Court Rulings

R.C. 2711.03 arbitration duty to arbitrate contract interpretation. Trial court erred when it failed to grant appellant's petition to arbitrate where the record established that the parties were disputing the interpretation of terms in the collective bargaining agreement and the parties had assigned interpretation disputes to the arbitrator.

Assignment of bargaining unit rights to non-bargaining unit employees waiver by union to bargain 4117.08 bad-faith ripeness for review. City adopted plan to hire part-time employees who would perform union work but not be members of union and took steps to hire those part-time employees. The City presented the plan to the union and maintained the position that it did not have to bargain with union over plan. Union discontinued meetings with City and filed unfair labor practice complaint with SERB. SERB held hearing and found City committed unfair labor practice and negotiated in bad faith. In overruling City's assigned errors in its administrative appeal, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining union did not explicitly waive the right to bargain the hiring of part-time employees who would be assigned bargaining unit work. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by determining that union did not waive its right to bargaining by discontinuing meeting with City because of City's continued position that it was not required to bargain. Because the issue of reassignment of bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit employees has long been held to require negotiation, City's continued refusal acknowledge a duty to bargain, the trial court cannot be said to have abused its discretion by finding the City did not bargain was in good faith. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by finding that City's steps to hire employees made the issue of assignment of bargaining unit work to non-bargaining unit employees a present and imminent concern ripe for review.

The common pleas court properly denied the motion to vacate the arbitration award because (1) the award was sufficiently definite, providing clear instructions for compliance and (2) the arbitrator's factual determinations and interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement were based on a reasonable understanding of the factual record and within the bounds of a permissible interpretation of the agreement.

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION – DISABILITY DISCRIMINATION – REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION – RETALIATORY DISCHARGE – SUMMARY JUDGMENT: The trial court erred when it granted summary judgment to defendant former employer on plaintiff former employee's disability-discrimination claim because the deposition transcripts and plaintiff former employee's medical and personnel records created genuine issues of material fact as to whether 1.) plaintiff former employee's physical and mental impairments substantially limited his major life activities, and 2.) whether defendant former employer provided reasonable accommodations. The trial court did not err when it granted summary judgment to defendant former employer on plaintiff former employee's retaliation claim because the evidence did not create a genuine issue of material fact and showed that defendant former employer terminated plaintiff former employee because of violation of attendance and respect policies, which were legitimate and nondiscriminatory reasons for that termination.

The trial court improperly accorded claim-preclusive effect to appellant's R.C. 4112.02 retaliation claim based upon the District Court's judgment of dismissal. The District Court's decision dismissing appellant's Title VII retaliation claim \with prejudice\ for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, on the unique procedural facts of this case, did not serve to bar appellant from pursuing a R.C. 4112.02 retaliation claim in state court. The District Court's judgment did not meet the first element of res judicata/claim preclusion as it was not a judgment on the merits. Therefore, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee as to the retaliation claim. However, the trial court properly accorded claim-preclusive effect to appellant's R.C. 4112.02 race discrimination claim based upon the District Court's judgment of dismissal. The judgment met all the elements of res judicata/claim preclusion. Therefore, the trial court did not err in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee as to the race discrimination claim. Accordingly, appellant's sole assignment of error is sustained in part and overruled in part. Judgment is reversed in part and affirmed in part. Case is remanded to the trial court.

wrongful termination in violation of public policy, Greeley, Civ.R. 12(B)(6), contract employee, at-will employee, Title IX, motion to dismiss

¶0 The plaintiffs/appellants worked for and delivered Amazon packages in the Tulsa, Oklahoma, area for the defendant/appellee, James Kerr. After Kerr fired them, the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit against him. Kerr sought to compel arbitration pursuant to arbitration provisions of the plaintiffs' employment contracts. The plaintiffs objected, arguing that they could not be compelled to arbitrate because federal and state law precluded arbitration. The trial court disagreed, granted the motion to compel arbitration, and stayed the lawsuit until completion of arbitration. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Court of Civil Appeals affirmed. We granted certiorari and hold that: 1) employees who deliver Amazon packages are exempted from arbitration under federal law and 2) the district court's exclusive jurisdiction over the retaliatory discharge claims precludes arbitration of those claims under Oklahoma law. STAY OF NOVEMBER 20, 2023, LIFTED COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS OPINION VACATED TRIAL COURT REVERSED AND REMANDED FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THIS OPINION.

CIVIL - disability discrimination tortious interference with employment relationship Open Meetings Act Civ.R. 12(B)(6) motion to dismiss res judicata claim preclusion issue preclusion finality issues were already decided privity sua sponte dismissal

The trial court did not err in granting appellee's motion to dismiss appellants' claims. Because none of appellants' claims are independent of the collective bargaining rights created by R.C. Chapter 4117, their complaint is subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the Ohio State Employment Relations Board and the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over the case. Judgment affirmed.

Pursuant to statute (§ 52-552e (a)), ''[a] transfer made or obligation incurred by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, if the creditor's claim arose before the transfer was made or the obligation was incurred and if the debtor made the transfer or incurred the obligation: (1) With actual intent to hinder, delay or defraud any creditor of the debtor; or (2) without receiving a reasonably equivalent value in exchange for the transfer or obligation, and the debtor (A) was engaged or was about to engage in a business or a transaction for which the remaining assets of the debtor were unreasonably small in relation to the business or transaction, or (B) intended to incur, or believed or reasonably should have believed that he would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay as they became due.'' The defendant J appealed from the judgment of the trial court rendered for the plaintiff on three counts of his complaint that asserted claims of fraudulent transfer against J and her husband, the defendant W, pursuant to the Connecticut Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (CUFTA) (§ 52- 552a et seq.). In September, 2004, on the advice of W, the plaintiff transferred funds from his 401 (k) account into an individual retirement account (IRA) comanaged by A Co., W's employer. W subsequently formed T Co., and he left his employment with A Co. in 2007. In 2008, on the advice of W, the plaintiff transferred the balance of his IRA into another entity, and the funds were subsequently transferred to a bank account owned by T Co. so that W, as the sole member of T Co., could fully manage and invest the funds for the plaintiff. As part of this transaction, T Co. issued an unsecured promissory note to the plaintiff in the amount of $185,000. The plaintiff invested additional funds into accounts held and managed by T Co. in 2009 and 2011, bringing the plaintiff's total principal investment to more than $227,000. Thereafter, W mismanaged the plaintiff's investments and was negligent in the han- d

Domestic relations—Child support—R.C. 3119.01(C)(17)—R.C. 3119.01(C)(17) requires that the domestic-relations court's child-support order include an express determination of voluntary unemployment or underemployment as a condition precedent to imputing potential income for child-support-calculation purposes—Domestic-relations court's lack of express determination of voluntary unemployment was reversible error—Court of appeals' judgment reversed and cause remanded to domestic-relations court.

The petitioner, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of the crimes of murder and criminal possession of a pistol or revolver, filed a fourth petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court, upon the request of the respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, issued an order to show cause why the petition should not be dismissed as untimely given that it had been filed beyond the time limit for successive petitions set forth in the applicable statute (§ 52-470 (d)). The court held an eviden- tiary hearing, during which the petitioner testified that he had filed a timely third habeas petition but withdrew it prior to trial on the advice of his prior habeas counsel. The petitioner further testified that counsel did not discuss § 52-470 (d) and that, if the petitioner had known that withdrawing his third petition and refiling would result in an untimely petition, he would not have done so. The habeas court dismissed the fourth habeas petition as untimely, concluding that the petitioner had failed to demonstrate good cause for the delay in filing the petition. Thereafter, the petitioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to this court, which affirmed the judgment of the habeas court. The peti- tioner, on the granting of certification, appealed to the Supreme Court, which granted the petition for certification, vacated the judgment of this court, and remanded the case to this court for further consideration in light of Rose v. Commissioner of Correction (348 Conn. 333). Held that, after further consideration of the issue raised in this appeal, the proper remedy was to remand the matter to the habeas court for a new hearing and good cause determination under § 52-470 (d) and (e), consistent with the principles set forth in Rose, Rapp v. Commissioner of Correction (224 Conn. App. 336), and Hankerson v. Commissioner of Correction (223 Conn. App. 562). Argued April 8—officially released May 14, 2024

CIVIL - magistrate's decision Civ.R. 53 judgment issued day prior to filing of magistrate's decision appellant's duty to provide a transcript for appellate review arbitration agreement motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(1) subject matter jurisdiction Civ.R. 12(B)(6) failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted Civ.R. 12(B)(6) movant may not rely on allegations or evidence outside the complaint unless court converts the motion to a motion for summary judgment stay pending arbitration.

CONTRACTS – DISCOVERY – MOTION TO COMPEL – CIV.R. 56 – ABUSE OF DISCRETION – SUMMARY JUDGMENT – BREACH OF CONTRACT – CONTRACT INTERPRETATION – IMPLIED COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING – IMPLIED-IN-FACT CONTRACT – UNJUST ENRICHMENT – FRAUD: The trial court did not abuse its direction in impliedly denying plaintiff's motion to compel discovery and plaintiff's motion for a continuance under Civ.R. 56(F) and instead ruling on defendant's dispositive motion for summary judgment where plaintiff's substantial rights were not harmed by closing discovery because plaintiff stated in its memorandum in opposition to summary judgment that it had sufficient facts to survive summary judgment. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on whether defendant breached the contract by providing notice of termination because there is no genuine issue of material fact that the defendant provided to plaintiff the written notice to terminate required by the contract and there are no facts suggesting defendant breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on whether defendant breached the contract by refusing to pay amounts owed prior to providing notice of termination where there is no genuine issue of material fact that the amounts were due for services rendered prior to defendant sending notice to terminate the contract and defendant had not paid those amounts. The trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff on whether defendant breached the contract by not paying amounts owed under the contract during the 30-day notice period where there is no genuine issue of material fact that the termination clause keeps the contract in force for 30 days after a party provides written notice to terminate, and sets the amounts owed while the contract is in force, and the plain language of

Magistrate's decision adopted as no objections were filed. Respondents' motion for summary judgment denied because public records request was not subject to grievance system and therefore the affidavit requirements of R.C. 2969.26(A) did not apply. Relator's motion for summary judgment granted in part and denied in part. Statutory damages awarded.

Pursuant to statute (§ 16-262e (c)), the owner or landlord of a multiunit residential dwelling ''shall be liable for the costs of all [utility services] furnished . . . to the building, except for any service furnished to any dwelling unit of the building on an individually metered or billed basis for the exclusive use of the occupants of that dwelling unit . . . .'' The plaintiff landlord, N Co., sought a declaratory ruling from the defendant, the Public Utilities Regulatory Authority (PURA), that it may use ratio utility billing (RUB) in recouping its costs for utility services from tenants in two multiunit residential buildings that did not have individual meters for each unit but, rather, had only a master meter. Under the RUB methodology, N Co. would bill its tenants for monthly utility charges on the basis of what it had determined to be their proportionate share of utility usage for the month, which could be calculated by N Co. on the basis of each unit's square footage and the number of bedrooms and occupants, among other factors. In its final decision, PURA con- cluded that RUB violates the plain meaning of § 16-262e (c) because that provision expressly prohibits charging a tenant for utility services the tenant did not exclusively use. Nevertheless, PURA explained that N Co. could use the ''building in'' methodology instead and build the estimated cost of utilities into the fixed rent charged to tenants each month. N Co. filed an administrative appeal from PURA's decision, and the trial court remanded the case to PURA for further consideration of whether PURA's decision that RUB violates § 16-262e (c) conflicts with its conclusion that the ''building in'' approach does not similarly violate the statute. PURA issued a supplemental decision in which it reaffirmed its prior ruling. N Co. appealed from PURA's supplemental decision to the trial court, which dismissed the appeal and rendered judgment thereon. Thereafter, N Co. appealed from the trial court's jud

Civ.R. 12(B)(6) failure to state a claim wrongful termination clear public policy pregnancy discrimination temporal nexus

Federal Arbitration Act arbitration agreement motion for protective order motion to stay discovery motion to compel arbitration. - Trial court's denial of appellants' motions to stay discovery and for a protective order while appellants' motion to compel arbitration remained pending was immediately appealable under the Federal Arbitration Act, which applied to the arbitration agreements at issue, because the orders effectively denied appellants' motion to compel arbitration.

The plaintiffs, B, E, and M Co., sought to recover damages from the defendant car dealership for alleged breach of contract, fraud, theft, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA) (§ 42-110a et seq.) in connection with the purchase and sale of a plow truck. B, the managing member of M Co., testified that, on January 21, 2015, he signed an instalment contract on behalf of M Co. for the purchase of the plow truck. E, who was not a member of M Co., cosigned the contract, and B drove the truck off the lot. The plaintiffs did not submit this purported contract as an exhibit in the trial court. A few days later, B returned to the showroom at the request of D, one of the defendant's salesmen, to return the purchase documents so that corrections could be made. B was assured that the terms of the documents would not change. B and E claimed that they never signed any other documents in connection with the sale of the plow truck. Both parties, however, submitted into evidence an instalment contract dated January 26, 2015, which identified the plow truck as the purchased vehicle and listed an increased sales price, a higher loan interest rate, and a longer loan period than that which the plaintiffs alleged had been quoted by D and incorporated into the original contract. The plaintiffs claimed that the defendant forged their signatures on the January 26, 2015 contract documents. They also alleged that the window sticker on the plow truck, known as a Monroney sticker, did not reflect the vehicle's true price. D died sometime after the purchase of the plow truck and was never deposed in this action. G, the owner of the defendant, was called to testify at the trial by the plaintiffs. She stated that, although she did not have firsthand knowledge of the events surrounding the transaction, she had discussed it with D and there was no indication that there had been a deal or contract that reflected the terms the plaintiffs claimed were set forth in the Janu

Appellants failed to provide timely notice of termination, causing the lease agreement to automatically renew for the following month. The trial court did not err in adopting the magistrate's decision in favor of appellee and denying appellants' objection. Judgment affirmed.

Pursuant to statute (§ 14-227b (c)), when a person has been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug, the arresting officer ''shall prepare a report of the incident and shall mail or otherwise transmit . . . the report and a copy of the results of any chemical test [of such person's blood, breath or urine] to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days.'' Pursuant further to Volck v. Muzio (204 Conn. 507), an incident report prepared in accordance with § 14-227b (c) is admissible at a motor vehicle operator's license suspension hearing, as an exception to the hearsay rule, without the need for testimony from the arresting officer. The plaintiff, who had been arrested for operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, appealed to the trial court from the decision of the defendant, the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles, who temporarily suspended the plaintiff's license to operate a motor vehicle. At the plaintiff's license suspension hearing, the plaintiff's attor- ney objected to the admission of an incident report that was prepared by the arresting officer on the ground that it was not prepared and mailed to the Department of Motor Vehicles within three business days, as required by § 14-227b (c). The arresting officer had not completed the report until five business days after the plaintiff's arrest. The department hearing officer overruled the objection and admitted the report, which was the only evidence submitted at the hearing. On appeal to the trial court from the hearing officer's decision, that court dismissed the appeal, concluding that strict adherence with the preparation and mailing requirement of § 14-227b (c) was not necessary for the report to be admissible because the report bore indicia of trustworthiness and relia- bility. The Appellate Court affirmed the trial court's judgment, conclud- ing that, because § 14-227b (c) is not accompanied by any nega

Divorce final decree business valuation fair market value of business expert witnesses manifest weight spousal support tax responsibility. Affirmed. Plaintiff-appellant Adriana Granada appeals her final divorce decree, arguing that the trial court erred in its valuation of the family business and in accepting defendant-appellee Israel Rojas's expert witness in making such valuation. Granada also contests the trial court's decision to refrain from awarding spousal support as well as the trial court's failure to address any potential tax liability. Granada's assigned errors are without merit and overruled.

Workers' compensation—Total-temporary-disability compensation—R.C. 4123.511(K) requires Bureau of Workers' Compensation to recoup overpayment of total-temporary-disability compensation paid to an injured worker between time injured worker reached maximum medical improvement and date of termination of total-temporary-disability compensation—Court of appeals' judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed—State ex rel. Russell v. Indus. Comm. overruled.

POLITICAL SUBDIVSION IMMUMITY - APPELLATE REVIEW/CIVIL - DEFAMATION – POLITCAL SUBDIVISION EMPLOYEE IMMUNITY: The trial court erred by denying defendant political subdivision's motion for summary judgment on the basis that it was immune from liability where there remained no genuine issue of material fact that plaintiff was not an employee of defendant but an independent contractor: the plaintiff worked for a separate agency, received his paychecks from that agency, received no payments from defendant, was not required to sign off on defendant's policies but had to follow his agency's policies, and defendant did not have authority over the agency's employees. Where the trial court denies a motion in which a political subdivision or its employee seeks immunity, that order denies the benefit of an alleged immunity and is a final order under R.C. 2744.02(C) and, because a determination of immunity can be made prior to investing time, effort, and expense of courts, attorneys, parties, and witnesses, where only issues of law exist as to the issue of immunity, an appellate court may decide the appeal based on those issues of law. Defendant, a political subdivision that provided services to developmentally-disabled individuals, was engaging in a governmental function and was entitled to the general grant of immunity under R.C. 2744.02(A) and because plaintiff did not meet his burden of establishing that one of the exceptions to immunity in R.C. 2744.02(B) applied, defendant is immune from liability. While the tort of defamation may be either negligent or intentional, plaintiff alleged only intentional conduct, and political subdivisions are immune from intentional torts. The trial court erred in failing to find that the employees of the political subdivision were immune from liability where plaintiff failed to show that the employees' actions or omissions were manifestly outside the scope of their employment or that their acts or omissions were with malicious purpose, in b

CIVIL – The repetition of severance language in a root of title is general, and does not contain a specific identification of a recorded title transaction, where the language is subject to more than one interpretation and is not repeated throughout the relevant deed history. Further, a putative mineral owner is a proper party where the resolution of the lawsuit may impair or impede the party's ability to protect his or her interest.

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL - Ohio Civil Rights Commission final order finding of discrimination R.C. 4112.02(H) subject matter jurisdiction affirmatively plead jurisdictional facts notice pleading particularity charge of discrimination conciliation probate cause uncontested facts \no animals\ rule discriminatory statement R.C. 4112.02(H)(7) reasonable accommodation R.C. 4112.02(H)(19) constitutionality of process for determining damages R.C. 4112.051 Ohio Constitution, Article I, Section 5 standing.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant for the allegedly wrongful termination of his employment, in violation of public policy and the statute ((Rev. to 2015) § 31-51q) prohibiting an employer from retaliating against an employee for exercising constitutionally protected speech. The plaintiff, who had been employed by the defendant as a commercial truck driver, alleged that the defendant terminated his employment after he raised complaints concerning the safety of its vehicles. At trial, the plaintiff testified that, following the termination of his employment, he was out of work for approximately 6 months, the defendant had paid him at a rate of 46 cents per mile, he had driven a little more than 2000 miles per week, and he had driven approximately 230,000 miles during his 2 years with the defendant. The plaintiff's testimony was the sole evidence presented with respect to his lost wages, and the defendant offered no evidence to impeach his testimony. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff and awarded him $24,288 in damages for lost wages. The jury interrogatories indicated that the jury had found that the plaintiff was owed wages corresponding to 2200 miles per week at a rate of 46 cents per mile for a period of 24 weeks. The defendant filed a motion for remittitur, seeking to reduce the dam- ages award to zero. The defendant asserted that there was no evidence to support the damages award because the plaintiff had failed to provide tangible evidence or to testify with sufficient specificity as to his lost wages. The trial court denied the defendant's motion for remittitur, concluding that the plaintiff had presented sufficient evidence to support the damages award and that, in light of the specific figures in the jury interrogatories, the award was a reasonable estimate of the plaintiff's lost wages. The trial court thereafter rendered judgment for the plaintiff in accordance with the jury's verdict. The plaintiff appealed and the defen

Summary judgment on employer intentional tort press crushed hand

Motion to dismiss Civ.R. 12(B)(1) subject matter jurisdiction de novo review State Employment Relations Board exclusive jurisdiction R.C. Chapter 4117 collective bargaining agreement final and binding arbitration exclusive remedy claims arising from or depending on collective bargaining agreement breach of contract terms and conditions of employment. The claims raised in the instant matter do not fall outside the scope of the collective bargaining agreement, and thus the only remedy available to appellant was through the appropriate grievance procedure. The trial court properly found that it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction over appellant's claims.