Court Rulings

A subsequent, summarized order for publication does not restart the time to appeal a termination of parental rights. An untimely notice of appeal leaves the Supreme Court without jursidiction to consider the appeal.

CIVIL - summary judgment loss of consortium bodily injury does not include nonphysical harm R.C. Chapter 2744 political subdivision tort liability board of education employment relationship employees of political subdivision malice defamation qualified privilege educators parents duty to ensure student safety and welfare intentional infliction of emotional distress civil conspiracy unlawful act hazing harassment.

Trial court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee employer in wrongful discharge in violation of public policy claim where clarity and jeopardy elements were met. The jeopardy element was met because the clear public policy articulated in R.C. Chapter 4115 protects not only the society's interest in supporting collective bargaining, but also the substantive right of employees to be paid prevailing wage, and the remedies available in R.C. Chapter 4115 are inadequate to protect such substantive right of appellant employee.

The decision of the Ohio Department of Job and Family Services that appellant was not entitled to unemployment compensation, because she quit her job without just cause, was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. The evidence supported the finding that appellant unjustifiably quit her job before giving her employer a chance to resolve her employment problems. Judgment affirmed.

2021 COA 125. No. 20CA0950. Johnson Nathan Strohe, P.C. v. MEP Engineering, Inc. Limitation of Liability Clause—Contracts—Ambiguity. Johnson Nathan Strohe, P.C. (architect) designed a building and contracted with MEP Engineering, Inc. (engineer) to provide mechanical, plumbing, and electrical engineering services for the building. The contract contained a clause limiting the engineer's liability to $2,000 or twice the engineer's fee, whichever was greater. The architect alleged that as the building was nearing completion and the engineer was close to completing its work, the owner and architect discovered substantial problems with the building's heating and hot water systems. The architect also alleged that the engineer admitted it erred and then designed and implemented repairs. Additional problems were subsequently discovered, and the architect hired another firm for those repairs. The building owner initiated an arbitration proceeding against the architect regarding the heating and hot water systems, and the arbitrator awarded the owner $1.2 million in damages. The architect then sued the engineer for negligence and moved under CRCP 56(h) for a legal determination of the validity of the limitation of liability provision, claiming it was too vague and ambiguous to be enforceable. The district court found the provision unambiguous and enforceable. The engineer moved for leave to deposit twice its contractual fee plus interest into the court's registry and for dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the motion. On appeal, the architect argued that the district court erred by concluding that the limitation of liability provision was clear and unambiguous. Here, the district court did not review this provision in its entirety, did not give effect to all parts of the provision, and did not address the clause stating that "such liability shall be limited . . . as consequential damages." This clause is subject to several interpretations for example, it could

2021 COA 125. No. 20CA0950. Johnson Nathan Strohe, P.C. v. MEP Engineering, Inc. Limitation of Liability Clause—Contracts—Ambiguity. Johnson Nathan Strohe, P.C. (architect) designed a building and contracted with MEP Engineering, Inc. (engineer) to provide mechanical, plumbing, and electrical engineering services for the building. The contract contained a clause limiting the engineer's liability to $2,000 or twice the engineer's fee, whichever was greater. The architect alleged that as the building was nearing completion and the engineer was close to completing its work, the owner and architect discovered substantial problems with the building's heating and hot water systems. The architect also alleged that the engineer admitted it erred and then designed and implemented repairs. Additional problems were subsequently discovered, and the architect hired another firm for those repairs. The building owner initiated an arbitration proceeding against the architect regarding the heating and hot water systems, and the arbitrator awarded the owner $1.2 million in damages. The architect then sued the engineer for negligence and moved under CRCP 56(h) for a legal determination of the validity of the limitation of liability provision, claiming it was too vague and ambiguous to be enforceable. The district court found the provision unambiguous and enforceable. The engineer moved for leave to deposit twice its contractual fee plus interest into the court's registry and for dismissal with prejudice. The district court granted the motion. On appeal, the architect argued that the district court erred by concluding that the limitation of liability provision was clear and unambiguous. Here, the district court did not review this provision in its entirety, did not give effect to all parts of the provision, and did not address the clause stating that "such liability shall be limited . . . as consequential damages." This clause is subject to several interpretations for example, it could

Final orders R.C. 2505.02(B)(1) Civ.R. 54(B). The trial court's order granting the defendant's motion for partial summary judgment is not a final, appealable order under R.C. 2505.02(B)(1). In its order, the trial court found that the defendant could not be liable for its physicians' conduct, but the issue of whether the defendant is liable for the conduct of its nonphysician employees remains pending. The case involves a single claim against a single party, and Civ.R. 54(B) does not apply to transform the order into a final order despite the trial court's use of the language "no just reason for delay."

Trial court did not err in granting appellee/employer's motion for judgment on the pleadings as to appellant/employee's promissory estoppel claim where appellant's amended complaint failed to allege appellee made specific promises of future job security upon which appellant reasonably relied in leaving her former employment and accepting employment with appellee. It is not reasonable to construe vague and indefinite representations regarding appellant's qualifications and ability to succeed in the position as a clear and unambiguous promise of future job security. Judgment affirmed.

Workers' compensation—Application of Bureau of Workers' Compensation formulary guidelines under Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.3 and application of Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.7 to a self-insuring employer's termination of payment for narcotic and muscle-relaxant prescriptions for allowed conditions pursuant to Ohio Adm.Code 4123-6-21.1(I)(4)—Court of appeals' judgment granting limited writ vacated—Writ granted in part.

The defendant employer G Co. appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which reversed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commissioner concluding that G Co.'s workers' compensation insurance policy, issued by the defendant L Co., was still in effect on March 1, 2016, the date on which the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury while at work. In September, 2015, L Co. issued G Co. a workers' compensation insurance policy. In October, 2015, L Co. issued a cancellation notice with an effective cancellation date of Novem- ber 3, 2015, and filed the cancellation notice with the National Council on Compensation Insurance. In February, 2016, L Co. sent G Co. an endorsement to the insurance policy. In April, 2016, G Co. was sent a prorated portion of its previously paid premium. The plaintiff filed a workers' compensation claim against G Co. in May, 2016, and L Co. denied coverage. After a hearing, the commissioner found that coverage was in place on the date of the plaintiff's injury and that the cancellation notice did not comply with certain statutory (§ 31-321) requirements. L Co. appealed to the board, which reversed the commissioner's decision. Held that the board properly determined that the insurance policy was cancelled effectively on November 3, 2015, and that there was no insur- ance coverage on the date of the plaintiff's injury: L Co.'s electronic notice of the cancellation to NCCI was sufficient to comply with the requirements that insurance companies notify the chairman of the Work- ers' Compensation Commission of cancellations pursuant to statute (§ 31-248), as § 31-248 authorized the commission to utilize NCCI to collect notices electronically of policy cancellations and was what the legislature intended when it amended § 31-248; moreover, the fact that G Co. may have believed that it still had insurance because L Co. did not refund the premium until after the date of the plaintiff's injury and sent inconsistent lett

The trial court did not abuse its discretion when it upheld as supported by reliable, probative and substantial evidence the determination of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Board that BMW did not establish good cause for vetoing a proposed franchise transfer. Judgment affirmed.

CONVERSION – DAMAGES – MARKET VALUE - EXPERT TESTIMONY : The trial court did not err in its determination that the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness was sufficient to establish, beyond mere speculation, the value of damages for conversion of plaintiff's ring and brooch. The trial court erred when it determined that plaintiff's failure to present expert testimony on the value of her diamond bracelet precluded a recovery of damages for that item, because lay testimony, or a combination of lay and expert testimony, may be enough to prove damages under certain circumstances.

CONVERSION – DAMAGES – MARKET VALUE - EXPERT TESTIMONY : The trial court did not err in its determination that the testimony of plaintiff's expert witness was sufficient to establish, beyond mere speculation, the value of damages for conversion of plaintiff's ring and brooch. The trial court erred when it determined that plaintiff's failure to present expert testimony on the value of her diamond bracelet precluded a recovery of damages for that item, because lay testimony, or a combination of lay and expert testimony, may be enough to prove damages under certain circumstances.

Attorneys—Misconduct—Violation of the Rules of Professional Conduct—Failing to register an employment relationship with a suspended attorney with disciplinary counsel or to obtain acknowledgement of the relationship from disciplinary counsel before it began—Failing to notify a client that the disqualified attorney will work on the client's case—Public reprimand.

The plaintiff appealed from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which affirmed the decision of the Workers' Compensation Commis- sioner dismissing the plaintiff's claim for certain disability benefits. While working for the defendant employer, the plaintiff, who had a history of cardiac disease, among other conditions, and who was stand- ing on a level surface, became lightheaded, passed out, fell backward, and hit her head on the ground. The plaintiff was then taken to a hospital, where she suffered cardiac arrest and was treated for her cardiac episode and head trauma. In denying the plaintiff's claim for benefits, the commis- sioner determined that the plaintiff's head injury did not arise out of her employment but, rather, was caused by her cardiac condition, and, therefore, was not a compensable injury. After the board upheld the commissioner's decision, the plaintiff appealed to the Appellate Court, which reversed the board's decision and remanded the case with direc- tion to sustain the plaintiff's appeal. In doing so, the Appellate Court relied on this court's decision in Savage v. St. Aeden's Church (122 Conn. 343), in which this court concluded that a head injury sustained by an employee at his or her workplace due to a fall caused by the employee's purely personal medical condition, i.e., an idiopathic fall, was per se compensable. On the granting of certification, the defendant employer and the defendant insurer appealed from the Appellate Court's judgment to this court. Held that this court overruled its decision in Savage to the extent that it held that an idiopathic fall on a level surface occurring during the course of employment is compensable as a matter of law, and, accordingly, this court reversed the Appellate Court's judgment with direction to affirm the board's decision upholding the commission- er's denial of the plaintiff's claim for benefits: because Savage was predicated on a misapplication of prior precedent and out of step wit

The trial court did not err in granting YSU's motion for summary judgment on Hughes' claim of employment discrimination as Hughes failed to demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination.

Credit union reserved the right to change the terms of its membership agreement, which it did by adding a provision to arbitrate disputes. By maintaining his account after this term was implemented, appellant-credit union member manifested his assent to the arbitration provision. The arbitration provision in the membership agreement was not unconscionable. Judgment affirmed.

COMMUNITY SCHOOL – JURSIDICTION – STANDING – FAITHLESS SERVANT DOCTRINE – OHIO CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT – STRICT LIABILITY – VOID PUBLIC CONTRACTS: The trial court did not err in concluding that contracts with a community school's superintendent's family violated R.C. 2921.42's prohibition against public officials having a personal interest in a public contract where defendants superintendent and family failed to prove that any exception applied.The trial court did not err in concluding that the attorney general had statutory standing, under R.C. 2117.42, to sue defendants community school superintendent and her family to recover public funds. The trial court did not err in concluding that, under the faithless servant doctrine, the superintendent and her husband should forfeit their employment wages. The trial court erred in concluding that the superintendent and her husband were liable for treble damages under the Ohio Corrupt Practices Act where the illegal contracts did not constitute a pattern within the meaning of the statute. The trial court did not err in concluding that the superintendent is strictly liable for the illegal contracts with her husband and daughter where she received public funds under color of office and was responsible for the school's expenditures. The trial court did not err in concluding that the superintendent's daughter should return all income received under her illegal contracts where, on appeal, defendants provided no argument to the contrary.

CIVIL - credit card default summary judgment cross-examine affiant Civ.R. 56(F) no motion for extension no affidavit hearsay business records exception evidence sufficient to support summary judgment.

CIVIL – domestic relations divorce termination of marriage trial court erred and abused its discretion with respect to its orders allocating marital assets and liabilities trial court improperly declared a de facto date of marriage R.C. 3105.171(A) evidence does not support a finding of a clear and bilateral termination of the parties' marriage trial court did not make sufficient findings of fact to support its conclusions regarding the division of marital property R.C. 3105.171(G) trial court improperly reserved jurisdiction over the division of assets and liabilities R.C. 3105.171(I) trial court improperly ordered marital assets to be liquidated at public auction trial court utilized an exhibit that was not offered or admitted at trial trial court failed to dispose of all assets and liabilities R.C. 3105.171(B) trial court erred and abused its discretion with respect to its order awarding spousal support to Appellee failure to properly consider the R.C. 3105.18(C)(1) factors in sufficient detail improper property division as part of the award of spousal support R.C. 3105.18(A) spousal support award inability to pay reversed and remanded.

Negligence small claims manifest weight competent and credible evidence comparative negligence damages abuse of discretion App.R. 16. The trial court's determination that plaintiff was comparatively at fault for damages to his vehicle while driving through a construction zone was supported by competent and credible evidence. The trial court's damages award was not an abuse of discretion.

The plaintiff property owner sought a permanent injunction against the defendants, the Commissioner of Energy and Environmental Protection and the Secretary of the Office of Policy and Management, prohibiting them from taking further action in the redevelopment of a state park and for an order precluding them from denying her alleged statutory (§ 22a-16) right to intervene in public hearings related to the redevelop- ment project. The plaintiff filed a complaint with the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection, seeking to intervene in the public hearings on the project pursuant to the applicable statute (§ 22a-19) and to have the opportunity to present expert witnesses on her behalf in opposition to the conclusions of the environmental impact evaluation, as well as seeking to cross-examine the department's witnesses and provide rebuttal expert testimony. The department denied that there was a proceeding in which the plaintiff could intervene. The plaintiff brought an administrative appeal, in which she claimed, inter alia, that the redevelopment plan would have irreversible environmental impacts on the area and, because her property was close to the park, the redevel- opment would affect her special personal or legal interests. The trial court subsequently dismissed the action on the ground of sovereign immunity. Held: 1. The plaintiff could not prevail on her claim that the trial court erred in determining that she failed to allege facts sufficient to establish her statutory standing under § 22a-16, as her complaint failed to articulate a colorable claim of unreasonable pollution, impairment, or destruction of the environment; the complaint contained only two causes of action, alleging that each defendant violated § 22a-16, and the complaint's focus was entirely on how the plaintiff's rights were violated when the depart- ment denied her petition for intervention, and alleged a procedural violation without alleging facts that, if proven, would support a f

The trial court did not abuse its discretion in finding that reliable, probative and substantive evidence supported the Ohio Real Estate Commission's adjudication order that appellant violated R.C. 4735.18(A)(6) and (A)(9) and its decision was in accordance with the law. The evidence supported finding that appellant failed to timely respond to the investigation of the Ohio Division of Real Estate and Professional Licensing where after sixteen months since the issuance of the complaint and shortly after a subpoena was issued, did appellant provide response to the division's investigation. Further, the evidence supported during the course of the investigation, it became evident that appellant failed to notify the superintendent that his residential address had changed, twice, within a reasonable amount of time. Also, appellant failed to cite to the record to support his defense that an inaccurate charge to the property owner reflected on the owner statement was due to a contract dispute. Finally, the determination of the appropriate sanction for the violations is strictly for the commission to determine as authorized by law and therefore appellant's due process rights were not violated when the commission revoked his license. All assignments of error are overruled. Case affirmed.

The plaintiff D sought to recover damages from the defendant L Co., her insurer, for underinsured motorist benefits, and from the defendant M, for M's alleged negligence in connection with a motor vehicle accident involving D. D's husband, C, joined the action as a party plaintiff more than two years after D commenced the action. D entered into a voluntary arbitration agreement with L Co., and, after an evidentiary hearing, the arbitrator awarded D a certain amount of damages in underinsured motorist benefits. D filed a demand for a trial de novo with the trial court, which was denied. Additionally, M moved for summary judgment on C's claims against him on the ground that they were barred by the two year statute of limitations (§ 52-584) for negligence claims. The trial court granted M's motion for summary judgment. D and C filed a joint appeal to this court challenging the trial court's denial of D's demand for a trial de novo and the judgment for M on C's complaint. Held: 1. The trial court did not err in denying D's demand for a trial de novo following the arbitrator's decision on her claims against L Co., as the parties entered into a voluntary arbitration; the trial court determined that the submission was voluntary and unrestricted, and, because D voluntarily submitted her claims against L Co. to arbitration, any review of the arbitrator's decision was governed by a statute (§ 52-418) under which there was no right to a trial de novo, and the legal authority pursuant to which D argued that she had an absolute right to a trial de novo pertained to compulsory, not voluntary, arbitration. 2. The trial court did not err in rendering summary judgment in favor of M on the ground that C's claims were barred by the two year statute of limitations in § 52-584 because C suffered actionable harm on the date of the accident and he did not file his complaint against M within two years from that date; in arguing that his claims were not subject to the two year statute of li

Mandamus clear and convincing evidence summary judgment Civ.R. 56 de novo review R.C. 149.43 public record attorney-client privilege waiver disclosure. Appellee did not waive attorney-client privilege by disclosing the investigative report to its employees. The records sought by appellant in his public-records request were excepted from disclosure under Ohio's Public Records Act, and the trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of appellee.