Court Rulings

I concur fully with the conclusion reached by the majority that there was evidence to support the trial court's decision to revoke Defendant's probation and to order Defendant to serve the balance of his original sentence in incarceration. I write separately to affirm my belief expressed in my concurring opinion in State v. Craig Dagnan, No. M2020- 00152-CCA-R3-CD, 2021WL 289010, at 3 (Tenn. Crim. App. Jan. 28, 2021), perm. app. filed, that once a determination is made that a defendant has violated the conditions of his or her probation, neither an additional hearing nor any additional findings are statutorily mandated of a trial court to determine the manner in which the original sentence should be served. Thus, there is no opportunity for an abuse of discretion when a "second exercise of discretion" is not required by either sections 40-35-310 or 40-35-311 of Tennessee Code Annotated.

The Defendant, Kelly Lee Pitts, was convicted by a jury of seven counts each of attempted first degree murder and possessing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony. Thereafter, the trial court imposed an effective fifty-one-year sentence. On appeal, the Defendant contends that (1) there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions for attempted first degree murder, specifically, challenging the element of premeditation (2) the trial court erred by imposing partial consecutive sentencing based upon the dangerous offender criterion (3) and the trial court erred in imposing Class C felony convictions for employing a firearm during the commission of or attempt to commit a dangerous felony when he was convicted only of possessing such a firearm, a Class D felony.1 The State concedes that the sentences and judgments for employment of a firearm were in error, and we agree. In all other respects, we affirm. Accordingly, though we affirm the Defendant's convictions, we vacate and modify certain judgment forms and sentences consistent with this opinion. The case is remanded.

The plaintiff sought to recover damages from the defendant, T Co., for, inter alia, the alleged wrongful termination of her employment in violation of the statutory (§§ 3-94h and 53a-157b) public policy against making false statements with the intent to deceive or mislead. The plaintiff was employed by T Co. as a paralegal and reported to G, an attorney. G asked the plaintiff to prepare an affidavit stating something that the plaintiff alleged was not true regarding a litigation matter. The plaintiff drafted the affidavit but refused to notarize it because she knew it was false. G kept asking the plaintiff about the status of the affidavit and the plaintiff repeatedly stated that it was not filed because she would not sign it. T Co. terminated the plaintiff's employment approximately eight days after G first asked her to draft the affidavit. The defendant filed a motion to strike the count of the plaintiff's complaint alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy, arguing that she failed to allege sufficient facts to establish that T Co.'s conduct at issue contravened the public policy cited. The trial court granted T Co.'s motion to strike, and the plaintiff appealed to this court. Held that the trial court erred in granting T Co.'s motion to strike as to the count of the complaint alleging wrongful termination in violation of public policy, as the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded facts that, if proven, would fall under the public policy exception to the at-will employment doctrine; when read in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the alleged facts were sufficient to support a finding that the plaintiff's employment was termi- nated because she refused to assist T Co. in misleading the court and others involved in the subject litigation by notarizing the allegedly false affidavit, and both §§ 3-94h and 53a-157b outline a public policy against knowingly assisting an affiant in submitting false statements to a court. Argued October 19, 2020—officia