Court Rulings

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant acupuncturist, W, and his employer, C Co., for injuries she suffered when a heat lamp used during an acupuncture treatment burned her left foot and toes due to W's alleged medical malpractice. The plaintiff attached to her complaint a good faith certificate from her attorney but did not attach a written and signed opinion letter from a similar health care provider. C Co. filed a motion to dismiss the action on the ground that the plaintiff failed to attach a written opinion letter from a similar health care pro- vider as required by statute (§ 52-190a). Thereafter, W joined C Co.'s motion to dismiss. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed a request to amend her complaint to attach an opinion letter that she indicated had existed at the time the complaint was originally filed but inadvertently was not attached. The plaintiff also objected to the motions to dismiss and claimed that the trial court had discretion to allow the amendment and to deny the motions to dismiss because the opinion letter existed at the time the action was commenced and was only inadvertently not attached to the original complaint. The trial court denied the motions to dismiss and overruled the objections to the plaintiff's request to amend. There- after, the court granted W's motion to implead H Co., the distributor of the heat lamp, as a third-party defendant. Subsequently, the plaintiff filed an amended complaint to allege a product liability claim against H Co. Following a trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff on the medical malpractice and product liability counts. Thereafter, the court granted W's and C Co.'s motions for permission to file a second motion for reconsideration of the denial of their motions to dismiss but denied the requested relief, denied H Co.'s motions for a directed verdict and to set aside the verdict, and rendered judgment in accordance with the verdict. On separate appeals brought to this c

The plaintiffs in this action are operators of businesses that collect and transport municipal solid waste. The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendants, a company that operates a landfill and the county that is a partial owner of the landfill, alleging violations of certain statutes regulating solid waste disposal and landfill operations. Upon a motion to dismiss filed by the defendants, the trial court dismissed the plaintiffs' claims based upon, inter alia, the plaintiffs' lack of standing and the court's determination that the statutes did not create a private right of action. The plaintiffs have appealed. Discerning no reversible error, we affirm the trial court's dismissal of the plaintiffs' claims.

The plaintiff, Jane Doe, appealed from a Superior Court judgment dismissing her complaint against the defendants, Brown University and two of its employees. In Superior Court, the plaintiff asserted claims under both the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (RICRA) and article 1, section 2 of the Rhode Island Constitution. On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the hearing justice erred in determining that her claims under RICRA were precluded by the prior dismissal of the plaintiff's federal Title IX claim. The plaintiff also argued that the hearing justice erred in holding that section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution does not grant the plaintiff a private right of action. The Supreme Court first held that the plaintiff's claims under RICRA were predicated upon the defendants' alleged violations of Title IX, which had already been litigated in federal court. Further, the Supreme Court stated that the resolution of that issue in federal court was essential to the judgment on the merits and, therefore, issue preclusion barred the plaintiff's claim in Superior Court. The Supreme Court also held that the plaintiff's claim that the defendants interfered with her contract with an educational institution was not actionable. Next, the Supreme Court examined the antidiscrimination clause contained in section 2 of article 1 of the Rhode Island Constitution and held that it was not self executing. Further, the Supreme Court held that principles of judicial restraint prevented the Court from creating a private right of action under these circumstances. Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court.

Generally at issue in this litigation is the propriety of a foreclosure. The trial court held that summary judgment should be entered in the appellee's favor due to, among other things, the appellant's lack of standing. The appellant's principal brief only raises issues connected to the trial court's determination on standing, although even these issues have now been disclaimed by the appellant on appeal. We therefore affirm the trial court's judgment.