Court Rulings

In this divorce action, the husband appeals the trial court's distribution of the marital estate, denial of the husband's request for alimony in futuro, grant to the wife of sole decision-making authority over the parties' minor child, and grants to the wife of attorney's fees and discretionary costs. The husband, who received disability benefits for a prior mental health diagnosis, also appeals the trial court's finding that he was voluntarily unemployed and the court's denial of his motion to strike certain expert witness testimony. Having determined that an unspecified portion of the discretionary costs awarded to the wife for fees related to three expert witnesses, one vocational rehabilitation consultant and two psychiatrists, were not allowable under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 54.04(2), we vacate the trial court's award of discretionary costs as to the fees for these three experts' work with the exception of $2,070.00 in demonstrably allowable fees paid to the vocational consultant. We remand for a specific determination of the fees for these three experts allowable, if any, as an award of discretionary costs to the wife under Rule 54.04(2). We also modify the trial court's award of discretionary costs to the wife for court reporter fees to reduce them slightly pursuant to Rule 54.04(2). We otherwise affirm the trial court's judgment. We deny the wife's request for an award of attorney's fees on appeal.

The defendants, an employer and its third-party administrator appealed to this court from the decision of the Compensation Review Board, which reversed in part the Workers' Compensation Commissioner's decision approving a form 36 filed by the defendants. During the course of his employment as a custodian, the plaintiff sustained a compensable injury and entered into two voluntary agreements with his employer. The plaintiff thereafter sustained another injury and two voluntary agree- ments were approved with respect to that injury. Subsequently, the defendants filed a form 36 seeking to discontinue or to reduce the plaintiff's workers' compensation benefits, asserting that the plaintiff had a work capacity and had reached maximum medical improvement. After formal hearings on the form 36 and on the plaintiff's entitlement to total disability benefits pursuant to statute (§ 31-307), the commissioner approved the form 36. The plaintiff appealed to the board, claiming inter alia, that the commissioner incorrectly concluded that further medical care of his compensable injuries would be palliative when that issue was not noticed for or litigated during the formal hearings. The plaintiff further claimed that the commissioner applied an improper standard in determining that his current disability was the result of preexisting, noncompensable injuries and, thus, not compensable under § 31-307. The board concluded that substantial evidence supported the commis- sioner's decision approving the form 36. The board, however, stated that it was persuaded that the manner in which the commissioner addressed this evidence impaired the plaintiff's right to a fair hearing. Accordingly, the board vacated the majority of the commissioner's con- clusions and remanded the matter for further proceedings. The board subsequently denied the plaintiff's motion for articulation or reconsider- ation in which he argued that a de novo trial before a different commis- sioner was required on remand, a

This appeal arises from an action to recover personal property. The plaintiff, who is the former fiancé of the defendant, claimed the defendant retained some of her personal property after he forced her to vacate the premises where they previously resided. This action was initiated with the filing of a civil warrant in the general sessions court. After the general sessions court awarded the plaintiff a judgment in the amount of $7,500, the defendant appealed to the circuit court. Following a trial, the circuit court awarded the plaintiff a judgment of $4,745.30. This appeal followed. Finding no error, we affirm.

The trial court did not err in granting employer's motion to dismiss due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction in an appeal brought pursuant to R.C. 4123.512. Although the Commission determined that an intervening injury broke the causal connection between the original industrial injury and the new non-industrial injury, the decision of the Commission expressly stated that claimant was not forever barred from seeking future benefits under the original allowed claim. Therefore, the issue at hand related to the extent of claimant's disability, not his right to participate in the worker's compensation fund, and the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. Judgment affirmed.

Employee Frederick Russell was working for Employer Aluma-Forrn, Inc. in January 2018 when he sustained an injury to his left shoulder and neck. He reported the injury and received treatment from an orthopedic specialist whose conservative approach to his case included an MRI, an EMG, physical therapy, and referrals to a neurosurgeon and a pain management specialist. Though Employee reported continued pain despite these efforts, his medical providers opined that they could find no objective basis for his reported syrnptoms and believed them unrelated to his work injury. Employee later sought treatment from a different, unauthorized orthopedic specialist who performed surgeiy on his shoulder and thereby discovered and repaired a previously undiagnosed torn labrum. Employee sought compensation, and after considering the proof, the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims held that Employee had established that his injury was caused by his workplace incident, that Ernployer was liable for his medical expenses including those incurred for unauthorized treatrnent, and that Employee was entitled to both permanent partial disability benefits and temporary total disability benefits. Employer appealed, arguing that the trial court erred on all three issues. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for consideration and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

public record R.C. 149.43 court of claims R.C. 2743.75 attorney-client privilege waiver R.C. 149.43(A)(1)(p) R.C. 149.43(A)(7) R.C. 149.43(A)(8) personal privacy. Requester sought all documents from a meeting of respondent trustees. Respondent redacted portions of the records as alleged confidential attorney-client communications or confidential personal information. The special master found that most of the emails consisted of cover letters, pleasantries, scheduling, and other non-legal information. With few exceptions, the special master found respondent failed to show that redacted email content fell squarely within the common-law attorney-client privilege. The special master further found that one email string had been disclosed to third parties, waiving the attorney-client privilege. The special master further found that redacted information from an employee bio sheet went beyond the four names that were the only items falling squarely within the "designated public service worker residential and familial information" exemption defined in R.C. 149.43(A)(8).