Court Rulings

This appeal involves review of a trial court's denial of the defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's lawsuit pursuant to the Tennessee Public Participation Act. The trial court determined that the Tennessee Public Participation Act was not applicable and denied the motion, finding that the defendant's activity was not protected. The defendant now appeals, contending that the underlying matter involves the exercise of her right to free speech and her right to petition. We agree and find that the defendant engaged in protected activity in the filing of a Title IX complaint. Because we find that the defendant's appeal is limited to that part of the trial court's judgment relating to the allegations in plaintiff's lawsuit concerning defendant's Title IX complaint, we reverse in part the trial court's cited basis for denial and remand for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion and the Tennessee Public Participation Act.

The respondent, Municipal Employees' Retirement System of Rhode Island, sought review of a decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court, awarding counsel fees and costs to the petitioner. The respondent claimed that the Workers' Compensation Court lacked specific statutory authority to award counsel fees in accidental disability retirement cases and that, if there were statutory authority to award fees, the petitioner did not submit an affidavit from a disinterested attorney to support the fee determination. The Supreme Court determined that there was nothing in the language contained in G.L. 1956 § 45-21.2-9 or in reference to G.L. 1956 § 28-35-20 that conferred to the Workers' Compensation Court statutory authority to award attorneys' fees in accidental disability retirement appeals. Accordingly, the Supreme Court quashed the decree of the Appellate Division of the Workers' Compensation Court.

Gwendolyn Jumper ("Employee") filed this action against Kellogg Company ("Employer"), seeking workers' compensation benefits for an injury to her back. Following a hearing, the Court of Workers' Compensation Claims denied Employee's claim for workers' compensation benefits. Employee has appealed. The appeal has been referred to the Special Workers' Compensation Appeals Panel for a hearing and a report of findings of fact and conclusions of law pursuant to Tennessee Supreme Court Rule 51. We affirm the judgment.

The defendants appealed from a judgment entered in the Superior Court after a jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, and from an order of the Superior Court denying their motion for a new trial. On appeal, the defendants contended that the trial justice erred in permitting consideration of prior oral agreements under the parol evidence rule, impermissibly allowed for enforcement of an illegal scheme, abused his discretion by admitting a recording they alleged was illegally made to impeach a witness's testimony, and erred in denying their motion for a new trial. The Supreme Court held that the trial justice did not err in denying the defendants' motion for a new trial because the trial justice performed a comprehensive review of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses before providing his grounds for denial. Additionally, the Court determined that the defendants failed to preserve their first two arguments, regarding parol evidence and illegality, which in any event lacked merit. The Supreme Court also upheld the trial justice's determination that an audio recording was admissible for impeachment and its late provision by the plaintiffs did not constitute a discovery violation. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the judgment and order of the Superior Court.

Appellant, a public employer, appeals from the trial court's denial of an application to vacate an arbitration award that sustained a grievance regarding a union member's employment termination. The arbitrator's interpretation of the relevant provision of the collective bargaining agreement was necessary to determine whether the termination was for just cause. Thus, the arbitrator did not exceed her authority by engaging in the contractual interpretation. Further, the arbitrator's factual conclusions were not a basis upon which the award could be vacated. Finally, the arbitration decision did not violate public policy. Judgment affirmed.

The trial court abused its discretion by omitting an express determination of whether the record comprised probative, reliable and substantial evidence in support of appellee's decision of July 2, 2020. Furthermore, as a matter of law, appellant put the real property identified in a zoning certificate issued by appellee to the purpose of operating a Class II composting facility by taking action to satisfy the associated legal and regulatory requirements. Judgment reversed and remanded.