 155 Ohio St.3d 78, 2018-Ohio-3890, a claimant is ineligible for temporary total disability ("TTD") compensation if the claimant's workplace injury did not cause the loss of earnings. Therefore, when a claimant removes herself from employment for reasons unrelated to the work-related injury, she is no longer eligible for TTD compensation.

The plaintiffs, two former employees of the defendant, sought to recover damages from the defendant for, inter alia, breach of their employment contracts and failure to pay wages pursuant to statute (§ 31-72). The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs on their respective claims for breach of written contract and failure to pay wages pursuant to § 31-72, and in favor of the defendant on the plaintiffs' respective claims for breach of oral contract. The court declined to award the plaintiffs double damages or attorney's fees as provided by § 31-72, reasoning that such an award is appropriate only when the trial court has found that the defendant acted with bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness, which the trial court concluded was not demon- strated in the present case, and the trial court declined to award prejudg- ment interest on the amounts awarded to the plaintiffs. On appeal, the plaintiffs claimed that the trial court erred in finding that there was no bad faith, arbitrariness, or unreasonableness on the part of the defendant to support an award of double damages and attorney's fees with respect to the plaintiffs' claims for failure to pay wages pursuant to § 31-72, and that the trial court abused its discretion in not awarding prejudgment interest pursuant to statute (§ 37-3a (a)). Held that this court declined to address the merits of the plaintiffs' claims, the plaintiffs having failed to provide this court with an adequate record: pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 61-10 (a)), the plaintiffs, as the appellants in the present case, bore the burden of providing this court with an adequate record for review; moreover, although the trial occurred over three days, the plaintiffs failed to provide this court with any transcripts and, in the absence of such transcripts, this court could not evaluate the plaintiffs' arguments under the applicable standards of review without resorting to speculation; accordingly, the judgment of

Directed verdict Civ.R. 50 de novo review age discrimination prima facie case direct evidence statements by employer indirect evidence reasonable inference reduction in force business considerations breach of contract renewal of contract assignment meeting of the minds essential terms promissory estoppel damages. The trial court did not err in granting a directed verdict on all of appellant's claims. Appellant failed to present direct or indirect evidence of his age-discrimination claim. Further, appellant did not demonstrate a prima facie case of breach of contract because there was no meeting of the minds, and the alleged contract lacked essential terms. Finally, appellant did not present evidence of damages in support of his promissory-estoppel claim.

R.C. 2323.51 frivolous conduct breach of contract manifestation of mutual assent consideration promissory estoppel reasonable reliance Prof.Cond.R. 1.5(e)

The plaintiff city sought to vacate an arbitration award issued in connection with its alleged breach of a collective bargaining agreement that it had entered into with the defendant police union. Between March, 2017, and June, 2018, all five of the city's police captains retired and their positions remained vacant until September, 2018, when they were filled simultane- ously. The union filed a grievance, alleging that the city had violated the terms of certain appendices to the agreement, which it claimed required the city to maintain five police captain positions at all times. The parties submitted the issue for arbitration. An arbitration panel found that the city had violated the agreement by leaving open the vacancies and awarded each of the employees who were appointed to the position of police captain in September, 2018, an amount equal to the difference between their rate of pay on the date when the first police captain retired and their rate of pay on the date when they were appointed police captain, for the period between March, 2017, and September, 2018, not including any overtime worked during that period. The city filed an application to vacate the arbitration award, which the trial court denied, and the city appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court properly rejected the city's claim that the panel exceeded its authority in violation of the applicable statute (§ 52-418 (a) (4)) in finding that the city violated the agreement: although the agreement did not explicitly state that the city must employ five police captains at all times, the panel interpreted the language of the agreement in such a manner, such an interpretation was not unreasonable, and the city's disagreement with the interpretation was not sufficient to establish that the panel had exceeded its authority; moreover, the city could not prevail on its claim that the award failed to draw its essence from the agreement or that the panel was dispensing its own brand of industrial justic

The commission did not abuse its discretion by applying the "special circumstances" exception from R.C. 4123.61 to exclude 46 weeks from the average weekly wage calculation. Objection overruled writ of mandamus denied.

Wrongful discharge in violation of public policy Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss choice of law place of injury tort action tortious interference with employment relationship prohibiting deceptive trade practices. The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's California-law-based claims when Ohio law controlled the case. In a wrongful termination case, the place where the plaintiff lost his or her employment is the place of injury, and the place of injury presumptively controls the choice of law. In this case, Gerace lived and worked in Ohio when he was terminated from his job. The trial court did not err by dismissing plaintiff's claim for wrongful discharge in violation of Ohio public policy because he failed to allege facts that jeopardized a clear public policy.