Court Rulings

The trial court did not err in determining that the client of a staffing agency was the plaintiff-appellant's employer for purposes of workers' compensation immunity as the client had the right to control the manner and means in which appellant performed his day-to-day tasks. Moreover, the trial court properly granted summary judgment to the client-employer because it complied with the relevant workers' compensation statues, thereby entitling it to immunity under R.C. 4123.74.

Where the record contained competent, credible evidence to support the Unemployment Compensation Review Commission's determination that an employee had been discharged for just cause, the commission's decision denying the discharged employee's claim for unemployment benefits is not unlawful, unreasonable, or against the manifest weight of the evidence, and the trial court did not err in affirming the denial.

motion for summary judgment, breach of contract, declaratory judgment, contract interpretation, intent of the parties, business partnership termination agreement

CIVIL – oil and gas lease failure to join indispensable parties production covenant release termination condition precedent production in paying quantities statute of limitations, R.C. 2305.041.

The respondent attorney appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court suspending him from the practice of law for one year. The respondent, who was admitted to practice law in both Maine and Con- necticut, had been involved in civil litigation in Maine involving water- front property that he owned in joint tenancy with several members of his family. After the trial court rendered judgment in that action, the respondent appealed as a self-represented party to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, which affirmed the judgment of the Maine Superior Court and concluded that the respondent had engaged in misconduct while prosecuting the appeal. Accordingly, sanctions were imposed against the respondent in the form of an award of attorney's fees and costs. Subsequently, Maine's Board of Overseers of the Bar suspended the respondent from practicing law in Maine for one year on the ground that he had violated Maine's Rules of Professional Conduct. Thereafter, in the present case, the petitioner, the Chief Disciplinary Counsel, filed an application seeking commensurate disciplinary action against the respondent pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 2-39). Subse- quently, the trial court found that commensurate discipline was appro- priate with respect to the respondent's Connecticut law license and ordered the respondent suspended from the practice of law in Connecti- cut for one year. On appeal, the respondent claimed, inter alia, that because he was a self-represented party at the time he engaged in the alleged misconduct that led to his suspension in Maine, the disciplinary action against his law license in Maine, and by extension, in Connecticut, violated his right as a citizen to petition the government for a redress of grievances as protected by the first amendment to the federal constitu- tion and violated his rights to due process and equal protection under the fourteenth amendment to the federal constitution. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in

CIVIL - definition of employee, independent contractor unemployment benefits R.C. 4141.282 just cause fraud right to control work OAC 4141-3-05(B) affirmed trial court's finding applicant was an independent contractor.

Although an employee's failure to participate in vocational rehabilitation can constitute voluntary abandonment of the workforce, here the Industrial Commission had some evidence to support its conclusion that the claimant's work-related injuries had rendered him permanently and totally disabled and thus obviated the need for vocational analysis. The magistrate's findings of fact and ultimate recommendation are adopted, and the requested writ of mandamus is denied. Objection overruled writ denied.

The court denies relator's objection to the magistrate's decision determining the attorney fee amount and allocation. The commission's fee controversy letter cited to the evidence upon which it relied in making the determination and there is some evidence in the record to support the determination. It is apparent from the commission's fee controversy letter that the commission considered the criteria outlined in OAC 4121-3-24 in making the determination. Writ of mandamus denied.

CONTRACTS – LANDLORD-TENANT: The trial court's judgment in favor of a commercial building owner against its tenant was not against the manifest weight of the evidence where the tenant breached the lease by failing to transfer a liquor permit to the owner at the termination of the parties' lease as required under the lease's clear and unambiguous terms. The trial court did not err by concluding that a contract was not unconscionable where the party asserting unconscionability of the contract failed to prove that the contract was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable.

Trial court did not err in ruling on appellant's motion to compel or in its determination that appellant's statistical evidence was not probative of discrimination.

Conciliator did not exceed his powers in adopting union's final offer pertaining to overtime eligibility under collective bargaining agreement where terms were more stringent than FLSA minimum standards. Township waived argument that conciliator exceeded his powers by adopting terms for health insurance benefits that violated R.C. 505.60(A) where township failed to raise objection during conciliation and itself proposed final offer that suffered same infirmity.

Petition for certificate of qualification for employment R.C. 2953.25 abuse of discretion. The trial court abused its discretion in denying the appellant's petition for a certificate of qualification for employment without setting forth its findings.

Trial court did not err when it dismissed appellant's appeal of a letter of determination on reconsideration issued by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission.

The trial court did not err in entering summary judgment against the appellant on its complaint alleging breach of a written employment contract and a subsequent oral agreement. Under the terms of the written employment contract, the appellant, a law firm, was entitled to compensation if the appellee, a former employee, left the firm and took with him a client who was not a "direct client referral" of the employee. The uncontroverted evidence established that the client at issue was a "direct client referral." Therefore, the trial court correctly held that the appellant was not entitled to compensation as a matter of law. The trial court also correctly held that an alleged subsequent oral agreement between the parties providing for the appellant to be compensated was precluded by an integration clause in the written contract. Finally, the trial court did not err in denying reconsideration of its summary judgment ruling. Nothing in the appellee's testimony during a sanctions hearing provided any basis for reconsideration. Judgment affirmed. (Froelich, J., dissenting.)

Summary judgment affirmed that employee-alleged severance agreement under statute of frauds did not constitute legally enforceable contract. Nor was reliance on contract existence or injury therefor supported by the evidence.

CIVIL - arbitration award application to confirm no motion to vacate, modify, or correct filed within three-month statutory limitations period objection to application formal aspect of the award waived venue R.C. 2711.16 trial court must determine venue.

The trial court correctly ordered that $10,000 disbursed from appellant's 401(k) plan and held in trust by his attorney be paid to Ace Sprinkler, Inc.'s receiver for distribution to an Ace employee and to appellant's former partner in the business. The funds were not protected by R.C. 2329.66, and appellant was unjustly enriched by the funds, which came from the employee's and partner's payroll deductions. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court correctly confined its review to the record as filed by the Ohio Civil Rights Commission (OCRC) related to a charge of discrimination against appellant's former employer. The trial court did not err in applying the "unlawful, irrational, arbitrary or capricious" standard of review to the OCRC's decision to dismiss appellant's charge of discrimination or in finding that the OCRC's decision was not unlawful, irrational, arbitrary or capricious. Appellant asserted that an unlawful discriminatory practice occurred on December 21, 2017, when her former employer filed a brief in a prior case asserting that further review of appellant's termination was moot because her teaching license had been permanently revoked. The OCRC determined that the former employer's argument was not a "discrete and new act of harm" to appellant over which it had jurisdiction, and the trial court correctly found sufficient justification for the OCRC's decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing or issue a complaint. Judgment affirmed.

Nieto worked for Clark's Market, Inc. (the Market) and accrued vacation time pursuant to the vacation policy in the Market's employee handbook. The handbook stated that an employee is entitled to payment for accrued but unused vacation time if she voluntarily resigns and gives at least two weeks' notice, but if the Market discharges an employee for any reason or for no reason, or if the employee fails to give two weeks' notice before quitting, the employee forfeits all earned vacation pay benefits. The Market discharged Nieto and refused to pay her for accrued but unused vacation time pursuant to its policy. Nieto sued for payment for accrued vacation time, alleging that the Market's policy violated CRS §§ 8-4-101(14)(a)(III) and -121 of the Colorado Wage Claim Act (CWCA). The district court granted the Market's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. On appeal, Nieto argued that CRS § 8-4-121 voids the Market's policy because her accrued vacation pay was earned and determinable, so she has a right to payment for vacation time under the CWCA, and the Market's policy is an illegal waiver of her right to payment. CRS § 8-4-101(14)(a)(III) explicitly includes vacation pay in the definition of wages, but it also provides that no amount is to be considered wages until it is earned, vested, and determinable. Further, nothing in the CWCA creates a substantive right to payment for accrued but unused vacation time rather, an employee's right to such compensation is determined by the parties' employment agreement. Here, the agreement conditioned payment for accrued but unused vacation time, and Nieto did not meet those conditions. Therefore, she did not assert a plausible claim that she was entitled to accrued but unused vacation time. Further, the anti-waiver provision does not create any substantive entitlement to payment independent of the parties' agreement it only applies to rights conferred by the CWCA, which looks to the parties' agreement as the sole potential

Objections to magistrate's decision overruled and writ of mandamus denied because employer failed to show it had a clear legal right to reimbursement of disabled workers' relief fund benefit payments, or that BWC had a clear legal duty to reimburse those payments, when both the employer and BWC operated under a mutual mistake of fact that permanent total disability compensation and disabled workers' relief fund benefits were being paid at the proper rates at the time the payments were made.

EXTRAORDINARY WRIT - Habeas corpus failure to make attempt to comply with requirements for maintaining action R.C. 2969.25(A) list of prior civil actions against government entity or employee inability to retain necessary inormation is not a sufficient excuse.

CONTRACTS – CONVERSION – R.C. 4113.15: The trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant employer on plaintiff former employee's breach-of-contract claim, because no contract was created due to a lack of consideration where the employer had gifted a raffle ticket to the former employee while she was still in its employ to enter an employer-sponsored raffle for a cruise package, which she won. The trial court properly entered summary judgment in favor of defendant employer on plaintiff former employee's claim alleging a violation of Ohio's Prompt Pay Act where the prize associated with the former employee's winning raffle ticket did not meet the definition of a "fringe benefit" as set forth in R.C. 4113.15(D). The trial court erred in entering summary judgment in favor of defendant employer on plaintiff former employee's conversion claim on the basis that the former employee did not have a right to possess the prize attached to the winning raffle ticket because she had not fulfilled the condition that she still be employed by the employer when she took the cruise, which the employer alleged was attached to the gift of the raffle ticket for the cruise package, because there remained a genuine issue of material fact as to what conditions, if any, were attached to the gift of the raffle ticket.

CIVIL - CBA teachers termination hazing R.C. 3319.16 sole remedy referee petition to enforce arbitration litigation untimely appeal of decision statutory proceeding prevails over conflicting provisions in CBA not arbitrable even if timely moot issues.

Workers' Compensation subject matter jurisdiction arising out of employment medical negligence

Property owner appeals the decision granting summary judgment to the defendants, a township and county. Property owner sought writ to compel defendants to enforce zoning resolution and state laws concerning alleged junkyard abutting the property owner's land. Zoning resolution defined "junkyard" as a site where inoperable vehicles would be stored for more than 30 days. Property owner established genuine issues of fact for trial concerning whether a junkyard existed, and entitlement to writ, through affidavits of witnesses who observed inoperable or wrecked vehicle stored on the neighboring land for years.