Court Rulings

This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement executed between Ashley River Plantation, an assisted-living facility, and Thayer Arredondo, the attorney-in-fact under two powers of attorney executed by Hubert Whaley, a facility resident. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals held the arbitration agreement was enforceable. Arredondo v. SNH SE Ashley River Tenant, LLC, Op. No. 2019-UP-293 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Aug. 14, 2019). We reverse the court of appeals and hold neither power of attorney gave Arredondo the authority to sign the arbitration agreement.

Unemployment compensation unlawful, unreasonable or against the manifest weight of the evidence employment just cause R.C. 4141.01(B)(1) R.C. 4141.29 R.C. 4141.291

This appeal concerns the enforceability of an arbitration agreement executed between Ashley River Plantation, an assisted-living facility, and Thayer Arredondo, the attorney-in-fact under two powers of attorney executed by Hubert Whaley, a facility resident. In an unpublished opinion, the court of appeals held the arbitration agreement was enforceable. Arredondo v. SNH SE Ashley River Tenant, LLC, Op. No. 2019-UP-293 (S.C. Ct. App. filed Aug. 14, 2019). We reverse the court of appeals and hold neither power of attorney gave Arredondo the authority to sign the arbitration agreement.

In this declaratory judgment action, Nationwide relies on flight-from-law enforcement and felony step-down provisions in an automobile liability insurance policy to limit its coverage to the statutory mandatory minimum. Following a bench trial and after issuance of this Court's opinion in Williams v. Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO), 409 S.C. 586, 762 S.E.2d 705 (2014), the circuit court held the step-down provisions were void pursuant to Section 38-77-142(C) of the South Carolina Code (2015). The court of appeals reversed. We now reverse the court of appeals and hold that section 38-77-142(C) renders Nationwide's attempt to limit the contracted-for liability insurance to the mandatory minimum void.

The plaintiffs, the town of South Windsor and its zoning enforcement officer, sought injunctive relief and fines against the defendant, who operated a salvage business out of her residential property in the town. The plaintiffs alleged that the defendant violated the town's blight ordinance and zoning regulations in storing materials on her property that created a junkyard. Prior to the commencement of the action, the enforcement officer had issued several notices to the defendant, beginning in 2014, which alleged that the defendant that was in violation of the town's regulations. In December, 2016, a fire occurred at the property and, thereafter, an arson investigation commenced, which ultimately dis- proved a claim of arson. On February 24, 2017, the defendant was notified again that she was in violation of the blight ordinance, was directed to remove the debris, and was informed that she had the right to appeal. The defendant also received, concurrently, a cease and desist order identifying a zoning violation and she was directed to cease the deposi- tion of discarded material on the property. The notice further stated that she had the right to appeal and that should she fail to address the issues, the defendant would be subject to further statutory (§ 8-12) proceedings and penalties. The defendant did not appeal from either notice. The plaintiffs commenced an action in effort to compel the defendant to comply with the notices. The trial court determined that the defendant was operating a salvage business on her property in violation of the town's zoning regulations and the blight ordinance. The court also found that the defendant had wilfully violated the town's zoning regulations since at least February 24, 2017, the date of the cease and desist order, and imposed a fine pursuant to § 8-12 of $175 per day, running from February 24, 2017, to the date of the court's decision, for a total sum of $125,000, and the defendant appealed to this court. Held: 1. The defe

This appeal arises from a post-divorce Petition to Modify Child Support and Declare Child to be Severely Disabled. After an evidentiary hearing, the court determined the parties' daughter had a severe disability and ordered the father to continue paying child support beyond the age of 21. The father raises three issues on appeal: (1) Did the trial court err in determining that the parties' daughter had a severe disability (2) Did the trial court err in awarding child support beyond the age of 21 without making specific factual findings that the daughter was living under the care and supervision of the mother and it was in the daughter's best interest to remain in the mother's care and (3) Did the trial court err in determining the amount of child support the father owed? We find the preponderance of the evidence supports the trial court's determination that the daughter has a severe disability, and it is in the daughter's best interest to remain in her mother's care. As for the amount of the child support award, the father primarily argues the daughter is underemployed therefore, the court should have imputed additional income to her. We have determined that the trial court correctly identified and applied the relevant legal principles, the evidence supports the trial court's determination regarding the daughter's ability to earn income, and the award of child support is within the range of acceptable alternatives. Therefore, we affirm the trial court's decision in all respects

The plaintiffs, K Co., the owner of a certain fraternity house on the campus of Wesleyan University, the local chapter of the fraternity, and a member of the fraternity, sought, inter alia, injunctive relief and damages from the defendants, the university, its president, and its vice president for student affairs, in connection with the university's decision to preclude the fraternity from allowing its members to reside in the fraternity house. Following the university's announcement in 2014 that all residential fraternities on campus would be required to coeducate, and following a series of unsuccessful negotiations between the parties to establish a mutually agreeable coeducation plan, the university notified the plain- tiffs that fraternity members could no longer reside in or use the frater- nity house as of the 2015–2016 academic year. A Greek Organization Standards Agreement (agreement) between K Co. and the fraternity, on the one hand, and the university, on the other, which was a prerequisite to allowing the use of the fraternity house for residential purposes, permitted any party to terminate the relationship for any reason upon thirty days' notice and required the fraternity to comply with and be bound by all university rules and policies, which the university could amend or modify at any time. In their action against the defendants, the plaintiffs alleged promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with business expectancies, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Following a trial, the jury awarded K Co. damages. In addition, the trial court issued an injunction requiring that the university enter into a new agreement with K Co. and the fraternity, allow the housing of fraternity members in the fraternity house, and afford the fraternity three years in which to coeducate. Moreover, the trial court, pursuant to CUTPA, awarded the plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs. The defendants appealed, raisi

The plaintiffs, K Co., the owner of a certain fraternity house on the campus of Wesleyan University, the local chapter of the fraternity, and a member of the fraternity, sought, inter alia, injunctive relief and damages from the defendants, the university, its president, and its vice president for student affairs, in connection with the university's decision to preclude the fraternity from allowing its members to reside in the fraternity house. Following the university's announcement in 2014 that all residential fraternities on campus would be required to coeducate, and following a series of unsuccessful negotiations between the parties to establish a mutually agreeable coeducation plan, the university notified the plain- tiffs that fraternity members could no longer reside in or use the frater- nity house as of the 2015–2016 academic year. A Greek Organization Standards Agreement (agreement) between K Co. and the fraternity, on the one hand, and the university, on the other, which was a prerequisite to allowing the use of the fraternity house for residential purposes, permitted any party to terminate the relationship for any reason upon thirty days' notice and required the fraternity to comply with and be bound by all university rules and policies, which the university could amend or modify at any time. In their action against the defendants, the plaintiffs alleged promissory estoppel, negligent misrepresentation, tortious interference with business expectancies, and violations of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act (CUTPA). Following a trial, the jury awarded K Co. damages. In addition, the trial court issued an injunction requiring that the university enter into a new agreement with K Co. and the fraternity, allow the housing of fraternity members in the fraternity house, and afford the fraternity three years in which to coeducate. Moreover, the trial court, pursuant to CUTPA, awarded the plaintiffs attorney's fees and costs. The defendants appealed, raisi