Court Rulings

The plaintiffs, L and her husband, sought to recover damages from the defendant physician, Z, her employer, and a hospital for, inter alia, injuries L sustained during a colonoscopy procedure performed by Z. The plaintiffs failed to attach an opinion letter written and signed by a similar health care provider to their original complaint, as was required by the applicable statute (§ 52-190a), and the defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint for that failure. In response, the plaintiffs filed an amended complaint as of right pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 10-59), and attached such an opinion letter. The amended complaint was filed and the opinion letter was dated after the expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Following oral argument, the trial court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction as a result of the plaintiffs' failure to attach an opinion letter to their original complaint. On the plaintiffs' appeal to this court, held that the trial court did not err in its decision to grant the defendants' motions to dismiss: the plaintiffs failed to comply with the requirement set forth in § 52-190a (a), as they did not attach an opinion letter to their original complaint, obtain an opinion letter prior to filing the action, or file the amended complaint prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, and such noncompliance mandated dismissal of the action under § 52-190a (c) when it was timely raised by the defendants; more- over, the plaintiffs were not entitled to amend their deficient complaint as of right under the rule articulated in Gonzales v. Langdon (161 Conn. App. 497), because the scope of that remedy was limited to curative efforts initiated prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations, allowing only for the amendment or substitution of an existing opinion letter, and the plaintiffs' amendment instead sought to introduce a new opinion letter; furthermore, this court d

The plaintiff police union sought to vacate an arbitration award in its favor issued in connection with the defendant city's alleged breach of a collec- tive bargaining agreement. Although the plaintiff had proposed a remedy for the violation of the agreement to include back pay and benefits, the arbitration panel did not include an award of damages. Initially, in a first memorandum of decision, the trial court determined that, although it could not vacate the arbitration award, the matter should be remanded to the arbitration panel for further proceedings because it appeared that the panel may have ignored important evidence in the record. Following a response and clarification from the panel, the trial court, in a second memorandum of decision, granted the plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitration award, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held that the trial court erred by granting the plaintiff's motion to vacate the arbitration award: in light of the trial court's conclusions in its first memorandum of decision, that the conclusion of the panel to deny an award of damages was neither inconsistent with the plain language of the parties' agreement nor was it inconsistent with logic and reason to deny payment for work not performed, and its determination that the panel did not violate clear public policy to warrant vacating the arbitra- tion award, the panel's award was a mutual, final and definite award and there was no basis for the court to remand the matter for further consideration of the evidence or the legal questions involved; accord- ingly, the court should have denied the plaintiff's motion to vacate in light of the conclusions set forth in its first memorandum of decision. Argued April 14—officially released September 14, 2021

The plaintiffs, D, M, J and G, who owned properties in Thompson that abutted property of the defendant R Co., sought, inter alia, to quiet title to a disputed portion of a road, which separated the property of J and G from R Co.'s property and which R Co. claimed was a public highway. Following a trial to the court, the trial court found in favor of the plaintiffs and the defendant town of Thompson on the quiet title claim. On appeal, R Co. claimed that the court erred in failing to find a mani- fested intent by the owner of the fee to dedicate the disputed portion of the road to public use. Held that the trial court did not err in determin- ing that there had been no implied dedication of the disputed portion as a public road: the court determined that the historical references on which R Co. relied, including the disputed portion's appearance in historical maps and its reference as a boundary in various deeds, did not compel the conclusion that an unidentified owner of the land under the road manifested an intent to dedicate the road for public use, and the court was not required to presume dedication as a matter of law, as evidence of prolonged use as a public highway was lacking; moreover, R Co.'s argument that the disputed portion was necessarily a public road because R Co.'s property otherwise would remain a landlocked parcel was without merit, as the determination of an easement by neces- sity would have required a distinct analysis from whether particular land had been dedicated to public use. Argued March 3, 2020—officially released September 14, 2021

The plaintiff, whose real property had been foreclosed on, brought an action against the defendant, a state marshal, alleging that the defendant stole, or allowed to be stolen, numerous items of the plaintiff's personal prop- erty when the defendant executed an order of ejectment at the property subsequent to the foreclosure. The plaintiff claimed that the defendant deprived him of certain of his constitutional rights and committed numer- ous violations of state law, including civil conspiracy and larceny. The defendant thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction and that he was entitled to judgment as a matter of law because no genuine issue of material fact existed. The trial court granted the defendant's motion, concluding, inter alia, that the defendant was entitled to sovereign immu- nity, which deprived the court of subject matter jurisdiction, and that the defendant was entitled to statutory immunity (§ 6-38a (b)) because there was no evidence of wanton, reckless or malicious conduct on his part. The court thereafter rendered judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held: 1. The trial court improperly concluded that the defendant was entitled to sovereign immunity, as state marshals are not state officials or public officials, and, thus, the doctrine of sovereign immunity is not available as a defense to an action against them for tortious conduct: the defendant's status as a state marshal is circumscribed by statute, as the legislature, following the abolition of the system of sheriffs by constitutional amend- ment and the passage of No. 99 of the 2000 Public Acts (P.A. 00-99), specifically designated state marshals as independent contractors who are compensated on a fee for service basis by agreement with an attor- ney, court or public agency, and who may not be a state marshal and a state employee at the same time, irrespective of the nature of the party that