Court Rulings

This appeal concerns a police officer's termination. Kodi Gail Knight ("Knight") was a police officer for the City of Fairview, Tennessee ("Fairview"). After an August 2019 incident in which Knight struck a handcuffed woman ("the Arrestee") in the face, Fairview police chief Zack Humphreys ("Chief Humphreys") submitted a request to City Manager Scott Collins ("the City Manager") that Knight be terminated. The City Manager sent Knight a termination letter. Knight requested, and was granted, a pre-dismissal hearing before the City Manager. Following this hearing, the City Manager affirmed the decision to terminate Knight. Knight filed a petition for writ of certiorari in the Chancery Court for Williamson County ("the Trial Court"). The Trial Court affirmed Fairview's termination of Knight. Knight appeals, arguing among other things that his procedural due process rights were violated because the City Manager both drafted his termination letter and presided over his pre-dismissal hearing. We find that Knight was an at-will employee who lacked a property interest entitling him to procedural due process protection. We also find that the City Manager's decision was supported by substantial and material evidence and was neither arbitrary nor capricious. We affirm the judgment of the Trial Court.

In this post-divorce action, the trial court awarded a judgment in the amount of $13,835.17 to the father, representing the mother's retroactive child support obligation. When calculating the mother's child support arrearage, the trial court declined to include the father's inheritance as income for child support calculation purposes because the father had used the majority of his inherited funds to pay private school tuition for the parties' two children. The court further awarded to the father attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $18,394.00 related to a previous child custody modification action. The mother has appealed. Discerning reversible error, we vacate the trial court's child support award and remand the child support issue to the trial court for further proceedings to determine whether a modification was warranted and if so, the appropriate amount of child support to be awarded pursuant to the Child Support Guidelines ("the Guidelines"). We also vacate the trial court's determination concerning civil contempt and remand that issue to the trial court as well.

The magistrate correctly found that R.C. 3309.01(B)(2) clearly and unambiguously defines employee membership in SERS retirement plan, and that the board properly applied R.C. 3309.01(B)(2) to the evidence in this case when it determined that Donna Eickholt was a public employee for the relevant time frame that she was entitled to service credit for those years and that Terra State was obligated to remit both the employer's and the employee's shares of contributions into SERS for such years. Objections overruled, magistrate's decision adopted as our own, and the requested writ of mandamus is denied.

The plaintiff filed an affidavit of illegal discriminatory practice with the defendant Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities, alleging that the defendant A Co. wrongfully terminated her employment. Follow- ing an assignment of the matter to the commission's Office of Public Hearings, a human rights referee granted A Co.'s motion for summary judgment, finding that there was no genuine issue of material fact. The plaintiff and the commission separately appealed the referee's decision granting the motion for summary judgment to the Superior Court. The plaintiff claimed that genuine issues of material fact existed. The trial court consolidated the appeals, sustained the consolidated appeal and remanded the matter for a trial before the Office of Public Hearings, concluding that the referee improperly rendered summary judgment because A Co. did not meet its burden of establishing that there were no genuine issues of material fact. On A Co.'s appeal to this court, held that the trial court properly sustained the consolidated appeal and remanded the matter for a hearing: the court properly considered the plaintiff's affidavit as competent evidence in opposition to A Co.'s motion for summary judgment as the plaintiff's affidavit of discriminatory prac- tice was sworn and was properly considered pursuant to the applicable rule of practice (§ 17-49); moreover, the court properly conducted a plenary review of the record in considering whether genuine issues of material fact existed, as the deferential standard used to review administrative fact-finding did not extend to the determination of whether genuine issues of material fact existed in the summary judgment context; furthermore, the court did not err in considering whether genu- ine issues of material fact existed, as the record contained contradictory information, including a sworn statement by an employee of A Co. that the plaintiff's job duties required her to be physically present at the workplace and the plaint