Court Rulings

The defendant appeals the trial court's judgment finding that he violated a reckless driving city ordinance, Metropolitan Code of Law § 12.68.180, when he drove 65 miles per hour in a 45-mile-per-hour zone. During trial, Metropolitan Government of Nashville & Davidson County, Tennessee ("Metro") presented evidence regarding the defendant's speed to support its allegation that the defendant was driving recklessly. Following proof of the defendant's excessive speed, the trial court found that the defendant had failed to rebut the presumption created by ordinance that he was driving in such a way as to demonstrate "a wilful and wanton disregard for the safety of persons or property." The defendant challenges the constitutionality of such ordinance, which provides a rebuttable presumption that the defendant was driving recklessly when driving at least fifteen miles per hour over the speed limit. However, the defendant's issues concerning constitutionality of the ordinance were not properly raised or decided by the trial court, and upon our determination that the ordinance is not facially unconstitutional, we hold that the defendant has waived his issues regarding the constitutionality of the ordinance. Upon our review of the record, we affirm the trial court's judgment that the defendant violated Metropolitan Code of Law § 12.68.180.

The magistrate correctly determined Worthington did not show a clear legal right to health insurance coverage during her work as an independent contractor and did not show either that OPERS has a clear legal duty to provide such benefits or that The Ohio State University has a clear legal duty to remedy the gap in healthcare coverage for her. Writ of mandamus denied.

The plaintiff insurance company brought the present declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking a determination that it was not obligated to defend and indemnify the defendant T in connection with a civil action brought against T by the defendant M. M's civil action stemmed from an incident in which he sustained injuries after T assaulted him. After the incident, T entered a plea of nolo contendere in a separate criminal prosecution to the charge of first degree assault. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in the present action, claiming that T's plea of nolo contendere relieved it of its duty to defend and indemnify T in M's civil action under a homeowners insurance policy issued by the plaintiff to T's mother in light of a criminal acts exclusion in that policy. Thereafter, the District Court, pursuant to statute (§ 51-199b (d)) and the rules of practice (§ 82-1), certified to this court the question of whether a plea of nolo contendere could be used by an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action to trigger a criminal acts exclusion to coverage. Held that T's plea of nolo contendere was inadmissible in the plaintiff's declar- atory judgment action to prove the occurrence of a criminal act and, therefore, could not be used to trigger the criminal acts exclusion of the homeowners insurance policy: under this state's common law, as codified in the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§ 4-8A (a) (2)), a plea of nolo contendere generally cannot be admitted in a subsequent proceed- ing to prove the occurrence of criminal act, and the court's holding in this case was harmonious with case law from numerous jurisdictions; moreover, the purpose of the plea of nolo contendere is to facilitate the efficient disposition of criminal cases by encouraging plea bar- gaining, such a plea potentially allows the criminal defendant to avoid the cost of litigating both criminal and civil cases and to consolid

The plaintiff insurance company brought the present declaratory judgment action in the United States District Court for the District of Connecticut, seeking a determination that it was not obligated to defend and indemnify the defendant T in connection with a civil action brought against T by the defendant M. M's civil action stemmed from an incident in which he sustained injuries after T assaulted him. After the incident, T entered a plea of nolo contendere in a separate criminal prosecution to the charge of first degree assault. The plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment in the present action, claiming that T's plea of nolo contendere relieved it of its duty to defend and indemnify T in M's civil action under a homeowners insurance policy issued by the plaintiff to T's mother in light of a criminal acts exclusion in that policy. Thereafter, the District Court, pursuant to statute (§ 51-199b (d)) and the rules of practice (§ 82-1), certified to this court the question of whether a plea of nolo contendere could be used by an insurance company in a declaratory judgment action to trigger a criminal acts exclusion to coverage. Held that T's plea of nolo contendere was inadmissible in the plaintiff's declar- atory judgment action to prove the occurrence of a criminal act and, therefore, could not be used to trigger the criminal acts exclusion of the homeowners insurance policy: under this state's common law, as codified in the Connecticut Code of Evidence (§ 4-8A (a) (2)), a plea of nolo contendere generally cannot be admitted in a subsequent proceed- ing to prove the occurrence of criminal act, and the court's holding in this case was harmonious with case law from numerous jurisdictions; moreover, the purpose of the plea of nolo contendere is to facilitate the efficient disposition of criminal cases by encouraging plea bar- gaining, such a plea potentially allows the criminal defendant to avoid the cost of litigating both criminal and civil cases and to consolid