Court Rulings

Christy's Auto Rentals, Inc. (Christy's) appealed to the Supreme Court seeking review of a January 25, 2016 judgment of the Providence County Superior Court granting the motion for summary judgment of Massachusetts Homeland Insurance Company (Homeland) in this declaratory judgment action. On November 7, 2018, the Court heard oral argument in the case. Christy's contended before the Court that the hearing justice erred in granting Homeland's motion for summary judgment because he erroneously found that: (1) Homeland did not waive Christy's lack of standing by asserting it first in its motion for summary judgment (2) Christy's lacked standing to pursue the declaratory judgment action (3) Homeland's insurance policy with its insured did not cover the accident and (4) coverage was not mandated by G.L. 1956 § 27-7-6. The Supreme Court held that Homeland properly raised the standing issue before the trial justice in its motion for summary judgment that Christy's indeed lacked standing to pursue a declaratory judgment regarding a contract to which it was not a party and that the hearing justice's determination of the insurance policy's coverage of the accident at issue and the applicability of the statute constituted nonbinding dicta. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the January 25, 2016 judgment of the Superior Court.

Industrial Commission did not abuse its discretion in granting claimant's PTD application where the medical opinion relied on by the commission provided some evidence to support the commission's finding that claimant is incapable of sustained remunerative employment solely due to the allowed impairment. Because claimant was medically incapable of sustained remunerative employment due to the allowed impairment, the commission was not required to consider non-medical disability factors before granting PTD, including claimant's lack of participation in re-education and retraining. Writ denied.

District court judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance order denying workplace injury benefits is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).

District court judgment affirming a Workforce Safety and Insurance order denying workplace injury benefits is summarily affirmed under N.D.R.App.P. 35.1(a)(5).

De novo review found no error in the Board of Tax Appeals affirming the tax commissioner's final determination that denied taxpayer's application for refund of commercial activity tax. Taxpayer's federal constitutional claims not supported by the record. Assignments of error overruled BTA decision affirmed.

Mandamus denied relator's refusal to subject himself to an examination by his employer's physician does not constitute good cause under R.C. 4123.65(C).

De novo review of summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee municipal corporation affirmed when record shows that municipal corporation's employees exercised discretion for which R.C. 2744.03(A)(5) confers immunity.

CIV.R. 12(B)(6) – NEGLIGENCE – EMPLOYER INTENTIONAL TORT – R.C. 2745.01: Where plaintiff employee suffered a severe hand injury when a coworker activated a mixing machine, the trial court erred in dismissing under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) the employee's negligent-inspection claim against two companies hired by the employer to inspect the machine and to ensure that it had the required guards where the employee alleged in his complaint that his employer had a duty to ensure the safety of the equipment at his workplace, the employer had contracted that duty away to the companies, and the companies had failed to exercise reasonable care in inspecting the machine. The trial court erred in dismissing under Civ.R. 12(B)(6) the employee's R.C. 2745.01 intentional-tort claim against his employer, because the allegations that the employer had actual knowledge that barrier guards were required for the mixing machine, the employer had removed barrier guards from the mixing machine, and, despite the danger, had required the employee to operate the mixing machine without the guards, stated a claim for relief with sufficient particularity to satisfy the heightened pleading standard set forth in Mitchell v. Lawson Milk Co., 40 Ohio St.3d 190, 532 N.E.2d 753 (1998), and its progeny.

Trial court's determination that appellants did not establish that a novation occurred in this case was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Contracts–trial court's determination to use company's tax returns for purposes of calculating "net profits" not against the manifest weight of the evidence when company vice president offered conflicting accounts of how she determined net profits trial court entitled to find vice president's testimony not worthy of belief trial court's finding that employer agreed to provide employee health insurance coverage not against the manifest weight of the evidence when three out of four people present at meeting during which employment offered testified that employer would provide health insurance appellant's argument that trial court failed to charge cost of motorcycle trailer against appellee's share of net profits unsupported–instead, trial court did charge cost of motorcycle trailer to appellee trial court's finding that golf cart in appellee's possession constituted gift not against manifest weight of the evidence

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43 ambiguous overly broad Title IX FERPA R.C. 3319.321 personally identifiable information attorney-client privilege non-record quasi-agency non-existent moot. Overview: Requester sought a Title IX investigation report and other records related to a former employee of respondent city schools. Respondent denied some of the requests as ambiguous or overly broad, and asserted that some requested documents were not records of the city schools or did not exist. Respondent asserted that some records were exempted from the Public Records Act by common-law attorney-client privilege, the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), and R.C. 3319.321. The special master found that the requests were moot to the extent that records had been provided, and that certain requests were ambiguous or overly broad except to the extent that they contained a sufficiently specific embedded request. The special master further found that FERPA and R.C. 3319.321 had been overapplied in redacting the Title IX investigation report, and that material not falling squarely within the term "personally identifiable information" must be disclosed. The special master further found that the city schools' insurer was not a person responsible for public records, under the theory of quasi-agency, for an insurer-appointed defense counsel's engagement and payment records. The special master found that respondent had no duty to provide non-existent records, or records that did not fall under the terms of any request.

legal malpractice, statute of limitations, termination date, cognizable event, fraud, separate claims

Taxation—R.C. 5739.01(B)(3)(k)—Sales tax imposed on transactions by which "employment service" is provided—R.C. 5739.01(JJ)—Definition of "employment service"—Providing personnel to perform work or labor "under the supervision or control of another"—Employment-service inquiry under R.C. 5739.01(JJ) focuses on who controlled workers' schedules and workplace assignments based on the evidence presented, with the "supervision or control" exercised involving the specific work performed by the provided personnel.

The existence and terms of an oral contract are findings of fact subject to the clearly erroneous rule. A district court's determination of whether the facts support a finding of unjust enrichment is fully reviewable on appeal. An award of damages for an unjust enrichment claim is reviewed under the clearly erroneous standard. Issues not raised in the district court are waived.

The trial court did not err in refusing to stay the litigation of certain claims pending arbitration where (1) those claims that were not part of the action that included the arbitrable claims and (2) the parties to the claims at issue had not executed an arbitration agreement.

respondeat superior, employee versus independent contractor status, right to control

Summary judgment in favor of appellees on appellant's claim for retaliatory discharge is warranted where appellant has not demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether appellees' proffered legitimate reason for the adverse employment action is mere pretext.

Formalistic compliance with an opt-out notice is not required to validly opt-out of a class action. A vehicle owner, who, by admission, knows little about cars and has never done any service on any cars, nor personally observed the condition, is not qualified to offer an opinion, either as an expert or lay witness, to overcome summary judgment on whether a transmission conductor plate was faulty four or more years before it was found to be faulty and replaced.

Dos Almas LLC began operating a restaurant after it acquired nearly all of the assets of WooPig LLC, which had operated a different restaurant at the same location. After the acquisition, Dos Almas applied for an unemployment compensation insurance account and a determination of employer liability by submitting a form along with a copy of the asset purchase agreement to the Department of Labor and Employment (Department). A deputy ruled that Dos Almas was a successor employer to WooPig for unemployment compensation tax rate liability purposes because it met the requirements of CRS § 8-76-104(1)(a) due to the acquisition. Dos Almas appealed more than eight months after the applicable 21-day time limit. Nevertheless, a hearing officer ruled that good cause was shown for the delay, and following a hearing the officer found that Dos Almas was not a successor entity to WooPig under the statutory criteria largely because it did not retain the employees as part of the asset sale. A panel of the Industrial Claims Appeal Office (the Panel) reversed. The Panel upheld the factual findings, but based on Dos Almas having acquired 90% of WooPig's physical and intangible assets, ruled that it had acquired substantially all of WooPig's assets and thereby met the statutory criteria to be considered a successor employer for unemployment compensation tax rate liability purposes. On appeal, Dos Almas contended that the Panel erred in ruling that it is a successor to WooPig for unemployment tax rate liability purposes. The hearing officer's factual findings support the conclusion that Dos Almas is a successor employer to WooPig for unemployment compensation tax rate liability purposes under the applicable statutory criteria in CRS § 8-76-104(1)(a). Further, the lack of employee retention in the asset purchase transaction is irrelevant to the successor issues in this case. The Panel did not err. The order was affirmed.

The common pleas court did not abuse its discretion on R.C. 3319.16 appellate review when it affirmed the board of education's order terminating teacher's employment. Judgment of the common pleas court affirmed.

Core Terms: public record court of claims R.C. 2743.75 R.C. 149.43(B)(8) inmate standing res judicata. Overview: Requester inmate and his designees sought records pertaining to his criminal case. The Prosecutor's Office argued that Ellis lacked standing to seek enforcement of requests filed by his designees, that a previous determination involving a separate law enforcement agency rendered this case res judicata, and that Ellis had not complied with the procedure required in R.C. 149.43(B)(8) for inmates seeking law enforcement investigatory records. The Special Master recommended that the court find, 1) Ellis has standing to seek enforcement of requests filed by his designees, 2) Ellis' previous action did not operate as res judicata, and 3) Ellis has not shown that he has complied with R.C. 149.43(B)(8), and thus is not entitled to production of the requested records.