Court Rulings

The Defendant-Appellant, Madaryl Hampton, was indicted by the Madison County Grand Jury with multiple counts of drug and weapon related offenses, all stemming from a single encounter with the Jackson Police Department (JPD). These counts were severed into two trials, one dealing with the drug related offenses and the other the weapon related offenses. In the first trial, the Defendant was convicted of two counts of simple possession of marijuana. In his second trial, the Defendant was convicted of four counts of being a felon in possession of a weapon. The trial court merged each of these counts and sentenced the Defendant as a Range II offender to twenty years' imprisonment for the weapon offenses to be served consecutively to eleven months and twenty-nine days' imprisonment for the possession of marijuana convictions. While the issues presented in this appeal as of right involve facts from the Defendant's first trial, the Defendant challenges only the felon in possession of a weapon convictions in arguing that: (1) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to admit evidence that the Defendant was in possession of marijuana, digital scales, and cash (2) the trial court committed plain error in allowing the State to comment on the credibility of the Defendant and the witnesses during closing arguments and (3) the evidence is insufficient to sustain the Defendant's convictions. Following our review, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.

Even if employees of auto dealership misrepresented that GAP agreement would provide coverage for total loss of truck—which they knew would be used for commercial purposes—this representation directly contradicted the express terms of commercial vehicle exclusion in the GAP agreement. Appellant cannot establish justifiable reliance, therefore, his claims for fraudulent inducement and negligent misrepresentation necessarily fail. Dismissal under Civ.R. 12(C) was properly granted.

This is an appeal from a divorce involving one minor child. In fashioning an initial parenting schedule, the trial court named the mother primary residential parent of the parties' minor child and entered a parenting plan awarding 242 days of parenting time to the mother and 123 days to the father. The father appealed. Because we conclude that the trial court's order regarding the residential parenting schedule does not contain sufficient findings of fact such that meaningful appellate review is possible, we vacate the order as to the parenting plan and remand for findings of fact and conclusions of law to facilitate appellate review.